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Look at what's happening in Sweden

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Sociologisk Forskning

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CHRISTOFER EDLING & SARA ELDÉN

”Look at what’s happening in Sweden”

Swedish sociology on contemporary Sweden

You look at what’s happening last night in Sweden. Sweden, who would believe this?
(His Excellency Donald Trump, February 18, 2017)

WHEN A SMALL country with miniscule global influence occasionally make it onto the political agenda of world leaders it usually steers up feelings of pride and importance. The reference that the President of the United States of America made to Sweden in his speech on February 18, 2017, however, caused mostly confusion, and in the aftermath a mix of ridicule and irritation. As Petter Karlsson, in collaboration with some of Sweden’s best photographers, showed in visual eloquence in *Last Night in Sweden*, nothing particularly exciting or remarkable happened in Sweden on that ”last night”.

Despite the fact that the remark even in retrospect is nothing short of absurd, it has a sinister undertone that we choose as a point of departure for this special issue of *Sociologisk Forskning*. Set in another angle, the invitation to look at what’s happening in Sweden is not a bad one. What is actually happening in contemporary Sweden, if anything? Swedish society is changing and the Nordic welfare model is in transition, so there are obviously important questions to ask. But where would you go to find the answers? We claim that sociology is one excellent source of information for anyone seeking fact-based answers.

We sent invitations to contribute a short research note to a fairly large group of Swedish sociologists who pursue empirical research on contemporary Sweden. The invitation list was by no means exhaustive, but aimed for broad representation within a rather narrow focus on *empirical* and *contemporary Sweden*. The list of potential invitees is much longer than the one that we sent out. We specifically asked contributors to focus on empirical results and to refrain from writing ”theoretical extravaganza” and ”political pamphlets”. Regretfully the invitation confused some and muted others from whom we would really have liked to see a contribution. Overall however, the response was overwhelmingly positive and enthusiastic. For those who are not acquainted with Swedish sociology, it should be noted that the particular focus of this special issue excludes an array of excellent Swedish sociology.

It is our hope that this issue will give the reader an insight into some of the empirical realities of contemporary Sweden, and a selected glimpse of Swedish sociology at work. Because a lot is happening in Swedish sociology!

Christofer Edling och Sara Eldén

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GÖRAN THERBORN

The "People's home" is falling down, time to update your view of Sweden

Abstract

Swedish society is changing profoundly. The egalitarian, solidaristic "People's Home", which has attracted widespread progressive admiration internationally, is being eroded and dismantled. The political economy of this process, since the turn of the 1980s, is highlighted; a process which includes a major, if not complete, substitution of a capitalist market of social provision for a welfare state, and of a stock market-driven capitalism for a full employment work economy. Some of its direct inegalitarian consequences are indicated, as well as unintended ones of petty corruption, cronyism, and swindle. The socio-political dynamics of the turn is briefly outlined.

Keywords: outsourcing, neoliberalism, Swedish model

From public service to private profiteering

In 2017, a profound process of social change in Sweden, an almost forty years old process, has suddenly been highlighted by a chain of scandals.

The latest so far – by August 17th – concerns a corporation specializing in leasing physicians to public health care. Because of its shady financial practices, its accountants KPMG have refused to sign an audit for it and have left their job. The making of Swedish passports has been outsourced to a cosmopolitan firm, through two consecutive lucrative non-competitive contracts. Two entrepreneurial policemen of the Police Board, generously wined and dined by the firm, convinced one rightwing and one Social Democratic government, that "for security reasons" there should be no competitive bidding. Somewhat earlier this summer, another outsourced "security" issue blew up, forcing two cabinet ministers to resign. Under the previous rightwing government it had been decided to outsource the IT management of all the registers of the Transport Board to private business. First to a Swedish one, but in 2015 the Director paid IBM to do it, without demanding any security clearance, and IBM outsourced the data, many of them sensitive to Swedish defence, further to its Eastern European contacts. At about the same time, it came out that Swedish Social Insurance had paid out about \$800 million to fifteen mafia companies claiming to provide assistance to disabled people. Last winter and spring the Swedish public was informed of two thirty-somethings who

had swindled 130,000 pension savers before their company – whose board included the former CEO of Swedish Business and a former Social Democratic Minister of Justice (!) – was thrown out of the part-privatized pension system.

These cases all derive from the conception that private profiteering is always better than public service and provision, which therefore should be outsourced and marketized. They are just the tip of a huge iceberg. By 2014, a third of all patient health care visits went to a private provider, a fourth of all home care hours for elderly, and a fifth of special elderly housing were private business (Vårdföretagarna 2016:34f). In education a fifth of pre-school children are in private hands, 15 percent of primary school, and a 25 percent of secondary school children, according to *Skolverket* (National Board of Education) statistics, still a public service. Most of these private units are for profit, some of them taking their profits to international tax havens.

The new business of Sweden is business

”Sweden Heads The Best Countries For Business For 2017”, *Forbes* declared on 21.12.2016. Post-industrial capitalism, accumulating on stock, finance, and real estate markets took off in the second half of the 1980s.



Figure 1. Stockholm stock exchange turnover as percentage of GNP, 1963-2012. Source: Hedberg & Karlsson 2016:239.

The stock exchange value went from 12 percent of GNP in 1980 to 68 in 1989 and 128 in 2012, i.e., larger than in the leading "shareholder value" countries, USA and UK, at 115 and 123 percent in 2012 (Hedberg and Karlsson 2016:214). The soaring stock and

financial markets are behind the remarkably rapid rise of income inequality in Sweden noted by the OECD. In Greater Stockholm in 2010 the top decile was the only part of the population with a positive capital income, and the latter made up 32 percent of the declared income of the richest ten percent.¹ Measured by the Gini coefficient, wealth is now distributed in Sweden more unevenly than in USA, although the share of the top 1 percent is much larger in the US (Lundberg and Waldenström 2016:40).

Sweden's turn to stock exchange capitalism has been accompanied by an abandonment of full employment, once the pride of social democracy. During the oil crises of the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, Sweden belonged to a quintet of developed countries successfully keeping unemployment below five percent (at 2.8% on the average), Austria, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Full employment as the primary goal of economic policy was abandoned in 1990, and has remained secondary and unachieved ever since. The other four countries have been more successful, and joined by others.

How could it happen?

Two key processes: 1. A Social democratic turn to neoliberal economics in the 1980s: a competitive devaluation to raise business profits, de-regulation of the credit market, abolition of all capital controls, substituting inflation control for full employment as priority policy. 2. A rightwing government policy of 1991–94 and 2006–14 of turning social rights into a market for private business.

Enabling contexts, of political economy: General transnationalization, financialization, and de-industrialization of core capitalism, new type of economic crises in mid-70s and early 80s, international diffusion of neoliberal policies of de-regulation, sharp transatlantic rightwing political turns. Of sociology: weakening of industrial labour, middle class expansion, a post-1968 de-radicalized individualism.

Political skill and concentrated power: The Social Democratic turn to liberal economics was made by a small group of technocrats in the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank, whose influence grew with their seemingly successful overcoming the crisis situation in the early 1980s. With the new homemade crisis from their deregulations they were thrown out of power, together with the whole party. But the liberal current in Social Democracy survived, and back in office from 1994 they maintained the rightwing opening up for private welfare business. However liberal, they have respected the party links to the unions, the leading one of which organizes the workers of the export industry and has always had an ear for liberal economics,

The architects of the successful bourgeois coalition governments of 2006–14, also a tiny coterie, operated in a similar manner, also skillful at crisis management. The major party, the "New Moderates", turned Blairism upside down, and vaunted their respect of union rights. The tax cuts were smartly finessed, the abolition of taxes on property, wealth, and inheritance was accompanied by income tax cuts for the employed working-class. The new social divisions created by the privatization of education

1 Calculations for my study by Simone Scarpa from Statistics Sweden household income data.

and care were blurred by being paid for by vouchers from taxes. In the public debate so far, the liberal slogan of "freedom of choice" has been at least as popular as the leftwing "no profits on welfare".

Effects: Inequality and social corrosion

The income equalization of 1968–80 has been wiped out, and Sweden is now a mediocre European country of income distribution, but with an extraordinary of inequality of wealth. Welfare capitalism has opened up new channels to private enrichment. Its effects on service provision are unclear and controversial. The effects on health and social care, appear too uncertain to call (Hartman 2011). School performance has declined since 2000, the gap between socially advantaged and disadvantaged pupils has increased, and is wider than the OECD average. Taking their social background into account, public school students perform better than private (OECD 2016).

A major effect is illustrated by the scandal cases mentioned above. A corrosion of the social, the civic, and the professional, through the strong incentives to monetary instrumentalization, to corruption and to cronyism. The social formation of modern Sweden, People's Sweden, of independent farmers, organized workers, and public service professions is up for sale.

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Work in Sweden 1974–2010

Work-life inequality at the intersection of class and gender

Abstract

This article traces work-life evolution in Sweden during recent decades against the backdrop of long-run structural change tied to class and gender. We examine the development of four key labor market features: (a) occupational sex segregation, (b) gender gaps in job quality, (c) skill upgrading and mismatch, and (d) youth employment. While occupational and educational upgrading is beneficial for most people, some groups face waning work-life prospects. Maintaining social inclusion is the great challenge for the future.

Keywords: work, class, gender

Long-run change in working life: A tale of two trends

Two secular trends tied to social class and gender are driving the development of labor markets in economically advanced countries: on the job side, a rise in skill requirements (class) and a shift from manufacturing to service (gender); on the individual side, educational expansion (class) and rising female labor force participation (gender). These trends are highly consequential for the nature of job tasks and for work-life inequality.¹

Rising skill requirements are beneficial in many ways, but might at the same time spell trouble for youth, immigrants and the low-educated. The rise of services might also have positive consequences, although more uncertain than those tied to job upgrading; possible advantages are likely greater for women than for men due to a gendered patterning of the job structure, with manufacturing dominated by males and service work by females.

These structural changes are of course not limited to Sweden. Similar trends are unfolding in many other economically advanced countries, albeit with different pace and emphasis depending on specific institutional traits. Sweden, as well as its Nordic neighbors, has a higher average skill level of jobs than most other countries in Europe.

1 On the links between class and skill, see le Grand & Tåhlin (2013). Another important trend in Sweden and many other western countries is a rising immigrant share in the population. Temporary frictions aside, however, and in contrast to class and gender, individuals' migration background is not systematically related to the structure of jobs and labor markets.

The service sector, especially welfare services, is also relatively large in Sweden. In other respects, working conditions in Sweden are not much different from those in comparable countries, e.g. concerning physical demands and work intensity.²

The empirical analyses in this article are based on data from the *Swedish Level of Living Surveys* (LNU), carried out six times since 1968; the results reported below cover the period from 1974 to 2010.

Empirical findings

Upgraded class structure, declining sex segregation

The labor market's job structure has changed considerably between the 1970s and 2010 concerning both social class and gender. Differences in class position between women and men have clearly diminished, although there is still a gender gap in authority (managerial jobs). While the degree of occupational sex segregation is still high, it has fallen markedly in recent decades, partly due to the long-term upgrading of the class structure. Professional jobs not only have relatively good working conditions, but also a fairly equal sex composition. As the professional share of all jobs grows, overall occupational sex segregation in the labor market thus tends to fall. However, another consequence of upgrading is a stagnation of the gender wage gap: wage differences between women and men tend to be larger at higher than at lower class levels (for Sweden, see e.g. Boye et al. 2017).

Improving job quality – but rising job strain

Educational requirements of jobs have increased among both women and men. The trend is significantly stronger for women, who (on average) passed men in the skill hierarchy between 2000 and 2010. This labor market shift reflects the reversal of the sex gap in education that occurred in many countries around the turn of the century. Physical job demands, in contrast, have not changed much; hardly at all among men and rising slightly among women, with no sex difference remaining. The largest male-female difference in job quality is in job strain (the combination of high mental demands and limited autonomy; see Karasek & Theorell 1990). Job strain has increased considerably over the period, especially among women. This is partly a consequence of service sector expansion, but most of the rise in strain has taken place within jobs, primarily in welfare services such as care work and education.

Educational requirements, physical demands and job strain can be combined into an overall measure of job quality. By this measure, women's conditions have improved slightly and men's marginally since the 1970s. In 2010, the gender gap in general job quality was very small.

2 Source: Data from the European Social Survey and Eurofound, the latter reported in Green et al. (2013).

Rising over-education

An important aspect of people's working life is how well the individual's education is matched with the skill requirements of her/his job. This match is important since the association between years of education and earnings is strongly dependent on the length of education required for the job. Education corresponding to the job's requirements has much larger economic returns than education that exceeds the job requirements (for Sweden, see e.g. Korpi & Tählin 2009).

In Sweden, as in many other countries, individuals' education is clearly longer than the educational requirements of the job that individuals hold. This imbalance has increased over time. In the mid-1970s, a large majority of all employees were matched in terms of length of education. Since then, their share has continuously decreased and in 2010, it comprised only about four out of ten employees. This decline corresponds to a sharp rise in the proportion of over-educated, which in 2010 was more than half of all employees. The under-educated (i.e., less schooling than required for the job) have accounted for approximately one tenth of all wage earners throughout this period, with a slowly falling trend.

A common notion is that the character of the job has become more dependent on the characteristics of the person who holds the job. However, contrary to what could be expected if work requirements had become more difficult to define and more flexible, the economic importance of a good match between the workers' education and the requirements of her/his job, as reflected in the difference in wage premium between those with a matched education and those being over-educated, has grown in recent decades. Thus, the increase in the number of over-educated seems to be a real problem.

Youth employment decline

An important consequence of over-education is that it may raise hurdles to work-life entry. If highly educated individuals find it harder to get skilled jobs, they will look further down in the job hierarchy and compete with lower educated individuals. Such a downward movement ('bumping down') may lead to low-skilled individuals – as well as workers with limited experience, such as young people and newly arrived immigrants – becoming unemployed.

Young people have met with increased problems to establish themselves in the labor market. This trend started already in the 1980s but gathered speed after the economic crisis in Sweden during the first half of the 1990s, and has continued thereafter. The proportion of young people who neither work nor study (NEETs; Not in Employment, Education or Training) has clearly increased, while the share of students has increased even more. However, for many young people, to study is a second-best option: if the sharp increase in the proportion of students mainly reflected young people's free choice, youth wages would be expected to have risen, but have instead fallen. Thus, demand for young workers has likely decreased. An important reason for the increased difficulty of young people in the labour market is a shortage of entry-level jobs, i.e. jobs with low requirements for prior skill and experience. Although there are still many low-skill jobs, they are increasingly held by relatively well-educated persons unable to

get a job at their own skill level. Increased over-education is therefore likely to lead to more severe competition for low-skilled jobs.

Implications for the future

Occupational and educational upgrading in recent decades have increased human welfare in many ways. The positive results are distributed in a highly uneven way, however. While most people appear to benefit from new opportunities for a richer (in several senses) life, others have difficulties adapting to changing demands. If educational expansion and job upgrading continue to raise requirements for work-life participation, divergences in living conditions will likely keep increasing. Making working life larger and more inclusive – especially in its initial phase, i.e. for young people and the foreign-born – is a major challenge for the future.

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Forestry and the environment

Tensions in a transforming modernity

Abstract

Sweden is often described as an environmental forerunner and one of the most ecologically modernized countries in the world, one where social welfare, economic growth and environmental protection mutually support each other. Examining the case of Swedish forestry, we discuss a number of tensions in this sector that mirror some general tensions in Swedish society and explore how these tensions can be understood as part of a transforming modernity.

Keywords: ecological modernization; second modernity; Swedish forestry

SWEDEN IS WIDELY considered a forerunner in environmental policy and one of the most ecologically modernized countries in the world. It is also commonly described as the epitome of the Scandinavian welfare model, with a long tradition of cooperation between state and market. Swedish politics is also seen as dominated by consensus between different interests. However, whereas some scholars characterize Sweden as a society where economic growth, social welfare and environmental protection mutually support each other, others claim that this is a rosy picture that says more about national self-image than empirical realities (Lidskog and Elander 2012). Even if Sweden has contributed to and adopted the global discourse of sustainability it is a country with increasing economic cleavages, problems with social and economic exclusion, and an ecological footprint that is globally unsustainable. Drawing on the case of Swedish forestry, this paper discusses six tensions in the forest sector, which mirror some general tensions in Swedish society.

Trees and tensions

Industrial forestry has been fundamental to the making of modern Sweden. About half of Sweden is covered with productive forest, and the forest sector is still important for employment and export (accounting for 11 percent of the total goods exported). It is likely that forestry's economic importance will increase in a future fossil-free society. In recent decades, environmental, social and cultural forest values have been subject to in-

creasing stress. The importance of the forest for reducing greenhouse gases and protecting biodiversity has been particularly emphasized. For these reasons, Swedish forest policy hosts multiple and often contradictory goals (cf. Beland Lindahl et al. 2016). The tensions that stem from this are many, and we will here broadly summarize six of them, namely tensions between (i) deregulation and reregulation; (ii) public and private interests; (iii) disembedding and local anchoring; (iv) economic growth and environmental protection; (v) short and long-term perspectives; and (vi) certainty and risk.

First, having originally been characterized by strong state involvement, the forest sector was deregulated in the early 1990s. The new policy is often summarized by the phrase "freedom with responsibility." Legislation has been made less strict and the responsibility for balancing production with environmental, social and other values has been shifted onto private actors (Löfmarck et al. 2017). Simultaneously, Sweden's membership in the European Union means increased mandatory environmental regulation. Two parallel regulatory frameworks now exist, and a number of controversies have emerged, e.g. concerning how to interpret and implement the EU's Birds and Habitats directives (Uggla et al. 2016).

The second tension – between forestry as a private and public interest – relates to the first. Half of the Swedish forest is owned by small-scale private owners, a quarter is owned by larger companies/corporations, and the rest is publicly owned. At the same time, the Swedish forests are seen as a national resource with multiple values of public interest. This means that, in accordance with the principle of "freedom with responsibility", forest owners are obligated to take measures to protect the forest's multiple values, circumscribing their right of ownership.

Third, the Swedish forest is simultaneously locally anchored and subject to disembedding processes such as globalization and urbanization. As a natural resource, the forest is place bound and still domestically owned. However, both the processing industry and the forest owners are increasingly mobile, the former looking for lower production costs overseas and the latter relocating from rural to urban areas, thereby losing their local connection and/or practice-based knowledge.

The fourth tension concerns environmental protection and economic growth. The current debate about the future role of Swedish forestry is increasingly polarized, particularly along the lines stated here. In particular, globally adopted sustainability goals, such as those established in the Paris agreement (2015) on climate change mitigation, and goals on biodiversity protection, heighten this tension. According to Swedish forest policy, equal priority should be given to production and environmental protection, but little guidance is given on how to accomplish this in practice.

Fifth, there is a general tension in forestry between short and long-term perspectives. One manifestation of this temporal aspect is the long rotation period of trees (in Sweden often 60 to 80 years), which does not sit well with a society characterized by both economic and social acceleration. Another manifestation is the mismatch between current conditions for replantation and the implications of future climate change; it is difficult to adapt to a predicted warmer climate because trees suited for such a climate might not grow well today (cf. Lidskog and Sjödin 2014).

Finally, there is a tension between certainty and risk. A risky future, both in terms of climate and economy, requires reflexivity and adjustment. At the same time, traditional ways of doing things generally seem to provide humans with a sense of security. New risks call for new approaches, but the forest sector is characterized by a considerable amount of inertia, with the standard forestry practices resting on historically accumulated experience and deeply rooted norms.

A transforming modernity

Looking for a common denominator, we contend that the tensions discussed in this paper can partly be understood as an expression of a transforming modernity (Beck and Lau 2005). The first modernity that shaped Swedish forestry was characterized by a logic of dichotomous differentiation (either/or), which drew boundaries between groups (us *or* them), objects (nature *or* society, private *or* public) and activities (production *or* environmental protection). Within this logic, aspects such as power and responsibility were fairly easy to allocate. In contrast, second modernity is characterized by profound uncertainty and the insight that things often are ambiguous and multifaceted (both/and). At the same time as new ways have developed for dealing with ambiguity and uncertainty as permanent conditions, the institutions and logics of first modernity still exist and are continuously applied to new challenges. To conclude we discuss how two examples of the above-mentioned tensions in Swedish forestry can be understood as parts of a transforming modernity.

First, in the logic of first modernity, monopolization is a chief strategy for the state to counteract ambiguity and achieve standardization by legal means (Beck and Lau 2005). "Freedom with responsibility" clearly represents a different strategy (transferring responsibility from politics to private actors), but it coexists with monopolization in the form of mandatory EU environmental directives. These parallel regulatory systems based on different logics entail a situation in which forest consultants and forest owners alike are caught between "freedom with responsibility" and mandatory environmental legislation.

Second, in the logic of first modernity, marginalization means that deviations from the norm are treated as residuals that sooner or later will vanish and leave room for normality (Beck and Lau 2005). The standard practice of industrial forestry is still very uniform, with alternative management regimes at best being seen as interesting curiosities. At the same time, the giving of equal priority to production and environmental goals in forest policy can be seen as a "plural compromise", a strategy typical of second modernity, which consists of forming compromises between fundamentally contradictory principles.

As the case of Swedish forestry suggests, there is no clear break between the logics of first and second modernity. Instead policies and regulations based on different logics co-exist within this field. The tensions described above are not unique to the forest sector, even though their scope and magnitude may differ in other sectors. As societies try to respond to the various challenges, tensions will emerge not only between diverging values and interests, but also between the logics of either/or and both/and.

Sweden's ambition to be an ecological forerunner makes it of great interest to see how the country will handle these tensions in the future.

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KENNETH NELSON

Lower unemployment benefits and old-age pensions is a major setback in social policy

Abstract

The Swedish welfare state has been subject to a substantial re-organization in recent decades, not always recognized in the international literature. Almost every area of social policy have changed, often in the downward direction and with potential far-reaching consequences for the social sustainability of the Swedish welfare state. In this research note, I discuss significant changes to Swedish social policy and place the reorganization of the Swedish welfare state in an international perspective. Focus is on old-age pensions and unemployment benefits. Both areas are characterized by significant changes.

Keywords: social policy, cutbacks, welfare state

THE SWEDISH WELFARE state has attracted considerable attention in the social policy literature. In contemporary sociology and related social sciences, Sweden is often considered an archetypical case of a social democratic welfare state regime, where all (or nearly all) citizens receive high degrees of social protection through state legislated programs (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This social democratic model is often contrasted against the liberal welfare state regime, which by comparison places stronger emphasis on market-based provisions. Recent decades have presented new challenges to the Swedish welfare state and with far-reaching consequences for the organization of social policy. Both the provision of cash benefits and services have changed. Whereas cash benefits in many instances have been subject to cutbacks, elements of new public management, marketization and reforms to strengthen user choice characterize many service areas (Fritzell et al., 2013). This nearly complete overhaul of the Swedish welfare state is not fully recognized internationally.

In this research note, I discuss changes to Swedish social policy and place the reorganization of the Swedish welfare state in an international perspective. Is Sweden moving away from the social democratic welfare state regime? It is not possible to provide a comprehensive analysis of all changes that have been introduced to the Swedish welfare state. Due to the prominence of cash benefits for the pooling of risks

and resources that traditionally have characterized Swedish social policy, focus is on income replacement in areas of old age and unemployment. Developments in both these areas have been exceptional and to some extent symbolize the metamorphosis of the Swedish welfare state. Most of the empirical evidence presented below comes from research carried out by sociologists in the Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI) at Stockholm University. At SOFI, considerable efforts have been devoted to analyze the role of distributional conflict for the development of social citizenship – broadly interpreted as bundles of specific rights and duties associated with the expansion of welfare states in the post-World War II period. This includes the development of new research infrastructures to facilitate comparative analyses and to reorient the empirical study of welfare state development from crude measurements of aggregate social expenditures to more refined institutional analyses on the actual content of social policy (Ferrarini et al., 2013).

Changing social policy

For much of the post-war period, Sweden has been at the top of the equality league. However, similar to many other countries, Sweden has experienced major challenges in the most recent decades, in part caused by increased fiscal constraints, a return of mass-unemployment and demographic developments, such as aging populations and refugee immigration. In this period, income differences in Sweden widened and social policies have in many instances been scaled back or substantially reorganized (Bäckman and Nelson, 2017).

To illustrate some of these changes to social policy, Figure 1 shows net replacement rates in old age pensions and unemployment insurance for the period 1990–2015. In order to situate Sweden in an international perspective, for each program I also show averages for 17 longstanding OECD countries. All this data is from the Social Policy Indicators Database (SPIN), www.sofi.su.se/spin. Replacement rates reflect the extent to which normal living standards are protected through legislated rights to economic compensation. They are calculated by relating the net benefit (after taxes and social security contributions) of a typical type-case to the net wage of the same household type. Benefits reflect those provided to a production worker earning average wages and for ease of presentation the type-case is assumed to be single without children. For each program, entitlements are expressed as percentages of an average production worker's net wage.

In the mid-1990s Sweden introduced a new multi-tiered pension system with a funded component. This new pension system introduced elements of individual risk-taking and linked parts of pension entitlements to macro-economic developments. For example, it is mandatory for all citizens to invest the funded component on the stock market. The new income pension may also automatically be reduced during economic downturns. It was generally assumed that this measure of economic stabilization in the pension system would never be used, but it has already lowered benefits twice since the most recent global financial crisis beginning in 2007/2008. Since




Figure 1. Net replacement rates in old-age pensions and unemployment insurance in Sweden and 17 OECD countries (average), 1990–2010. Source: The Social Policy Indicators Database (SPIN).

1990, when replacement rates in most social insurance programs peaked in Sweden, pension entitlements have declined substantially. In 2015, the net replacement rate of the Swedish old-age pension was down by about 40 percent from its levels in 1990. Notably, income replacement in the Swedish old-age pension is nowadays even below that of many other OECD countries.

Unemployment benefits have also undergone substantial changes in Sweden. Cutbacks to unemployment insurance were introduced during the deep economic recession in the first half of the 1990s, including a reduction of the formal rates of income replacement and non-decisions to avoid updating of income ceilings for benefit purposes to wage increases. This downsizing of social protection continued well into the 2000s, not least as part of government policy-packages to increase work incentives by the introduction of an earned income tax credit for those in gainful employment. At average wage levels, unemployment insurance replacement rates declined by more than a third in Sweden between 1990 and 2010. For higher wage earners replacement rates have deteriorated even faster. Relative to the development of wages, the maximum unemployment benefit was halved during this period (Ferrarini et al., 2012). Notably, these developments made the Swedish system of unemployment benefits less generous, also by international standards. However, it should be noted that income replacement in the Swedish unemployment insurance program were somewhat restored in 2015 when the income ceiling for benefit purposes was raised.

Besides these changes to income replacement in unemployment insurance, also eligibility criteria and financing have been modified, often restricting access to social insurance. According to estimates from the Swedish government, the share of the unemployed eligible for earnings-related unemployment benefits has declined substantially in Sweden, from 80 percent in the beginning of the 2000s to about 40 percent in the mid-2010s. Meanwhile, the number of beneficiaries and expenditure of social assistance have increased. Against the backdrop of cutbacks in the public programs, occupational and private insurances against losses in work income – which previously was almost absent in Sweden – have become more prominent. Figures from the OECD show that private social expenditure as a percentage of GDP more than tripled over the last three decades in Sweden. The corresponding increase in public social expenditure was only about 10 percent.

Concluding discussion

Due to the changes introduced in major cash benefit programs, Sweden has dropped in international rankings of welfare state generosity. Compared to its equal peers (i.e. longstanding OECD countries), Sweden occupied the top positions considering both unemployment and pension net replacement rates in 1990. Two decades later, in 2010, replacement rates in unemployment and old age pensions in Sweden were substantially lower. Whether Sweden still can be described as the archetype of a social democratic welfare state regime is questionable. In areas of central relevance for the pooling of risks and resources in the welfare state, Sweden has moved much closer to the liberal regime than what is commonly recognized in the literature.

In the short-term, changes to Swedish social policy may increase inequalities. To some extent, developments in this direction can already be observed. According to the OECD, income inequality has grown more in the Sweden than in most other rich countries, albeit from a low starting level. Not all of this increase in income inequality can be attributed changes to social policy. Nonetheless, the two trends in benefits and incomes raise concern. In the long-term, substantially eroded social benefits may impact negatively on the possibilities to encourage cross-class alliances in defence of a large welfare state, thus threatening the social sustainability of publicly provided social protection. This implies that it may prove very difficult in the future to restore the system and move the Swedish welfare state closer to its social democratic origin.

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Swedish cities now belong to the most segregated in Europe

Abstract

This article presents our research on contemporary urban developments in major Swedish cities. First, we present an analysis of new forms of urban governance in major cities, particularly focusing on inner city developments. Second, we present research on the transformation of housing policies and the so-called Million Program. Third, we highlight new conflicts that have emerged as consequences of these developments, including urban collective action.

Keywords: segregation, entrepreneurialism, urban movements

IN AN URBAN context, the transformation of the Swedish welfare state has involved a roll-back of the urban and housing policies that constituted cornerstones in the construction of the post-war welfare state. This process can perhaps best be defined as a neoliberal re-engineering of the welfare state, in which de-regulation of urban policies has been combined with re-regulation to support market mechanisms (Thörn and Larsson, 2012). This article brings out two defining logics of this re-engineering: marketization, that combines principles of de-regulation and re-regulation to support privatization of land and housing; and entrepreneurialism, new forms of public and private partnerships that govern urban development (Franzén, Hertting and Thörn 2016). Further, we highlight the consequences of these changes in the shape of deepened spatialized social inequalities in Swedish cities; and recent collective action that have emerged as a response to these developments.

The shift to entrepreneurial governance in Swedish cities

During the past decades major cities in Sweden have been transformed through entrepreneurial governance, introduced as an answer to the crisis of Fordism and the decline of the industrial city (Franzén, Hertting and Thörn 2016). As a strategy to transform and adjust the urban landscape to the demands of global capitalism entrepreneurialism is recurrent around the world, with context-specific variations. Therefore, entrepreneurialism plays out differently in former industrial cities such as Gothenburg than it does in Stockholm or Umeå. Here however, we focus on a few characteristics common to the Swedish articulation or entrepreneurial governance.

Entrepreneurial governance is a strategy launched in the context of global competition between cities, in order to make the city economically attractive to investors, tourists and new, wealthy inhabitants. It is focused on creating a sellable image of the city; therefore enhancing the brand of the city becomes essential, with investments in high-profile events, icon buildings and consumption districts. Further, entrepreneurialism takes the shape of private-public partnerships that combines public and political power with private and economic power. A distinctive feature for these partnerships is the creation of municipal development companies that can take a leading role in initiating, designing and executing urban renewal programs in close cooperation with real-estate owners. Working outside of the formal planning structures the companies have the capacity of speeding up the planning process and give the private investors a high degree of influence at the cost of public transparency. Further, these partnerships tend to foster a consensual vision of urban development that tones down political differences and conflicts. In contrast to former co-operation between the political and economic elite in Sweden, entrepreneurial governance shifts the priorities of local politics – from provision of general welfare to more proactive development strategies to encourage economic growth. Therefore these new partnerships form the basis for a form of neoliberal engineering where the local state facilitates the private exploitation and gentrification of urban land (Thörn & Holgersson 2016). As an embedded strategy of entrepreneurialism, gentrification feeds an uneven development where some urban areas are viewed as financial assets and others are left to decline. What we see today in several Swedish cities is therefore a highly selective re-making of parts of the city for upper and middle class consumption (in housing as well as upgraded shopping areas) and displacement of poor people that increases social segregation in cities.

The transformation of the Million Program

With the abolishment of the Ministry of Housing in 1991, a fundamental roll-back of the welfare era's urban reforms was initiated, accompanied by re-regulations supporting privatization and marketization of the public housing sector. Supported by new legislation, a significant share of the previously non-profit municipal housing companies have been privatized; and the housing stock remaining in public ownership is longer allowed to be non-profit (Hedin et al 2012). This has resulted in an increase in the number of evictions from municipal housing; and of the number of homeless (Sernhede et al 2016). Partly as a result of the abolishment of subsidies to investment in rental housing, a decline in production has led to overcrowded housing and a serious housing shortage. These developments have struck particularly hard on the inhabitants of the so-called Million Program – an affordable housing scheme created between 1965 and 1975. In addition, partly as an effect of systematic disinvestment, the Million Program has become in urgent need of renovation, which has come with "upgrades" and rent increases of up to 80 percent, something which has laid the ground for the most recent phase of gentrification through "renoviction". In addition, these areas are the ones most severely hit by cutbacks in the public sector. For example, a combination of cutbacks and a

free-school reform has contributed to school segregation along class- and racialized lines; and to Swedish pupils' school performance dropping from the top to the bottom of OECD ranking. In many of these suburbs, fewer than 50 percent make it to upper secondary school (Sernhede et al 2016). Taken together, re-regulated housing policies and other neoliberal reforms have caused deepening spatialized social inequalities in Swedish big cities; they today belong to the most segregated in Europe. For example, more than 40 percent of young people between 20 and 25 in the poor suburbs neither study nor work; more than 50 percent of children in the poorest neighborhoods in the Metropolitan districts grow up in poverty.

Urban conflict and collective action

The contradictions and tensions produced by the developments recounted for above have in some cases developed into conflict, protest and collective action. During the past decade, the Swedish population has become familiar with media images of burning cars, illustrating clashes between police and youth that have more or less regularly occurred in Swedish poor suburbs. In May 2013, such images were disseminated across the world as international news channels reported live from the poor suburb Husby in Stockholm where protest against a fatal police shooting of a man of immigrant background developed into a major urban uprising, spreading to other poor Stockholm suburbs and to eight smaller cities (Sernhede et al 2016). Beyond such spontaneous clashes, organized collective action in the shape of a new urban social movement has recently emerged, primarily based in the poor suburbs, basically with two major demands on its agenda: a restoration of the poor suburbs in light of roll-back of public services, and the systematic disinvestments in housing (Sernhede, Thörn and Thörn 2016); and demands for affordable housing in light of privatization and renovation with dramatic rent increases. In connection with this, demands have also been made on municipal housing companies to facilitate cohousing and cooperative self-government as a new form of affordable housing (Scheller and Thörn, forthcoming).

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Female same-sex couples act long-term financially rational?¹

Abstract

One of the challenges faced by research on the gendered transition to parenthood is how to dismantle the interconnected nature of biology, gender and economic reasoning. We contribute to this aim by comparing division of parental leave in different-sex couples (DSC) and female same-sex couples (SSC). Motherhood identity formation appears to be strong in DSC as well as SSC. Net of this, gender is an important predictor of parental leave in DSC. To some extent, SSC seem to divide the leave in a more long-term financially rational way than DSC do.

Keywords: gender, parental leave, same-sex couple

ALTHOUGH GENDER EQUALITY in paid and unpaid work has increased in Western societies, the trend has slowed in the most recent decades. Men's unpaid work has not increased to the extent that could be expected, and the gender wage gap has been resistant to change after the stabilization of women's labour force participation (e.g., Boye & Evertsson 2014; Boye, Halldén & Magnusson 2017). Researchers have argued that the gendered division of paid and unpaid work that is established when couples become parents is the most important reason for lasting inequalities in the labour market, including the gender wage gap and gender unequal access to authority positions (for an overview, see Evertsson & Boye 2016). A question that has challenged researcher is why the gendered division of care work and labour market work remains, despite its consequences for women's careers and its presumed (negative) impact on men's relationships with their children. Research on the topic has been abundant but even so, the theoretical drivers of the process have remained elusive. Part of the reason for this is that in most couples, a person's gender is inseparable from biological sex and from determinants of who carries the child, gives birth and (if at all) breastfeeds the baby. In addition, income and occupational prestige correlates with gender. Comparative advantage in the household and in the labor market is inevitably linked to gender, making it difficult to separate financially rational decision making from gender

1 The descriptive statistics referred to are part of a more comprehensive empirical and theoretical analysis in a manuscript under review at the European Sociological Review (in November 2017).

norms and expectations in different-sex couples. One potential way around the fact that it is impossible to vary the gender of the parents in a couple in order to discriminate between theories on gender, specialization and relative resources, is to compare different-sex couples (DSC) to same-sex couples (SSC). Focusing on the transition to parenthood in female SSC and DSC while holding observables constant, we study the division of care (i.e. parental leave) in couples with comparable labor market income, education and age, thereby getting closer to netting out gender.

Why is the transition to parenthood (still) gendered?

The transition to parenthood is framed by institutional context, norms and expectations. As an example, the degree to which mothers return to the job that they had before the birth of the child, or quit work, varies with social policies and gender culture (Aisenbrey, Evertsson & Grunow 2009). According to current discourses on parenthood, the fact that the (birth) mother is the parent who has carried the child during pregnancy and – in most cases – breastfeeds the child, creates a special bond between the mother and child (e.g. Grunow & Evertsson 2016). This discourse shapes birth mothers' identity formation and has important implications for what parents consider to be in the best interest of the child. Linked to this, societal norms and ideals with regard to the 'good' mother and father shape the degree to which the mother and her partner will spend time away from paid work to care for the small child. Money also matters and one important reason why many couples divide care and paid work unequally is that it is financially rational for the family. In DSC, men on average earn more than women do and fathers' labour market prospects often are better than mothers' are. Consequently, it is rational – at least in the short-term perspective – for the person earning the most to invest mainly in paid work and the person earning the least to invest mainly in unpaid work and care (cf. Becker 1981). Although this is what theory and earlier research on DSC indicate, shifting the perspective to SSC puts these results on their head.

Financially irrational or long-term rational same-sex parents?

Based on Swedish population register data, we study parental leave uptake in couples in which the birth mother, aged 20–49, had her first child within a SSC or DSC in the period 2003–2011. Focusing on those with a clear link to the labour market, both partners' income the year before first birth is at least SEK 80 000 (converted to 2012 years' value, close to 8 500 EUR in 2017 currency rates).²

2 Among SSC, we can identify couples who are in a registered partnership or married. Among DSC, we can also identify parental couples who never married during the period. We include couples who entered cohabitation/marriage before the birth of the first child, during the birth year or the year after the child's birth.

Table 1. Characteristics of the partners in DSC and SSC, descriptive statistics.

	Birth mother SSC	Birth mother DSC	Social mother SSC	Father DSC
Income year before 1st birth (Euro)	30 360	26 970	30 180	34 060
Educ. <= 2 years post-upper sec.	9.7	9.4	12.2	21.2
Long post-upper sec./univ. < 3 years	34.2	43.9	38.7	47.6
Long university educ. >= 3 years	56.1	46.7	49.1	31.2
Age at 1st birth	33.1	29.9	34.11	32.3
N	424	226 681	424	226 681
Parental leave days birth year + 1	209.2	256.2		
	N=424	N=226 681		
Parental leave days birth year + 2			123.3	75.4
			N=259	N=134 679
Share of parental leave birth year + 2	0.66	0.79	0.34	0.21
	N=259	N=134 679	N=259	N=134 679

The within-couple income gap the year before first birth is considerably bigger in DSC than in SSC (see Table 1). As expected, fathers have the highest income of all whereas mothers in DSC have the lowest income. In SSC, the birth mother is often the woman with the highest income as well as education. This speaks against specialization theory according to which it is rational to let the partner with fewest labour market resources specialize in care. Economic rationality may still play a role though; in many SSC, women take turns giving birth and given that both may become birth mothers in the end, it may be rational to let the person who has come the furthest in her career be the first to give birth.³

Applying identity theory to parenthood, we expect the motherhood identity to be highly salient and linked to internalized role expectations to prioritize the child. Linked to this are norms regarding the infant's need of its birth mother and discourses on the importance of breastfeeding (Grunow & Evertsson 2016). Consequently, we expect birth mothers to take a longer leave than their partner. Descriptive statistics (Table 1) indicate support for this assumption; the birth mother takes the longest leave in both DSC (256 days) and SSC (209 days). Parents often use five instead of seven days of paid leave per week so this corresponds to about 13 months for DSC and 10 months

3 Female couples who are cohabiting have the right to medically assisted insemination and IVF. Treatment cost for a first child is the same as the regular (subsidized) patient's fee, i.e. a few hundred SEK. However, treatment to have a second child is not counted as part of regular health care and is considerably more costly.

for SSC. This leave is on average longer than the prescribed breastfeeding period of six months, indicating that identity formation plays a role in both groups of couples.

As earlier discussed, we expect gender to influence the division of leave in DSC. Although ideals have changed and care is an integral part of modern fatherhood, expectations on fathers still mainly link to paid work and breadwinning. Hence, we expect birth mothers in SSC to take a shorter leave than mothers in DSC and we expect fathers to take a shorter leave than social mothers. Also this hypothesis is confirmed. As we saw above, birth mothers in SSC take fewer leave days in the year of birth and the following year than do mothers in DSC. Social mothers take on average 123 days of leave (approx. 6 months) in the birth year + the following two years compared to 75 days (almost 4 months) for fathers.

In the best of worlds, we would like to compare DSC and SSC that are as equal as possible on background characteristics. Therefore, we estimate a nearest neighbour matching model in order to check whether the average difference in parental leave uptake between birth mothers in SSC and mothers in DSC remains when we match the couples on the partners' (individual) income the year before the birth, age of each partner, education, year of observation and birth month of the child. The difference in parental leave uptake is presented as the average treatment effect on the treated. It is highly significant and amounts to a difference of 32 days when same-sex birth mothers are compared to different-sex mothers. In other words, the matching model indicates that birth mothers in SSC take about six weeks shorter leave (if uptake is five days per week) than do mothers in DSC.

Summing up, our results indicate that motherhood identity formation and norms linked to the infant's need of its birth mother are strong in DSC as well as SSC. Net of this, gender is an important and significant predictor of parental leave uptake in DSC. In these couples, the mother, who most often has weaker labour market resources than the father, tends to be the one making the largest adjustments of labour market work by taking considerably longer parental leave, working part time etc. This may be rational in a short-term perspective but less so in a long-term perspective as a faster return to paid work and/or a more equally divided parental leave should benefit mothers' careers. SSC often choose the person with the stronger labour market resources as the (first) birth mother. Although parental leave uptake is not equally divided either in SSC or in DSC, taking turns to give birth and be on leave may contribute to more evenly shared parenting in SSC than our results indicate. SSC seems to be guided by more long-term financial rationality than DSC are and in addition, equality and fairness more likely enters the discussion (cf. Malmquist 2015).

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Lone mothers with low income face obstacles to practice their mothering

Abstract

Lone mothers are an increasingly vulnerable group in Sweden. Mothers with less education are particularly at risk. This short paper discusses some findings from a study exploring low-income lone mothers' possibility to reconcile paid work with family commitments. Results show that a lack of financial resources significantly limited the mothers' possibility to combine various responsibilities and practice the kind of mothering they preferred. This conflict between aspirations and access to means for their realization engendered dilemmas and feelings of inadequacy.

Keywords: low-income lone mothers, work-family conflict, sociological ambivalence

SWEDEN IS OFTEN considered advantageous to lone mothers on account of high employment rates and low poverty rates. After the economic crises in the 1990s Swedish lone mothers' situation has, however, deteriorated. Poverty rates have increased, and nearly three out of 10 lone mothers have an income level that is below 60 percent of the median in the country (the EU's at-risk-of-poverty measure) (SOU, 2011:51, p. 117). Higher unemployment levels and reductions in welfare benefits are important explanation. Lone mothers with a lower education are particularly at risk.

The discussion in this short paper is based on a research project exploring work-family reconciliation among Swedish lone mothers with different socioeconomic background. It focuses on one of the main findings, namely, that low-income mothers' limited access to economic resources seriously constrained their ability to act in accordance with their notions of "appropriate care" (Alsarve, Lundqvist & Roman 2016).¹ The results considered in this paper are mainly based on 15 in-depth interviews with low-income and working class lone mothers. Two of the mothers had migrated to Sweden from a non-European country. Two were born in Sweden by migrant parents. In the following paragraphs I elucidate ways in which financial difficulties restricted the low-income lone mothers' possibilities to act in accordance with ideas of "good" mothering.

1 The Swedish Research Council funded the research project. It has been carried out in collaboration with Åsa Lundqvist, Jenny Alsarve and Terese Anving.

Struggling to be a "good" mother

Regardless of socioeconomic background, the mothers who participated in the study associated good mothering with meeting the children's needs, spending much time with them, and not letting them spend too long days in preschool. Reconciling paid work and caring responsibilities was not easy, however. The culturally shaped ethical ideas of good mothering particularly constrained the low-income mothers' possibilities to reconcile paid work with caring commitments. While all mothers wanted to give appropriate care to their children, the opportunities to do so varied greatly (cf. Rowlingson & McKay 2005).

Facing the money-care dilemma

The low-income mothers had to devote a lot of time and energy to paid work in order to manage the household funds. This, in turn, restricted their ability to act in accordance to their ideas of good mothering. The challenges confronting the low-income mothers can be called the money-care dilemma. To earn enough money to provide for the family, they had to work long hours, leaving them less time and energy to spend on their children. After a working day, often at inconvenient hours, the mothers frequently felt drained of energy. It is thus illuminating when a mother with school children said that she felt so worn out after a day's work that she would often go to bed before the children. The money-care dilemma that faced the low-income lone mothers is well captured by one of the mothers in the quote below.

... on the one hand I want to work more because it means money, but on the other hand I must think of the child, who means even more than that.

Because of difficulties to combine full-time work with family responsibilities the mothers typically wished to work fewer hours. They wanted to spend more time with their children. In Sweden, parents whose children are under eight years old have the legal right to reduce their working hours. Earnings are reduced accordingly. While the middle-class mothers could typically afford to do so, the household finances did not allow the low-income, working class lone mothers to shorten their working hours. Some mothers were hourly employed. They found it difficult to benefit from their social right to stay at home with a sick child on the days they had promised to work. The reason was that the economic compensation they would receive from the state was much lower than the expected earnings that day (as the yearly income is the basis of calculation). The low-income mothers badly needed all the money they could earn. They therefore recurrently had to take the sick child to preschool. Limited access to economic resources was also problematic because the mothers had difficulties to sustain the same lifestyle as other families. They could not afford to enrol their children in organized activities associated with a cost, take them to amusement parks, go on holidays, or give them much coveted things and clothes like "everyone else". Not

having the resources to do so was a source of distress giving rise to feelings of relative deprivation (cf. Townsend 1979).

Feelings of inadequacy and guilt

Lacking the means to act in ways the mothers considered to be in the best interest of the child engendered feelings of guilt and inadequacy. When asked how she managed to combine the job with the care of her children, it is significant that one of the mothers said that she never thinks that she has "done the right thing" and managed "to be a good enough mum". The reason she felt this way was that she had to work full-time on inconvenient hours to cover household expenses. The mothers who had to take their sick child to preschool expressed similar feelings. One mother put words on this when stating that she "didn't want to become the kind of mother who drops off her child with a runny nose", but that was exactly what she had to do in order to support the family.

Conclusion

The findings of the study referred to in this paper dispute the rather rosy international picture of the situation for lone mothers in Sweden. They highlight the difficulties that employed low-income lone mothers come up against when trying to realise ideals connected to the care of children. A possible explanation of this finding is in terms of the concept of "sociological ambivalence". It says that conflicts and dilemmas arise when there is a "disjunction between culturally prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing these aspirations" (Merton & Barber 1963: 98). The low-income and working-class mothers' opportunity structure made it difficult for them to act in accordance with culturally shaped ideas of good mothering. They wanted to spend much time with their children, stay at home with them when they were sick, pick them up early from preschool, do fun things with them, and so on, but lacked the economic resources to do so. This situation fostered feelings of guilt and shame. The discrepancy between the culturally shaped ideal of a good mother and the mothers' opportunities to act as such was clearly connected to economic inequality. The lack of economic resources also meant that they could not fully benefit from some of the social rights to which they are entitled, such as reducing their working hours or staying at home with a sick child. To conclude, the mothers' prospects of reconciling paid work and caring commitments were influenced by social class, as well as by their position as lone mothers.

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Women have a stronger say in couples' decisions to have a child

Abstract

Sweden stands out as a forerunner in the development of gender equality and family dynamics. To deepen the knowledge on power distribution and gender dynamics of couple relations, we investigate how women and men's childbearing intentions influence actual childbearing behavior. The Young Adult Panel Study (YAPS) has information on both partners' childbearing intentions in 2009, which we follow for five years with register data on childbearing. The results indicate that women's childbearing intentions are more important than men's intentions in determining actual childbirths.

Keywords: childbearing intentions, gender equality, couple decisionmaking

SWEDEN IS IN the forefront of the social and demographic development regarding families. Fertility declined early in Sweden but is now among the countries with relatively highfertility in Europe. Other relevant developments are for instance that the importance of marriage and marriage stability have decreased and marriage is less closely related to childbearing, women are economically independent, and men increasingly take part in traditionally female areas such as childcare. This development is sometimes referred to as the gender revolution (Goldscheider et al. 2015) and the generations born in the late 1960s to early 1980s are the first to grow up under these circumstances. These women and men seem to follow similar patterns of childbearing as their parental generations when it comes to the number of children they have on average but when in life to have children has changed over time. Even though we know much about how family dynamics develop, we know less about couple-level decisions and negotiations behind the demographic behavior of these generations. In order to address this rather neglected dimension, this study focuses on how couples' childbearing intentions are related to realized childbearing in the near future. This question originates in a strand of research on the relationship between intentions and behavior (Ajzen and Klobas 2013), and numerous studies of the relationship between childbearing intentions and realized childbearing (see for example Thomson & Hoem 1998; Stein et al. 2014). Early studies on couples' childbearing intentions indicate mixed results as to whether the woman or

the man has a stronger say, while somewhat more recent studies sometimes indicate a veto decision (Thomson & Hoem 1998). It thus seems as if both partners have to agree for more children to be born. We are interested in whether this is true also in Sweden today.

We want to relate this question of decision making within couples to the development of gender equality in the last decades and therefore ask *whose intentions are decisive for childbearing*, to give insights into the dynamics of power relations and gender for couples in this new context. As our core interest is the gendered dynamics of such decisions, we focus on heterosexual relations, although obviously all individuals who reflect on whether to have children are not living in couples and all couples do not consist of a woman and a man. The unveiling of how decisions are made in heterosexual couples will likely be of importance also for other constellations and for decision making regarding childbearing in general. But needless to say, same-sex couples and single individuals face in large part different conditions for childbearing.

Data and method

We use the Young Adult Panel Study (YAPS) which measures the childbearing intentions of both partners in couples in 2009. Thereafter we follow the same couples using register data until 2014, to investigate whether their intentions were realized. YAPS includes a nationally representative sample of women and men born 1968, 1972, 1976 and 1980, where also coresidential partners were asked to fill out a questionnaire (see www.suda.su.se/YAPS). Our working sample contains 865 opposite-sex couples; 23.8 percent with no children, 28.3 percent with one child, and 47.9 percent with two children at the time of the survey.¹ Logistic regression is applied, and we conduct a pooled analysis, containing all couples, as well as additional separate analyses for childless couples, one-child couples and two-child couples.

Childbearing intentions are based on the question *Do you think you will have (more) children in the future?* Responses *yes* and *probably yes* are regarded as *wanting a(nother) child*, while the responses *no* and *probably no* are regarded as *not wanting a(nother) child*. Non-responses and don't know-answers are also coded as *not wanting a(nother) child*. The answers of the woman and the man are combined into four categories indicating intention agreement or disagreement.

¹ Among the couples, approximately 110 couples were expecting a child when the interview took place and those were coded as belonging to the parity they were soon to belong to. The rationale for this is that the question on childbearing intentions refers to first or additional children, apart from previous children or the expected child (if pregnant). A note of caution is that our data only includes information about the respondents' births and within the five years following the interview, some couples may have split up and the birth may actually be by a new partner. We therefore performed additional analyses where we only included births during 2010–2012. The results are not sensitive to a shorter follow up period and we therefore decided to use data from the whole five year period.

Findings

Most couples, 87 percent, agree in their intentions to have or not to have children. About 41 percent agree that they want a(nother) child and 46 percent agree that they do not. Among childless couples and one-child couples 67 percent and 69 percent, respectively, agree that they want a(nother) child. Among two-child couples 75 percent agree that they do *not* want to have more children, reflecting the strong two-child norm in Sweden. Considering the outcomes of these intentions, among childless couples where both partners wanted children as many as 80 percent had a child within five years. The figure is even higher among couples with one child, almost 85 percent, whereas only 49 percent of couples with two children who stated that they wanted another child realized these intentions within five years. Also within couples where neither partner intended to have children this occasionally happened.

The central question here is what happens when the woman and the man have different intentions. In eight percent of the couples the woman intended to have a child but the man did not, and in five percent of the couples the man intended to have a child and the woman did not. Out of the couples where only the woman wanted a child, 47 percent ended up with a child, to be compared to 30 percent of the couples where only the man wanted a child.

Findings from the logistic regression (Table 1) on the association between a couple's childbearing intention and realized childbirth, where confounding factors are controlled for, indicate the same pattern for childless, one-child couples and two-child couples, even if the small sample restricts statistical significance in the parity-specific models. Couples where the woman but not the man intended to have a(nother) child, were more likely to end up with a child, compared to when only the man intended to have a(nother) child, although this difference is statistically significant only in the pooled model. Not surprisingly, the couples where both wanted a child were most likely to have a(nother) child in the following five years and couples where neither partner wanted a(nother) child were least likely to do so. The findings indicate that although couple agreement to have children seems to be positive for childbearing, women more often have a stronger influence on childbearing decisions.

Table 1: Logistic regression on the likelihood to have a child between 2010 and 2014. Odds ratios and p-values.

Childbearing intentions	All couples		Childless couples		One-child couples		Two-child couples	
	OR	p	OR	p	OR	p	OR	p
Woman wants/ Man does not	1		1		1		1	
Woman does not/ Man wants	0.26	0.005	0.28	0.118	0.21	0.141	0.31	0.190
Both want (more) children	1.91	0.035	2.01	0.292	2.79	0.111	1.48	0.428
Neither want (more) children	0.19	0.000	0.15	0.013	0.33	0.136	0.16	0.000
Constant	3.18	0.019	2.80	0.266	2.94	0.290	3.08	0.164
Nagelkerke R Square	0.59		0.41		0.603		0.43	
N	865		206		245		414	

Note: The models control for both partners' age, education and employment status, as well as partnership status, number of children and age of the youngest child (for one-child and two-child couples).

Conclusion

In Sweden, women and men increasingly participate on equal terms in the private and public sphere, have similar roles, and are economically independent. In this setting, gender equality is a strong norm which is likely to influence negotiations also over childbearing in couples. The findings from this study nevertheless indicate that women's childbearing intentions are a stronger predictor of realized childbearing than men's intentions. If only the woman wants a child and not the man, the couple more often ends up with a child than if only the man wants a child.

Women's stronger say in realizing childbearing intentions indicate that the reproductive area still to part is a woman's decision area. It may also indicate that women still carry the largest costs for childbearing, and thus have a larger say in the decision. For example, although Swedish women to a high degree remain on the labor-market after having children they take the major part of the parental leave that is available to all parents (Duvander, Ferrarini, Johansson 2015) and the income development of women and men after childbearing is unequal.

The findings do not necessarily indicate that men have children against their will but possibly that childbearing intentions may change more easily for men than women. Five years is a long follow up and by the time the actual decision is made many men who responded that they were not intending to have a child, may have changed their mind. The findings may be interpreted to mean that a woman is more successful in convincing her partner of having a child, than the other way around. Understanding the reasons behind female dominance in childbearing decisions is an important topic for future studies.

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Popular peers and firstborn siblings are better off

Abstract

'The apple doesn't fall far from the tree' is an idiom that ultimately is reflected in the reproduction of inequality patterns across generations. Representatives of the child's own generation, such as siblings and peers, may however play a key role by either reinforcing or counteracting this reproduction. Based on a Stockholm cohort now approaching retirement, we explore whether the inheritance of parents' misfortunes, here reflected through poverty, varies in strength depending on the cohort members' position in the sibship or peer group.

Keywords: inequality, life-course, relationships

CHILDREN BORN TO less fortunate parents are more likely to find themselves in adverse situations while growing up. This tends to translate into higher risks of disadvantageous living conditions at subsequent points across the life course, including periods during which they raise their own children. A vicious cycle is hereby created, through which disadvantage is inherited from one generation to the next, reproducing patterns of inequality in society. When it comes to poverty, this is evident also in contemporary Sweden, despite being a well-developed welfare state with comprehensive social insurance systems (Stenberg, 2000).

Early life experiences are however not only shaped by the parents. Representatives from the child's own generation, such as siblings and peers, also constitute important agents of socialization. Although these types of intra-generational relationships are more egalitarian in comparison to parent-child relationships, they still reflect relational issues of power and dominance. For example, siblings may share both genes and their home environment, but they tend to adopt different roles during upbringing that accentuates their dissimilarity. These differences can to some extent be seen as a function of each sibling's position in the sibship structure. There is a massive literature devoted to differences between being the oldest, youngest and intermediate child in the sibship. Earlier-borns are generally found to be in a more advantageous situation with respect to both cognitive and health-related outcomes compared to their laterborn siblings (Modin, 2002; Barclay, 2016).

While sibship is something that the child cannot choose for him- or herself, peer

relations tend to be established on a more voluntary basis. Peers, who spend a lot of time together in school or during leisure time, come from different families but are often remarkably alike. This is partly a result of the propensity to form relationships with similar others, partly due to mutual influences over time. In peer groups, processes of power and dominance give rise to a social ranking with a certain amount of status attached to each position. Being at the top of the hierarchy reflects a more central location in the overall network of peers, better access to information, and higher levels of respect and support. Research has revealed consistent short- and long-term advantages among these children (Almquist, 2011).

This study derives from the notion that the intergenerational reproduction of inequality may be modified by intragenerational relationships. Individuals holding advantageous positions in the sibship or in the peer group are expected to have access to resources that add to those stemming from the parents, thereby promoting upward social mobility. The opposite reasoning would then apply for individuals in disadvantageous sibling or peer positions. Focusing on one specific type of disadvantage – poverty – we explore these issues in one of few large-scale longitudinal data materials containing information about parents, siblings, *and* peers.

Data and methods


Data were drawn from the Stockholm Birth Cohort study (Stenberg *et al.*, 2007), defined as individuals born in 1953 who resided in the greater Stockholm metropolitan area in 1963, and were alive and living in Sweden in 1980 and/or 1990 (n=14,294). Only individuals with complete information for all study variables were included here (n=10,618).

Poverty in the parental generation (19%) was indicated through information from municipal archives concerning the parents' receipt of social assistance in 1953–1972 (ages 0–19). Poverty in the child generation (19%) was based on information about social assistance receipt in 1990–2009 (ages 27–56), kept by Statistics Sweden. While it should be noted that social assistance receipt is a commonly used indicator of poverty, the current study's operationalisation is crude and may reflect rather heterogeneous groups in terms of living conditions.

Cohort member's sibling position was divided into: 'Firstborn sibling' (30%), 'Middleborn sibling' (25%), 'Lastborn sibling' (33%), and 'Only-child' (12%). Information about peer position was based a sociometric test in 1966 (age 13) where cohort members were asked to nominate their three most preferred work partners in class. Those who received four or more nominations were seen as having 'High popularity' (31%), two-three nominations 'Medium popularity' (38%), one nomination 'Low popularity' (20%), and zero nominations 'Marginalised' (11%).

The statistical analyses were based on logistic regression, with poverty in the parental generation (G0) as the independent variable and poverty in the child generation (G1) as the dependent variable, using Stata 14. From the derived estimates, we first calculated Yule's Q according to the formula $(OR-1)/(OR+1)$. Second, we calculated

Figure 1. Adjusted proportions (expressed as percentages with 95 % confidence intervals) of poverty in adulthood among the cohort members, stratified by the presence or absence of poverty in the parental generation, as well as sibling position and peer position (n=10,618).



proportions (expressed as percentages) with 95 percent confidence intervals. The analyses were performed for the full sample as well as across the different sibling positions and peer positions, respectively. Adjustments were made for gender, sibship size, and school-class size.

Results

The intergenerational correlation in poverty is estimated at $Q=.38$ in this cohort. However, it varies across sibling and peer positions. The correlation is strongest among middleborn ($Q=.40$), firstborn ($Q=.40$), and those with medium popularity among peers ($Q=.43$), but not too much weaker among lastborn ($Q=.35$) or those with high popularity ($Q=.37$). Less pronounced correlations are found for only children ($Q=.29$) as well as marginalised children ($Q=.29$) and children with low popularity ($Q=.27$).

In the figure, the first pair of markers to the left show that 33 percent of cohort members whose parents were poor during their childhood are themselves experiencing poverty as adults. The corresponding figure for individuals who did not have poor

parents is 18 percent. The following four pairs of markers show these proportions across the different sibling positions, indicating no clear pattern. What can be noted is that firstborn siblings seem to be best off, especially in relation to only children where firstborns without poor parents display a significantly lower prevalence of own poverty.

The next four pairs of markers indicate the corresponding results for childhood peer position. Here, clear differences in the proportion of cohort members with experience of poverty in adulthood are shown, ranging from more than 40 percent among marginalised individuals whose parents were poor to 14 percent among those in the highest peer positions whose parents were not poor. The most striking finding is that the proportion who experience poverty in adulthood among marginalised children *without* poor parents, is the same as among highly popular children *with* poor parents (26%).

Discussion

In line with previous results (Stenberg, 2000), this study indicates a sizeable intergenerational transmission of poverty from the parents of our 1953 Stockholm cohort to the next generation of children. Interestingly, this transmission is more differentiated across childhood peer positions than across sibling positions. The downward social mobility among those who held marginalised positions in childhood, together with the upward mobility among those with high popularity, indicate a weakened intergenerational correlation in poverty but at the same time, adds new components to the pattern of inequality. Future studies should further address the underpinnings of these findings as well as explore other types of disadvantage.

For policy-oriented sociologists looking to identify meso-level factors that could potentially reinforce or counteract the intergenerational reproduction of inequality, it may now be time to extend the hitherto more or less exclusive focus on sibships to also encompass peer groups. However, at least in the context of quantitative sociology in Sweden, that would require us to rely less on administrative registers and put more effort into developing large-scale cohort studies that highlights potentially decisive features of childhood for later life chances.

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Fobbing care work unto ”the other”

– *what daily press reporting shows*

Abstract

Population ageing and international migration are two of the most significant challenges that Sweden is facing today. These – combined with the scholarly debate on the ethics-of-care that notions such as ‘caring democracies’ have re-ignited – raise questions about how media representations of elderly care and migration are shaped. This research note gives insight into how care, and migrant care workers, are regarded in one of the world’s most egalitarian societies. In doing so, it suggests that the intersection between population ageing and international migration is an abundant source of information about societies’ moral compasses.

Keywords: elderly care, migrant care workers, media representations

THE GLOBALISATION OF international migration and population ageing have put care on the agenda of the social sciences. Among the topics being explored are the care chains that are created by global migration; the increasing reliance on long-term care systems on migrant workers and the gendered, racial and ethical challenges that the import of workers to the care sector entails. Few studies have, however, brought attention to how public debates about care and migration are shaped and the assumptions about migrants (and the care sector) that these discussions make. This research note is based on a project that aims to fill this research gap and on an argument developed elsewhere (Torres 2018) that care scholarship would benefit from exploring the intersection between ageing and migration.

The rationale behind launching this project is threefold. First, research on media representations has consistently shown that ethnic majorities that do not have close relationships with ethnic minority groups tend to be profoundly influenced by media coverage about these groups. Second, although Swedish media research has consistently shown that migrants tend to be depicted in negative terms, we couldn’t help but wonder if this finding would hold if we were to focus on a context known for its ambivalent regard for migrants. The elderly care sector tends namely to think of care recipients with migrant backgrounds as a challenge while care providers with the same backgrounds tend to be regarded as an asset. Third, we designed this project against the backdrop that the feminist debate on ‘ethics of care’ offers (see e.g. Tronto 1993). This

debate has been central to sociologists' understanding of how care regimes organise care work, what care entails for gendered relationships, and who we imagine being best equipped to offer care and why (as well as who we believe could be exempted from their caring responsibilities). Thus, the third reason why deemed inquiries into media representations of care and migration to be sociologically interesting is that we believe that debates on care give us insights into society's moral compass as well as its' relationship with "particular others". Phrased differently one could say that we believe there is merit to Tronto's (2013: ix) argument that societies need "to put responsibilities for caring at the centre of their democratic political agendas".

Migrant care workers in the Swedish daily press reporting on elderly care

Our project uses quantitative and qualitative content analyses to shed light on how Sweden's newspaper articles have addressed migration, ethnicity, culture, language and religion within the context of their reporting on elderly care since 1995. That was the year when the public debate on these issues started (for insights into some of our findings see the one publication in English that we have authored so far: Torres et al. 2014). Worth noting is perhaps that we began with analyses of Svenska Dagbladet but are now in the midst of analysing articles published in Dagens Nyheter which is the other major national newspaper in Sweden.

Just as expected, the recruitment of migrants is discussed in this data corpus as the solution to the staff shortage crisis that the elderly care sector is experiencing. Originally, the articles suggested that the sector should recruit people with migrant backgrounds who are living in Sweden but are unemployed. Extracts such as this one were not uncommon then:

Sweden has failed to take advantage of the 'reserve army' constituted of existing immigrants and refugees. As long as these people are excluded from the job market, possibilities for development and civic life, labour migration is surely impossible. It is morally difficult to imagine that Latvians, Romanians, Czechs and Ukrainians should be offered work in Sweden while Swedes with an immigrant background remain unemployed. And the popular resistance to large-scale immigration will no doubt continue to be significant as long as today's problems related to the multi-ethnic Sweden remain (Article entitled "Commentary – Wanted: Visions and courage", published on March 22, 2000).

The issue at hand is indeed morally contentious just as ethics of care scholars have claimed. In this excerpt, we see how immigrants are described as "a reserve army". They are framed as a resource that Swedish society in general, and the elderly care sector in particular, have yet to tap into. Accordingly, they are an army "which it is both humanely and economically indefensible not to make use of" (as stated in another article entitled "Better educated immigrants meet companies' needs" published on June

6, 2000). The military jargon that is used in these articles begs our attention since the sector's crisis is depicted as one of the "battles" that this country is losing. It is one we need "the courage" to fight and one that the "reserve army" (comprised of our settled but unintegrated immigrants) could help us win. Worth noting is also that these articles often allude to Sweden as a society that has failed to integrate its immigrant population. This is why some articles argue that it would be both inappropriate and costly to embark on labour migration schemes to attract workers from abroad; the solution to the staff shortage for which other countries have opted. However, although this line of reasoning is quantitatively speaking the most common still, we have slowly but surely seen how the media has begun to suggest that the sector's resources should be used to import workers to Sweden:

The sector where employment is growing the fastest is care for the elderly – and it is expected that by 2050, one in ten Swedes will be older than 80. Who's going to take care of you when you get old? Demanding that well educated, young Swedes do it would crush their dreams and also be enormously costly to the economy and the public finances. So why not let, say, Filipinos do it? They would earn more than they would have in Manila, and Swedes – old as well as young – would benefit from it (Article entitled "More immigrants save the Swedish welfare state", published by Dagens Nyheter (DN) on April 5, 2008).

It is not only of interest that private companies in Sweden have just started to import Filipino nurses to work in home-care services for the elderly, but also that articles like this one give us insight into how care work (and the people employed to perform it) are regarded. Helping the elderly is not namely the kind of job that people "dream" of having; in fact, the prospect of it is a "dream crusher" for some. Moreover, the care we provide to the older segments of our population shouldn't be 'costly' so importing cheap labour makes perfect sense for all since "old as well as young would benefit from it".

Allusions such as this one remind us that "relatively more powerful people in society have a lot a stake in seeing that their caring needs are met under conditions that are beneficial to them, even if this means that the caring needs of those who provide them with services go unmet. More powerful people can fob the work of care onto others: men to women, upper to lower classes, free men to slaves, those who are considered racially superior to those whom they consider racially inferior people" (Tronto 2013: 105–106). This is why care scholarship that relies on "the ethics of care" lens draws attention to how social and political institutions allow some to pass on their caring responsibilities to others. As I have argued elsewhere, the intersection of population ageing and international migration is a fertile ground from which critical social scientific inquiries about ageing, migration, and care can be launched (cf. Karl & Torres 2016; Torres 2006, 2013 and 2018).

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Non-European migrants often have similar or better health than natives

Abstract

Sweden has experienced a sharp increase in migration flows in the last decades. Projections estimate that the migrant population rate will continue to grow in the near future. Given the centrality of health for the successful engagement of individuals in society, health aspects of migration have emerged as an important area of study. In this research note, we present a brief overview of current knowledge and argue in favour of developing a social determinants perspective on health in future research.

Keywords: country of birth, social determinants, healthy migrant paradox

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION HAS a significant impact on the academic and political spheres, insofar as it represents one of the most significant challenges for modern societies. Of the components of population growth, migration is the most unpredictable and yet the most important to warrant social cohesion.

Today, the foreign-born population of Sweden amounts to approximately 30 percent of the total (including first and second generations) and projections estimate that this group will grow in the near future. As a result, ensuring their wellbeing is a clear priority on the political agenda.

Health is a fundamental element of wellbeing. It is a necessary condition for the development of other dimensions of life (e.g. work). In Sweden, research on migration is relatively extensive yet predominantly descriptive and fragmented across different scientific disciplines. In this research note, we briefly present an overview of the research on migration and health in Sweden, and argue in favour of a social determinants perspective on health that might integrate the different areas of knowledge and produce more interpretative results.

Overview

Swedish research on migration and health is marked by the humanitarian nature of recent migration flows into the country. Up until the late 1960s, Sweden was characterized by open borders and the active recruitment of labour migrants to face the

demands of economic growth (Figure 1). With the onset of the global recession of the 1970s, Sweden began to close its borders to labour migrants and recast itself as a host country for people from various areas of conflict, to such an extent that it is today the European nation with the most refugees per capita (OECD, 2015).




Figure 1. Number of people emigrating and immigrating to Sweden between 1850 and 2015. Source: Statistics of Sweden

Refugee migrants constitute a prime target population in Sweden since, unlike labour migrants, they not only arrive in high numbers, but are also exposed to distinctive conditions of vulnerability before, during, and after migration (war, unsafe trips and long periods of uncertainty derived from the asylum-seeking process). Hence, Swedish research has mainly focused on identifying the specific needs of the refugee population, assuming that their background will make them more vulnerable in comparison to other migrant groups (Europeans) and the Swedish-born population.

Research shows that, overall, the health of migrants in Sweden is the country of birth, period, gender, and health outcome-specific, which makes it difficult to draw general conclusions. Below these lines, we offer an example of the complexity of the evidence in this area. It is somewhat perplexing, however, that the group of non-European migrants in Sweden who have prominently a refugee background often show similar or better health outcomes than the native population. Many studies have

found lower all-cause and cause-specific mortality among them when compared to the Swedish-born population (Honkaniemi et al. 2017;). An exception is mental health, an area where non-European migrants with refugee background show more consistent disadvantages (Gilliver et al. 2014). Although this result is in line with the international literature on the healthy migrant effect, which postulates that migrants (mainly labour migrants) are positively selected in origin, the advantage found among non-European refugees is still puzzling considering the number of adversities they face throughout their migratory process. Furthermore, because refugees are less likely to return to their homeland, the health advantage found in this group might be less likely to be explained by under-reported emigration (or salmon bias), which has been suggested as a potential reason for artificial lower mortality rates in international studies.

However, bias cannot be entirely ruled out, and in fact, some results point to biases; for example, when considering the inconsistency observed among indicators of general health shown in the literature to be correlated across different ethnic groups. This is the case between all-cause mortality (where most migrants show a relative advantage) and self-reported health (where they have a distinct disadvantage) (Rostila, 2007).

Future directions: a call for a social determinants perspective on health

Besides the strong methodological concerns inherent to the study of migration and health as well as the ever-changing composition of the migrant population in Sweden, most research in this area tends to interpret the observed variations by country of birth as a consequence of different distributions of risk and protective factors. However, the role of the social determinants in explaining the distributions of such factors between and within migrants' groups have been overlooked. We also know little about how distal and proximal social determinants of health are causally related.

A social determinants perspective on health builds upon the theory of the fundamental causes of health and disease introduced by the sociologists Link and Phelan (1995). According to this approach, risk and protective factors are postulated as proximate causes operating in between a more persistent association between social determinants (or distal factors) and health. The theory posits that crucial resources (such as knowledge, money, and social connections) that are important to avoid risks and adopt protective strategies are unevenly distributed across different socioeconomic groups. To disentangle how distal and proximate factors operate between migrants and Swedes is essential to reveal how health inequalities by country of origin are (re) produced in society.

The social determinants perspective on health needs to consider the effect of varying social circumstances operating at different moments and stages in life. A dynamic approach is clearly necessary for this field in order to avoid the general tendency to present migrants as a static category determined largely by their country of origin. The adoption of a dynamic approach can help to further elucidate the relative importance of the pre- and post-migration contexts on health. For example, changes in duration of

residence might suggest that the conditions in the receiving context (as opposed to the country of origin) play a significant role in explaining health patterns among migrants, yet few studies in Sweden have incorporated this time dimension.

The ultimate expression of a dynamic approach is the adoption of a life course perspective. The lack of information on migrants' conditions in origin limits the full adoption of this approach. However, further effort could be made to incorporate this perspective after they arrive in Sweden. For example, considering age at arrival could be one way to evaluate whether there are sensitive periods concerning migration.

The lack of a dynamic approach extends to the use of social determinants. Most studies focus on socioeconomic status (measured at one point in time), rather than on socioeconomic trajectories (i.e., upward mobility), or state changes (such as periods of (un)employment). The latter might better account for individual social circumstances and could shed light on the interrelation between social conditions and health (i.e., health selection and social causation) among people with a foreign background.

To sum up, studies on migration in Sweden have been descriptive in nature and fragmented in different fields. However, health cannot be isolated from other social dimensions, as it is conditioned (and conditions) the successful engagement of individuals in society. Hence, a social determinants perspective on health is needed to integrate the different areas of knowledge and produce more interpretative results.

A social determinants perspective in the field of migration and health will contribute to a better understanding of why some foreign origin groups are healthier and live longer than others. It will also provide a better understanding of the causal chains linking distal and proximal social determinants of health in the foreign population. A recent research programme Social determinants of health among individuals with foreign background: Societal and individual perspectives (SMASH) financed by FORTE (grant no 2016-07128) seeks to fill in the above-mentioned knowledge gaps and produce knowledge that can be used to tailor informed policies.

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Education: Family resources help girls more than boys when it comes to mental-health problems

Abstract

Research has established that school performance relates: (i) negatively with poor mental health during childhood and (ii) positively with family socioeconomic resources. In this article, we examine the potentially moderating effects of family resources on the relationship between school performance and poor mental health, using register data covering all children born in Sweden in 1990. The dependent variable is graduation from upper secondary school. We perform separate analyses for girls and boys. Our results indicate that compensatory effects of the socioeconomic resources of the family on the risk of graduation failure among those with poor mental health is more pronounced among girls compared to boys.

Keywords: upper secondary school graduation, family socioeconomic resources, mental health

EDUCATION IS A central determinant of various outcomes over the life course of individuals. In this article, we elaborate chiefly on previous research which has established that school performance is: (i) negatively related with poor mental health during childhood and adolescence (Brännlund et al. 2017), and (ii) positively related to socioeconomic family resources (Breen et al. 2010).

But how widespread is the impact of socioeconomic family resources on the chances for educational success? May socioeconomic resources of the family even moderate the strong negative relationship between poor mental health and educational performance? To answer this question, we use register data covering all children – including parental data – born in 1990.

Background

It has long been recognised that family and individual resources are not equally distributed among individuals, and such differences are mirrored in school performance. Parental resources have a strong impact on their children's future life chances – as the opportunities for resourceful families to invest money, knowledge, skills, and using

social networks for the benefit of their children are much more extensive compared to less resourceful families (Breen et al. 2010).

Socioeconomic background is usually understood as the parents' level of education, social class, and income. Children from less advantaged backgrounds, with limited academic, cultural and economic resources, are less likely to enter higher education (Breen et al. 2010). In addition, single parenthood and immigrant background are seen as risk factors for educational failure (McLanahan and Sandefur 2009; Aslund et al. 2011).

Regarding individual resources' effects on educational performance, we focus on mental-health status (Gustafsson et al. 2010), and the extent to which family-related resources may compensate for the risk of educational failure among those suffering from poor mental health. The share of young people suffering from poor mental health has steadily increased over the last decade, irrespective of whether poor mental health is measured as prescription of drugs or self-rated by the respondents.¹ Further, the prevalence of poor mental health is higher among girls than boys (Socialstyrelsen 2013).

Data

The data come from SIMSAM (Lindgren et al. 2016) which combines data from different national administrative registers.

The sample contains all children born in Sweden in 1990 and remained to live in Sweden up to 2010. The cohort is followed up to 2009 when a vast majority is expected to graduate from upper secondary school. The data comprise all students who completed their compulsory schooling in spring of 2006 and continued to upper secondary school the following autumn, $n=109\ 233$. The success-rate of completing upper secondary education in 2009 was in total 78.0 percent.

Variables

Graduation from upper secondary school is a dichotomous dependent variable coded 100 if upper secondary education was completed in 2009 and 0 if not.

The measurement of mental-health problems relies on the Swedish Prescribed Drug Register, which is available for the years 2005–2009 during which the students would have been 15 to 19 years old. It contains data on all prescribed and dispensed drugs following the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system. Our indicators of mental-health problems cover prescriptions of medicine belonging to the ATC codes N05 (psycholeptics) and N06 (psychoanaleptics) for the years 2005–2009. This variable, drug prescription [D], varies between 0 (no prescription) and 5 (prescriptions every year).

Parental education is measured by the parent with the highest level of educational

1 For further information, see; www.socialstyrelsen.se/statistik/statistikdatabas and www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se.

attainment [E]. Four levels are distinguished. Parental income [I] is based on annual disposable income 2004–2009. We use the mean value of both parents' income over the period. The unit for the income scale is 100 KSEK. Parental unemployment [U] is the mean value of father's and mother's unemployment experiences for the period 1990–2009. The scale varies between 0 (no unemployment) and 20 (at least one period of unemployment each year). Civil status [S] is measured by the mother's civil status 1990–2009 and has three categories: the mother was married or cohabiting over the complete period; the mother changed civil status one or several times over the period; the mother lived alone during the whole period.²

Finally, there are three control variables. Parental country of birth [C] distinguishes between: i. both parents born in Sweden, ii. one parent born in Sweden, and iii. no parent born in Sweden. Health status at birth is measured by the Apgar-score [A] (0-10 scale). Low birth weight [B] (yes/no).

Methods

Separate analyses for girls and boys were performed. The most important reason is the systematic differences between the sexes concerning both frequency and types of mental-health problems (Kessler 2003). Girls more often experience internalizing disorders, such as having poor self-esteem, suffering from depression and anxiety. For boys, externalizing problems, such as emotional dysregulation and impulsivity, are more common.

We apply a linear probability OLS model; the reported coefficients can be understood as changes in percentage units for the probability of graduating upper secondary school.

Results

In the analyses, we are primarily interested in the interaction effects between family socioeconomic resources and mental-health problems on school performance.³

² Information regarding the fathers' civil status was not available in the data.

³ It is worth noting that the observed main effects of the independent variables in Table1 do only change negligibly from models excluding interaction effects. Tables are available upon request.

Table 1. Probability to graduate upper secondary school by various individual and family oriented resources. Linear probability Regression Model (OLS). Significant coefficients (p < .05) in bold. Cell entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors.

		Boys		Girls	
		B	S.E	B	S.E
	Intercept	91,87	2,59	85,86	2,71
E	Education				
1	Compulsory	-18,65	0,80	-14,83	0,79
2	Secondary 2 years	-8,67	0,53	-5,35	0,53
3	Secondary 3 years	-1,00	0,53	0,66	0,52
4	University degree	0		0	
I	Income	0,38	0,10	0,53	0,11
U	Unemployment	-0,80	0,06	-0,66	0,06
C	Country of birth parents				
1	Both Sweden	1,64	0,73	1,07	0,70
2	One Sweden	-2,23	0,88	-1,96	0,84
3	Non Sweden	0		0	
S	Civil status				
1	No partner – stable	-16,13	1,24	-13,90	1,18
2	Mixed over time	-10,50	0,37	-8,75	0,36
3	Married/cohabitating – stable	0		0	
D	Drug prescription	-13,99	1,17	-10,60	0,88
A	Apgar	-0,35	0,25	0,40	0,26
B	Low birth weight	-1,29	1,14	0,19	1,08
	E*D				
	E1*D	1,10	1,29	-2,43	1,06
	E2*D	-0,38	0,93	-2,55	0,73
	E3*D	-0,86	0,93	-2,53	0,74
	E4*D	0		0	
	I*D	0,73	0,27	0,48	0,19
	U*D	0,01	0,10	-0,09	0,08
	S*D				
	S1*D	1,89	1,61	-2,23	1,31
	S2*D	-0,64	0,64	-2,04	0,51
	S3*D	0		0	

In Table 1, the dependent variable is graduation from upper secondary school. Although the primary effects of family socioeconomic resources are strongly related to school performance, we will not comment on these. Beginning with the results for boys, all but one of the interaction effects are non-significant. Parental income, however, has a significant compensatory impact of mitigating the risk of failing upper secondary school graduation for those suffering from mental-health problems. For boys having low-income parents (measured at decile 1 in the sample: 139 KSEK), that received medical prescriptions for five years decreased the probability to graduate from upper secondary school by 65 percentage units when compared to boys with no prescriptions. For boys from a high-income family (decile 9: 326 KSEK), the corresponding figure is 58 percentage units. The impact of poor mental health on the chances of graduating is thus somewhat less severe for boys having parents with high incomes than for boys having low-income parents.

Moving over to the sample of girls, we find several indications of socioeconomic compensatory effects mitigating the risk of failing upper secondary school graduation among those who are experiencing poor mental health. For the level of education of parents, the interaction terms show that the compensatory effect is primarily related university education. When comparing girls with five years of drug prescription with those with no prescription, we find that having at least one parent with a university degree decreases the probability for successful graduation with 53 percentage units. The corresponding figure for girls having parents with compulsory education is 65 percentage units. When it comes to parental income and civil status, the interaction terms indicate that the risk of failure to graduate upper secondary school is reduced for girls from a high-income family, as well as for those who are living in a stable two-adult household.

Discussion

To the extent that the socioeconomic resources of the family have compensatory effects for mitigating the risk of educational failure among those suffering from poor mental health, the analysis showed that this related principally to girls. A relevant question to ask is why family socioeconomic resources have compensatory effects for girls but very little for boys?

One possible explanation is that the type of mental-health problems differs between boys and girls. While girls tend to suffer from internalized mental-health issues, such as anxiety, mood disorders and depression, boys' mental-health problems are more often external - involving antisocial behaviour and substance abuse disorders. Another plausible explanation relates to traditional gender roles, where the child's sex most certainly influences parents' expectations and support strategies. Also, what children perceive as expected behaviour of them might depend on whether they are girls or boys.

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Girls with highly educated parents have less somatic complaints

Abstract

In Sweden, as in Western countries generally, somatic complaints are common in adolescents. These complaints are clearly connected with gender while the evidence of socioeconomic inequalities is less conclusive. The aim of this study is to analyse the combined relevance of gender and parental education for adolescents' somatic complaints, using national data with direct information from adolescents and their parents (n=7,393). Among girls, but not among boys, a graded association was found demonstrating less somatic complaints with higher parental education. Stress and coping are discussed as potentially important mechanisms.

Keywords: adolescence, health complaints, inequalities

A HIGH SHARE of adolescents reports suffering from health complaints in Western countries, with a clear and consistent gender gap to the disadvantage of girls (Ravens-Sieberer et al. 2009; The Public Health Agency of Sweden 2014). High levels of health complaints in adolescence are perhaps not surprising given that this life phase involves major changes and challenges (Arnett 1999), but the reporting has increased over time (Hagquist 2009; The Public Health Agency of Sweden 2014) suggesting that social context and circumstances matter. While the relevance of gender is clearly visible, differences by other dimensions of social stratification are less evident, although socioeconomic inequalities have been demonstrated in several studies.

A common type of health complaints are somatic, e.g., headache and stomachache. Somatic complaints are defined as symptoms without an organic pathological basis, and partly understood as a consequence of stress (Alfvén et al. 2008). Stress is often described as a process starting when the individual experiences an event or a more chronic situation that may act as a stressor, creating an imbalance between experienced challenges and the possibility to deal with these. The outcome of the process in terms of detrimental health effects depends on the individual's interpretation of the situation and possibility to cope with the stressor, i.e., the coping strategies employed and the coping resources available (Lazarus & Folkman 1984).

The gender gap in health complaints among adolescents has been subjected to various explanations. In addition to biological factors associated with sex and puberty, and

the possibility of a gender bias in reporting, the suggested explanations include gender differences in each part of the stress process. For example, the exposure to stressors, the interpretation of these stressors, and the available coping strategies and coping resources may differ between girls and boys. Some stressors may also be gender-specific, such as those stemming from societal norms for how girls and boys should be and act, and experiences of discrimination and appraisal tied to gender.

Other stratifying dimensions are also vital for the conditions of young people, such as the educational level of the parents. Similar to gender, parental education may create differences in every part of the stress process. This holds for potential stressors and coping resources directly linked with the family and the parents (e.g., risk of unemployment, financial strain, parental knowledge and support), but also for those in school (e.g., experiencing the school pace too high). Furthermore, the relevance of parental education and gender may intersect. Parental educational level adds a context in which the experiences tied to gender may vary, and inversely, the relevance of parental education may differ between boys and girls.

The study aim is to examine differences in somatic complaints by parental education in adolescent girls and boys using data with direct information from adolescents and their parents. To employ such data is advantageous since it is well-known to be difficult for adolescents to provide detailed and correct information on parental education.

Methods


The material used is the Survey of Living Conditions (ULF) and its child supplement (Child-ULF) collected by Statistics Sweden. ULF is based on a nationally representative sample of adults who are interviewed about their living conditions in a broad sense. Children aged 10–18 years living in the adult respondents' household are also invited to participate and provide information about their living conditions. The interviews are conducted yearly and since 2007 by phone.

This study uses the surveys conducted in 2007–2014. The non-response has increased over time, from 27 to 44 percent among adults and from 34 to 44 percent among children. Non-response was higher among adults with low education and born abroad. In total, 7,508 children were interviewed (48 percent boys; 52 percent girls), with full information on all study variables for 7,393 (i.e. 98.5 percent) children distributed across 5,278 households. The research has been approved by the Regional Ethics Committee in Stockholm.

Parental education was based on the highest level in the household and coded into six groups (percentage of children within parenthesis): compulsory/elementary (2.3 percent); upper secondary, ≤ 2 years (21.0 percent); upper secondary, ≥ 3 years (19.5 percent); college/university, < 3 years (19.6 percent); college/university, ≥ 3 years (35.2 percent); and doctoral studies (2.5 percent).

Somatic complaints were measured as the weekly co-occurrence of headache and stomachache (Alfvén et al. 2008).

Figure 1. Self-reported somatic complaints in adolescents (aged 10–18 years) by parental education. Unadjusted percent and odds ratios from binary logistic regression analyses using "College/university education, ≥ 3 years" as the reference group (OR=1), controlling for grade group, survey year, immigrant background and family structure, with robust standard errors clustered at the household level. Sweden, 2007–2014. $n=7,393$.



*** $p < 0.001$ ** $p < 0.01$

Prevalences (percent) and odds ratios (OR) from binary logistic regression analysis were calculated. The regression models were adjusted for grade/age group (grades 3–6; 7–9; and upper secondary school), survey year, foreign background (i.e., both parents born abroad versus at least one in Sweden), and family structure (i.e., living with two parents; a single parent; one parent and a step-parent). One important reason for including family structure is that it is connected to differences in sampling probabilities (e.g., children living with two adults had twice the probability of being sampled compared to children living with one adult). Since the children are clustered within households, robust standard errors were computed.

Results

The overall prevalence of somatic complaints was 8.6 percent (girls 12.1 percent; boys 4.9 percent). Among girls, a graded association with parental education was found (see Figure 1 showing percent on the left and OR on the right side): the lower the parental educational level, the higher the odds for somatic complaints. Compared with the reference group (≥ 3 years of university education), the excess odds for those with the lowest parental education (compulsory school) was more than twofold (OR=2.23; 95% CI 1.2–4.0). Compared to the reference group, the odds for the second lowest educational category (≤ 2 years in upper secondary school) was 73 percent higher (OR=1.73;

95% CI 1.3–2.3). The lowest prevalence was found in the highest educational category, namely parents with doctoral studies. This difference was, however, not statistically significant. Among boys, no clear association between parental education and somatic complaints was found.

Discussion

In this study, somatic complaints were clearly patterned by parental education among girls but not among boys. The family is a source of both stressors and coping resources that are likely to affect adolescents. That the degree and/or type of stressors and resources may vary with parental education does not seem far-fetched. However, why parental education would be relevant specifically for girls is less straightforward. One possibility may stem from a stronger focus on school achievement among girls. To view school work as important (Låftman & Modin 2011) and school achievement as vital for future prospects seems more linked with being a girl than a boy (Östberg et al. 2015, Wiklund et al. 2010). If school achievement generally is of greater importance to girls, and if parental education is linked with resources effective when dealing with school stress (e.g. support with homework, knowledge of the educational system, etc.) (cf. Jonsson & Erikson 2000), this would be consistent with the pattern seen here. Thus, the availability of support relevant for coping with school demands may be more important for girls' than boys' stress-related health.

The data material used involves a biased and high non-response rate which limits the possibility to transfer the conclusions to the general population. The attrition is higher among adults with low education (and thus among their children). If non-responders suffer more from health complaints, this study may have underestimated the association. A strength of the data is, however, the direct information from parents and children in the same families.

In accordance with earlier studies, the gender difference in somatic complaints was substantial. This was true also within each of the six educational groups studied here. However, due to the graded association among girls only, the size of the gender gap varied between educational groups. This shows that the gender difference is not unalterable but dependent on social context. In order to unravel social causes of relevance for the high and increasing levels of health complaints among adolescents in Western countries, this study illustrates the importance of a combined focus on gender and other dimensions of social stratification.

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Young people in suburbs feel discriminated, but hopeful

Abstract

Based on research in Swedish multi-ethnic areas, this paper examines discourses of unrest among youth in multi-ethnic, tower-block suburbs. While there is a focus on the mechanisms of racialized social exclusion among the youth, the preoccupation among local actors including social workers, police, principals and representatives of NGOs as is with the 'area of exclusion' itself as causing the problems of urban unrest. Such problematizing highlights broader policy changes in Sweden, where the main responsibility for welfare is put on the individual, rather than on the collective and the state.

Keywords: exclusion, youth, urban tensions

Suburbs on fire

In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to tensions and conflicts in the Swedish landscape of the tower-block suburbs. Media reports on youth uprising, burning cars and stones thrown at police and rescue vehicles have put the focus on urban peripheries and particularly on suburban youth as the subject of social disorder and disintegration (Stigendal 2016). Consequently, the urban peripheries and youth in the tower-block suburbs are formed as the subject of social change and social policy interventions.

These reports conflict with previous images of Sweden and Swedish welfare policy as successful regarding its universal outreach and arrangements aiming for equality, diversity and social inclusion (Schierup et al. 2014). In Sweden, as well as internationally, these problems of marginalization have recently given rise to intensified debates on the challenges or possible decline of multi-culturalism and need of strategies to promote integration and social solidarity. These conflicts are played out concerning fundamental transformations of Swedish welfare state policy, where welfarist governing from the social point of view has gradually been more and more influenced by neo-liberal rationalities (cf. Dahlstedt 2015). Since the 1990s, Swedish social policy is characterized by a shift from equality to freedom of choice, from redistribution to activation, from collective rights to individual responsibilities.

These shifts have had a range of consequences in terms of increasing social and eco-

conomic divisions and furthermore intensified polarization in Swedish cities (Schierup et al. 2014). Once more, public attention has been drawn to suburban tower-block areas previously known as part of the Million-program, a large-scale housing project initiated in the late 1960s as part of broader universal and state-centred welfare policies, providing rental apartments for the broad population. From the start, these urban areas of rental departments have been portrayed in terms of deviance and as sites of risk and social problems, tensions and conflicts. The areas have been described as Badlands of the People's home. In the 1970s there was a focus on class-related problems; in the 1980s and 1990s, the problem framing was changed into challenges of ethno-cultural difference and otherness (cf. Ristilammi 1993). In the beginning of the third millennium, these suburban areas and their residents were primarily characterized as 'areas of exclusion' (utanförskapsområden) tied to the political term of, 'the problem of the outside' (utanförskapsproblemet) (Dahlstedt 2015).

Stories from the urban periphery

These discourses of social exclusion have been problematized in an on-going study on social exclusion of youth in the suburban tower-block landscape. In the study, a range of local actors have been interviewed – including social workers, police, principals and representatives of NGOs – as well as youth living in suburban tower-block areas in two cities where repeated tensions and conflicts involving youth have been taking place (cf. Dahlstedt & Lozic 2017; Dahlstedt & Frempong 2017).

Among the local actors, the focus is first and foremost put on the 'areas of exclusion' and its inhabitants, when it comes to thinking about the possible causes of the urban development unrest among youth. The problem is primarily understood in terms of the 'areas of exclusion' as populated by households with poor resources – particularly by unemployed and 'migrants' – described as lacking the skills necessary in order for the parents to take responsibility for the upbringing of their children. Based on such an understanding of the problem, there is a variety of measures proposed as a means to address the present situation – primarily aimed at the 'areas of exclusion' itself and its inhabitants.

For instance, the head of a school in one suburban tower-block area describe the parents and specifically their lack of commitment in relation to school as a significant challenge – in contrast to the situation described in other parts of the city.

We rarely manage to get parents to parent's meetings. The ones participating are the parents who have a job and have become included in society, and not all parents have. [...] Among the economically stronger groups, where there are more highly educated parents, [in these areas], schools are more questioned by parents. It is not always the best for the school to be questioned by the parents, but the parents in the [Area] are generally passive.

In this description, parents living in the suburban area are portrayed as different from parents residing in the more prosperous areas of the city – they are passive, not active and questioning as parents in other areas. The main line of argument, focusing on the passivity of the suburban parents, appears in an interview with a teacher working in a suburban school in another city, describing the situation at school as follows:

There is a lot of extreme violence among the students. We are talking about grade one and three... extensive violence among the younger students... a huge problem [...] The parents are not at home with the students nowadays, as they used to be. It's different with the parents who are involved. We call to a parent meeting and there are three parents showing up.

Once more, the focus is put on the suburban parents as a main challenge. Among the local actors, there is a recurring discourse of the migrant background of the parents as a particular challenge. For instance, one police officer speaks of 'migrant parents' as having a 'completely different mind-set about sentence than they have in so-called West', arguing that they think about Swedish society as 'indulging' and 'petting with people'. According to another police officer, there are significant differences between Swedish authority and these parents' views on both society and upbringing: 'if you are talking to a father here, he could hit a child', which according to him would not be possible in other parts of the city.

Opposing exclusion

Among youth, there is a different understanding of the suburban problem emerging. Based on this understanding, there are other scenarios for future that emerge. If the suburb in the dominant discourses is described as a container of anomalies and insecurities, youth describe the tower-block suburb as a safe place, as a family, a place where they are cared for and feel at home. This particular story about the suburb is formed in contrast to the stories about the suburb told by the outside world, giving an entirely different description of the suburb from the one told by the youth. Certainly, there are 'stuff happening' also in the suburb, in terms of violence and criminal acts. But in the case of 'stuff happening', these cases tend to be exaggerated, not least by the media. 'In every country, there are the excluded suburbs, which are generally referred to as: "Do not go there, it's dangerous"', Siana says. 'But it's just bullshit. There is more murder downtown than here... I don't think they are aware of it, but they really hurt us'.

Among the youth, there is a focus on the mechanisms of racialized social exclusion as the main challenges for the inhabitants of the tower-block suburb. As illustrated by the youth, the dominant discourses about the suburb and their inhabitants are not only floating signifiers, words without further implications. Rather, these discourses have a range of concrete, material effects for those living in the areas portrayed as different: 'they do hurt us'.

Myner, one of the youth interviews, provide concrete examples of the material

consequences that the descriptions of the dangerous and unsafe suburb may have for those living there: 'It affects us, for example, if you are buying a car and you see the cost of the insurance. When you are applying for a job, they very much ask where you live. Everything is getting more expensive because of these prejudices'.

By making comparisons and referring to previous experiences, youth describe the tower-block suburb as a safe place, where they belong and feel at home, in stark contrast to the unsafe world of the outside, surrounding society, where they are not allowed to belong in the same way as in their 'own' suburb. Based on previous experiences, young people describe how they do not feel at home when they move in other parts of the city: 'one feels outside, simply'. They are looked upon and treated as being different, in the way they dress, in their appearance, their way of speaking and behaving.

Dreams about the future

Young people's stories about their existence today, in the safe place of the tower-block suburb, also shape their stories about the future, how they conceive of and talk about the future – for themselves as individuals and as well as for the suburb at large. In the young people's stories about the future, there is a recurring pattern in a strong willingness to change current living conditions and dominating discourses in society – i.e. of not giving up about all of the difficulties and challenges that young people face in their everyday lives.

In their stories about the future, youth argue that they can expect greater difficulties and challenges, just by living in the suburb. However, this description of the future and how the future is expected to be is not one-dimensional, but is based on harsh descriptions of difficulties as well as hopes of change and opportunities.

I'm a woman from Thailand, and I don't have a Swedish surname. Few people can pronounce my last name, and nobody knows how to spell it [laughter]. I'm also working class. Sure, some people are fighting for equality, that immigrants should have the same opportunities and some are struggling with the working class, but I am at the bottom in all three categories... I'm a little afraid of the future. If there are a thousand job applicants and I am one of them, how far will I get? It's a little dark, but I hope it will get better. If you live with that dream, there is still a chance.

Here, Mara illustrates how contemporary life conditions form her situation not only today but also in the future, as her plans for the future are conceived of as restricted and regulated by the fact that she is a young, working-class woman 'from Thailand'. At the same time, for Mara, as well as for other youth living in suburban areas, there are hopes and dreams for the future. What makes the future hopeful is that there is still a chance. For this chance to be realized, you need to keep hoping – and want change to happen: 'If you live with that dream, there is still a chance'.

May the tower-block suburbs burn

In the stories of young people there are valuable lessons to listen to in order to understand and to deal with the current situation in suburban areas throughout Sweden. Among the local actors interviewed in the project, the main focus is put on the local area and its inhabitants, its shortcomings and deviations as a problem – and the main solution identified consists of getting the inhabitants to adapt to and change themselves to the demands of the surrounding Swedish society. As illustrated in the interviews with youth living in the suburbs, young people are no passive victims of the current socio-economic conditions and the various difficulties they encounter in everyday life. They certainly see obstacles – among these current discourses about the suburbs as a problem. However, they also see opportunities. According to the youth, the obstacles must be overcome. Among the youth, there is a strong will for change, something that is hardly visible in the stories told by the local actors interviewed in the project.

At large, the interviews with youth confirm the main results of previous research illustrating how suburban youth are strongly affected by current structural conditions and dominant discourses. Unlike the main line of argument in dominant discourses on the challenges of ‘areas of exclusion’ in Sweden, suburban youth are neither passive nor victims. As evidenced in previous research, as well as shown in this project, youth develop a wide repertoire of strategies in order to negotiate with and also challenge prevailing conditions and dominant discourses.

Today there is a broad range of examples of negotiations. An increasingly loud mobilization is taking place among young people in suburban Sweden – against existing discourses on exclusion, accelerating patterns of inequality and welfare changes (cf. Schierup et al. 2014). Not least, popular culture is one of the arenas where such negotiations are being played out, for example in hip-hop, where negotiations are ongoing, making it possible for youth to develop a sense of pride in living in the Swedish urban periphery.

One thing is certain. Young people in the tower-block suburbs are on fire. What emerges as one of the most pressing questions today is how these flames can be dealt with, directed towards building a more inclusive society. The challenges are great, yet the time is short.

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MAGNUS WENNERHAG

Patterns of protest participation are changing

Abstract

Since the late 1960s, participation in political protests has become more common in Sweden. Today, a large majority of Swedes have at one point joined a demonstration or would be willing to join a demonstration, and around six percent of the population participates in a demonstration at least once a year. This article uses survey data to discuss the changing protest patterns in relation to the country's traditional corporatist political culture, with a focus on which groups participate in contemporary political protests.

Keywords: protest participation; social movements; normalization of protest

WITHIN BOTH POPULAR accounts and scientific research, Sweden is often depicted as a society in which political conflicts are settled around the negotiating table between well-organised stakeholders representing large groups of citizens and economically powerful actors. Apart from electoral competition, the aggregation of interests, opinions, and grievances has been seen as an act of co-operation among these stakeholders working within a corporatist framework. While it is true that Swedish post-war history is indeed full of examples of significant extra-parliamentary mobilisations and the use of contentious protest forms (Peterson et al. 2017), street protests and more contentious forms of politics have often, according to more prevailing stereotypes, been seen as something happening elsewhere, such as in France, Spain, or Greece. Despite the fact that the corporatist arrangements that are traditionally seen as integral for "the Swedish model" have been fundamentally reorganised in recent decades, with new actors entering the policy arena (Svallfors 2016), the picture of Sweden as a country with few protests and a low level of political contentiousness seems to persist.

This is, however, not what various social surveys tell us about protest participation in Sweden. For instance, the Swedish Level-of-Living Survey (LNU) shows that the percentage of Swedes who had taken part in at least one demonstration was 14 percent in 1968, 16 percent in 1974, 23 percent in 1981, 25 percent in 1991, and 27 percent in 2000. The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) asked a similar question in two recent rounds, and this showed that in 2004, 27 percent of the respondents had partaken in at least one demonstration, and in 2014, 29 percent

has done so. In comparison to other national populations surveyed by the ISSP, the Swedes ranked as one of the more protest-experienced populations in Europe (only outdone by Spain, France, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, and Iceland, varying from 30% to 49%).

Such a level of civil protest is well in line with the overall developments seen in many Western countries in recent decades. Research on social movements and political participation has noted that citizens in liberal-democratic societies have become increasingly inclined to take part in demonstrations to express their political stances. Since the 1960s, the staging of street protests has become a central repertoire of action among a wide variety of social movements, and authorities have come to regard demonstrations as a legitimate form of political action (Norris 2002). Subsequently, demonstrations have become an increasingly "normalised" form of political participation (Van Aelst & Walgrave 2001).

When looking into *how often* Swedes take part in demonstrations, an analysis of data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002–2010 shows that on average 6 percent of the Swedes had demonstrated at least one time during the previous year, a figure that places Sweden in the mid-range of the European countries surveyed by the ESS (Torcal et al. 2016: 333). While a quite large proportion of the Swedish population has experience in demonstrating, those engaging in such activities on a more regular basis are fewer.

What is particularly striking for Sweden is that a very large proportion of the citizenry see demonstrating as something that one "might do". The 2014 ISSP survey showed that 29 percent of the respondents had at one time taken part in a demonstration, but also that 43 percent had never participated but "might do it" (28% said they "would never do it"). Only Iceland and Norway had higher figures (51% and 44%, respectively), and after Sweden came Denmark (40%). This clearly indicates that demonstrating is regarded as a very "normal" form of political participation in the Scandinavian countries. Amnå and Ekman (2014) use the concept of "standby citizen" to highlight that a low degree of political participation does not necessarily equal "political disillusionment". They characterise standby citizens as those who are highly interested in politics and "are willing and able to participate if needed" (ibid.: 262), and they claim that this type of citizen is more common in the Scandinavian countries due to the prevalent political culture. Apparently, this is also true for "standby protestors" who have never taken part in a demonstration but still believe they might someday do so.

Another aspect of the "normalisation" of protest is what has been described as the "normalisation of the protester", meaning that demonstrators today are increasingly from a cross-section of the general population (Van Aelst & Walgrave 2001). One can, however, still find that some groups are more inclined to take part in demonstrations than others. When it comes to socio-demographic characteristics, particularly the well educated and the young take part in demonstrations more often (ibid.), and regarding political orientation, left-wing oriented citizens are more inclined to demonstrate (Torcal et al. 2016).

Table 1. Demonstration participation among various socio-demographic, political, and organisational groups in Sweden, 1999–2006. The table shows the percentages of each group among those who had participated in at least one demonstration during the previous year.

	1999	2000	2001	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Have demonstrated in the previous year	5.7	6.7	5.3	5.5	5.1	5.6	5.6	5.3	5.0	5.6	6.8	6.6	7.1
One time	3.2	4.3	3.3	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.1	3.2	3.5	4.2	4.0	4.6
Two or more times	2.5	2.4	1.9	1.8	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.2	1.9	2.1	2.7	2.7	2.5
Gender													
Female	5	6	6	6	5	6	5	5	5	6	7	7	7
Male	6	8	5	5	5	5	6	5	5	5	6	6	8
Age													
16–29 years	8	11	11	11	9	11	10	11	10	12	14	15	13
30–49 years	7	6	4	5	4	5	6	6	6	5	8	7	8
50–64 years	5	7	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	6	6	8
65–85 years	1	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	4	3	3
Country where one grew up													
Sweden	5	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6
Other country	9	11	11	12	9	10	11	10	6	9	10	9	11
Education													
Low or medium	6	7	5	4	4	4	4	4	3	5	4	4	6
High (University)	6	7	5	8	6	8	8	7	7	7	11	10	9
Political left–right orientation													
Clearly left	17	23	14	18	17	19	20	19	17	19	26	28	29
Somewhat left	6	8	7	7	6	7	8	8	7	6	8	9	10
Neither left nor right	4	4	4	4	3	4	4	3	3	5	4	3	4
Somewhat right	3	4	3	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Clearly right	3	7	2	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
Organisation membership													
Political party	18	19	12	20	17	19	19	22	19	25	25	26	26
Trade union	6	8	6	5	6	7	7	6	7	7	9	8	8
Total (N)	1,696	1,734	1,796	1,598	3,169	4,755	4,781	4,571	4,516	4,768	6,658	7,985	1,527
Have participated in specific types of demonstrations during the previous year													
Pride parades	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.5	–	–	–	–	3.4
May Day demonstration	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3.2	–	–	–	–	3.8
Total (N)								3,080					1,626

Who then is the typical protestor in today's Sweden? And has this changed during the last two decades? An (almost) annually recurring question in the Swedish national survey by the SOM Institute allows us to scrutinise this more in detail. Table 1 shows the percentages of those having demonstrated during the previous year, both across the general population and within specific groups.

When it comes to socio-demographic groups, the largest differences are in regard to age, education, and country of origin, where the young, well educated, and foreign-born are more inclined to take part in demonstrations. Differences due to gender are very small. However, it is primarily organisational membership and political orientation that matter the most for citizens' likelihood to take part in protests. Demonstration participation is much more common among political party members and among those self-identifying as "left". Apparently, those already connected to institutionalised politics through party membership are also more likely to take part in street protests. Furthermore, those self-identifying as "clearly right" are among those being least likely to demonstrate, which suggests that the media attention given recently to radical right-wing protests has been about a quite marginal phenomenon, at least in terms of sheer numbers.

The survey results also show that of those having demonstrated during the previous year, only a minority had done so more than once. In the SOM Institute surveys of 2011 and 2016, it was also asked if one had taken part in a Pride parade or a May Day demonstration during the previous year. Compared to the overall level of protest participation, the percentage of Swedes taking part in these annually reoccurring demonstrations was very high. This suggests that a large proportion of actual annual demonstration experiences stem from these two types of events.

Compared to many other liberal-democratic countries, demonstrations on May 1st are still important events for the Swedish labour movement and the political left, allowing these actors to gain both public attention and gather members and supporters. Even though the figures of participation might have decreased in recent decades, May Day demonstrations are still arranged across the country in many local municipalities (Peterson & Reiter 2016). The Pride parades of the LGBT movement have recently started following the same pattern and are today organised annually in more than 50 municipalities in Sweden (Peterson, Wahlström & Wennerhag forthcoming).

Perhaps it is the dominance of more "ritualised" – but still political – forms of protest, such as the annually occurring May Day and Pride parades, that explains the prevalence of the stereotype of Swedes as not taking to the streets when making political demands. Apparently quite many Swedes have demonstrated, and even more are prepared to do it, even though they don't do it every year; but when they do demonstrate, they primarily do so in more institutionalised forms of protests that are staged by actors who are quite well integrated within the political system.

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The Sweden Democrats and the ethno-nationalist rhetoric of decay and betrayal

Abstract

Sweden was long considered an "exceptional case" with no representatives of the radical right in parliament. However, the Sweden Democrats (SD) entered parliament in the 2010 parliamentary election, pointing towards the demand for ethnic nationalism also in Sweden. This article explores the party's rhetoric with particular references to the politics of decay and betrayal and its construction of a Swedish golden age. The rhetoric of decay echoes the ethnicity-based nationalisms articulated in other parts of Europe alongside nationalist claims of homogenous origins, a common destiny and an inherited social solidarity. The empirical material consists of political election programs since 1989 (SD 1989), high profile speeches and the party journal (SD Kuriren).

Keywords: radical right-wing parties, ethnic nationalism, the Sweden Democrats.

THE RESURGENCE OF strong radical right-wing parties and movements constitutes one of the most significant political changes in democratic states during the past decades. Sweden was for a long time an exceptional case until the Sweden Democrats were elected to the Swedish parliament in 2010 with 5.7 percent of the vote. This share of votes was increased to 12.9 percent in the 2014 election. Today the support is hovering between 15 and 20 percent in the polls.

The radical right shares an emphasis on ethno-nationalism rooted in myths about history. Their programs are directed toward strengthening the nation by making it more ethnically homogeneous and – for most radical right-wing parties and movements – by returning to traditional values. The radical right also tends to accuse elites of putting internationalism and their special interests ahead of the nation and the interests of the people (Rydgren 2018). Overall, anti-immigration sentiments are the most critical reason as to why voters support the radical right. This is indicated by two anti-immigrant frames, instrumental for attracting voters to radical right-wing parties. The first frame depicts immigration as a threat to the ethno-national identity of the majority. The second depicts immigrants as a major cause of criminality and other kinds of social insecurity (Rydgren 2008). The perceived threat against national

identity taps into sentiments of nostalgia, the loss of times bygone – of “not feeling at home anymore” – and is translated into ethnic and national terms. This raises the question of how radical right-wing parties construct their ethno-nationalist message, an issue which we turn to in this short text taking Sweden as our case in point.

The Sweden Democrats offer an apocalyptic rhetoric inspired by the (reactionary) conservatism of the late 1800s and early to mid-1900s and offers a rebranded version of the concept “Peoples Home” (Folkhemmet) along ethnic lines. A Swedish Golden Age, dated to the 1950s, is pitted against the decline of the past 50 years. The alleged decline is caused by the internationalisation promoted by the Social Democrats and the Liberals. Sweden of the 1950s is portrayed as a safe cohesive society with a homogeneous population – a symbol of traditional life. This image may attract voters with a conservative ethos. Yet, the Sweden Democrats show some signs of moderation, and of repackaging and rebranding their rhetorical message over time. For instance, the party is steering away from the nostalgia of the 1930s, an attachment notable with members of the early party formation. Moreover, approaching doom, decay, enemies and threats posed by immigration with more caution in official literature, has contributed to increasing the voter base. Having said this, however, when it comes to its core ethno-nationalist ideology the party shows considerable continuity, and it has ethnicised Swedish politics by merging the ideals of ethnic nationalism with Swedish democracy as it sets out to reconstruct a Swedish golden age in the future. We approach our case with the shifting rhetoric in mind.

The golden rule of ethno-national politics: the Swedish nation, its golden age and decline

Golden ages play a central role in nation-building and for the re-construction of nations as sources of political legitimacy, authority and authenticity (Elgenius 2011). Golden ages contribute towards claiming authenticity along the lines of historical continuity and ethnic homogeneity in times of untoward change, crisis, decay and decline. Thus, the rhetoric of decay help nationalists to construct a past of national grandeur suitable for serving the political project of the present. The discursive elements inherit in references to golden ages include the underlying assumption that the survival of the nation depends on moral guidance or ‘a return, at least in spirit, to these earlier ‘golden’ ages of the nation’s history’ (Smith 2009, 36). Few radical right-wing parties wish for an actual return to the periods they idealize (Rydgren 2018), but gain the direction for the political project by proposing to reconstruct the future. Ethno-nationalist claims are therefore closely associated with defining a national origin, a cultural heritage and significant national events that make sense of the nation as one continuous community of one homogenous people, despite the overwhelming evidence against such notions (Elgenius, 2015).

The decline of the Swedish nation is central to this form of ethno-nationalist politics (SD party programmes 1989 onwards) as is the end of the Swedish welfare state (SD Kuriren 2015). The decline of the Swedish Golden Age centres on recent periods of

the 1940s and 1950s as the beacon of Swedish democracy, socio-economic wellbeing and ethnic homogeneity and cohesion. The latter is directly linked to ‘the absence of foreign ethnic minorities’ (SD 1989) and the ‘strongly negative impact’ of immigration from ‘remote cultures’ (SD, 2011). The authenticity of the golden past is therefore portrayed as a continuous correlation between democratisation, ethnic homogeneity (SD 1989, 2011) and the ‘extraordinary’ Swedish socio-economic development pre-1960 (SD 1994).

The 1960s, however, marks the beginning of the end and decay:

Our national cohesion was undermined and the People’s Home started to march towards a disunited and violent society. (SD 1994)

The People’s Home (Folkhemmet, first used in 1928) may be described as a poetic term for the Swedish welfare state. In many ways a nationalist project, it acted on behalf of a discourse of ‘us’ and of social solidarity. Notably, it was first introduced with the social insurances in Germany in the middle of the 1800s but was later used for welfare initiatives in the 1900s with the so-called *Volksgemeinschaft*, associated with parties on opposing sides of the political spectrum.

The Sweden Democrats make central assumptions about the People’s Home, outlined in early party programmes, and not only about its ‘success story’ but also its alleged close connections to Swedish democracy, Swedish nationalism and the Swedish people. Above all, it is brought forward as a time of consensus about who the people actually were (SD 2011, 2014). A suitable past is therefore identified: Sweden as the cradle of democracy and democracy a ‘hallmark of Sweden’ (SD 2011). The empirical evidence to sustain such argument span centuries, and point to the Swedes’ democratic superiority, through the formation of early regional laws, the absence of serfdom (from 1350 onwards), the Acts of Freedom of Information (1776) as per the alleged ‘inherited human essence’ (SD 2011). The Swedes are in effect ethnically assigned a proneness to democracy and equality by the Sweden Democrats, in order to link ethnic homogeneity with Swedish democracy, the welfare state and the nation.

The Sweden Democrats argue that the 1940s and 1950s were characterised by national solidarity, but leftist forces undermined Swedish cohesion in the 1960s. The Swedish Democrats praise the early Social Democracy for the construction of the People’s Home and the Swedish welfare state, but simultaneously blame the recent Social Democracy for undermining the harmonious welfare state from the 1960s onwards. Olof Palme, Swedish Prime Minister (1969–1976; 1982–1986) is identified as the primary villain and stands accused of ‘rabid internationalisation’ and ‘senseless migration policies’ (SD Kuriren 1994, no 23:8), allegedly to strengthen the Social Democrats at the ballots. The ‘politically correct elite’, socialists and liberals, are blamed for allowing non-European migration from ‘ethnically distant or remote places’ since the 1970s. The elite is accused of letting the nation down by embracing multicultural values and by promoting membership in the European Union, resulting in the loss of Swedish sovereignty.

The Sweden Democrats single out migration from non-European countries as the cause of moral decay and as especially harmful to Swedish cohesion resulting in 'high crime numbers, divorces and broken homes, abortions and low Swedish nativity'. The rhetoric of decay includes the undermining of a distinct Swedish culture, common cultural roots, collective memories and cultural homogeneity (e.g. 1994, 2011), claims central to justify current threats (primarily posed by non-European migration) to Swedish interests. However, although the inherited essence of Swedish identity and culture is advocated in the ethno-national terms of continuity and homogeneity, Swedish identity and culture is appearing with considerable complexity as simultaneously claimed to be part of the Nordic, European and Western culture (SD, e.g. 1996, 2011, 2014). Thus, the 'inherited essence' of Swedish identity and culture is also narrated as one of a mixed Western and European heritage – excluding the heritage of Eastern Europe but including the heritage of Western countries outside Europe – with the sole purpose of raising boundaries against non-European and Muslim countries.

The core of the rhetoric of doom and decay – as a result of denationalisation – exposes a likeness to the 'nationalistic principles' of a Herderian framework, in which nationals are said to have a right and duty to protect the nation's distinct culture and soul. Such arguments are bound up with Herder's cultural nationalism and speculations about the historical continuity of national cultures founded in a 'spiritual genesis'. This genesis is constituted by traditions, customs and cultural ways transmitted by language from older to younger generations, who have a right and duty to carry on the culture of their ancestors. Herder's emphasises the role of the national language as the chief medium of this historical transmission, through which the Volk or people's distinct and persistent identity is both awaken and maintained over time. According to Herder, some 'mutations' of original cultures and traditions take place along the way, as a result of reappraisal and revaluation and cultures, therefore, develop in different directions under different circumstances. Yet, this process of cultural transmission is considered an example of the 'continuous spiritual genesis' that relate 'the living with the dead and with those yet to come' (Herder in Barnard, 2003:121). In the recycled rhetoric of the 21st century this is translated into the following:

The national community binds members of the nation together over time and creates ties between dead, living and unborn generations and between young and old, different social classes, political fractions and geographical regions. (SD 2011, 2014)

The Sweden Democrats' rhetoric includes references to the distinct nature of the Swedish national culture too. From premises, not dissimilar to a Herderian framework developed in the 18th century, the Sweden Democrats have argued in terms of a Swedish soul (*folksjäl*, SD 1994, 96, 99) and a distinct Swedish culture (e.g. 1994, 2011, 2014). In doing so, they also pledge to revive and protect the nation as if to cure it from neglect.

For Herder, the process of nation formation is defined by its organic attributes such

as ‘the virtue’ of generational transmission (Barnard, 2003:121), an ethno-nationalist logic traceable in the Sweden Democrats’ rhetoric. The party may rhetorically have shifted towards the terminology of ‘open Swedish-ness’ (i.e., a person is considered Swedish if defined as such by self and others) (SD 2003, 2005) relatively recently, but its underlying justification echoes exclusive boundaries drawn on the grounds of ethnic nationality rather than political citizenship. That is, regardless of achieved citizenship, the biological retainer and cultural resonance of inherited nationality enables the exclusion of Swedish citizens from being perceived as authentically Swedish in terms of nationality. This rhetorical shift to ‘open Swedish-ness’ was supported by a discursive shift of party symbolism too, from a torch of Swedish colours (linked to neo-Fascism and racial nationalism, via the Italian MSI and the British National Front) to a blue anemone in 2006. However, the implications of the exclusive nature of ‘open Swedish-ness’ may be exemplified by the support for repatriation subsidies to immigrants who wish to ‘return to their homeland’ (former Party Secretary Björn Söder, DN, 2014). Kent Ekeröth, Member of Parliament, took such arguments further (at a demonstration against refugees in Southern Sweden in 2015) saying that immigration has been the ‘destruction’ of Sweden and declaring the audience ‘members of a resistance movement’ and ‘a spearhead’ ‘to take our country back’ (Expo, 2015). The latter echoes references to ‘suicide politics’ in the early party programmes (e.g. 1989), the doom of the ‘dying nation’, its ‘terrible plight’, the ‘dark future ahead’ due to immigration, internationalisation and ‘islamification’ of Sweden (SD Kuriren 2001 no 43; 1996 no 27; 2003 no 51). The unsavoury historic connotations have therefore not been altogether eliminated by the shift in framing, rhetoric and corresponding symbolism.

Conclusions and contradictions

The Sweden Democrats offer Swedish nationalism as a remedy to restore authenticity, (ethnic and cultural) homogeneity and social solidarity. The official path of Swedish nation- or state-building has been disregarded; probably because of the relative value in providing a golden age or identifying a decline. A useful past, in the context of this rhetoric, is a past against which the discourse of decline, crisis, untoward change and related enemies be clearly identified. The politics of decline is, therefore, less about the past than about the present.

A suitable Swedish Golden Age, in this context, is a rebranded version of the 1950s conceptualisation of the Swedish welfare state – the People’s Home – originally founded in civic terminology but unwittingly oozing of nationalism and organic solidarity. With the main aim to restrict immigration to Sweden, the Golden Age of the People’s Home provides a clear framework; its egalitarian proponents and a rebranded nationalist project along ethnic lines. Thus, the construction of a Swedish Golden Age has become straightforward as a discourse of deservedness and, ultimately, membership along the lines of ethnic homogeneity. Swedish authenticity is hereby positioned in the golden age of the 1950s, with the nostalgia for civic egalitarianism yet rhetorically rebranded ethnically as a period of pre-immigration.

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The gender gap in crime is decreasing, but who's growing equal to whom?¹

Abstract

The declining gender gap in crime, observed in many Western countries, including Sweden, is often interpreted as showing an alarming shift in the offending of young women. Explanations to the observed pattern are often based on an assumption that women are increasingly coming to mimic the criminal behaviour of men, while we in this essay argue that to the extent behavioural change is at play, it is rather the other way around: men mimic women's behaviour.

Keywords: Gender gap, Crime trends, Equality

The sex ratio in crime varies widely from one nation to another /.../ If countries existed in which females were politically and socially dominant, the female rate, according to this trend, should exceed the male rate. (Sutherland 1947:100)

IT IS NOW more than forty years since Adler et al. noted, in their widely cited book "Sisters in Crime" (1975) that the gender gap in crime had become smaller, which they felt might be explained by reference to women's emancipation. The fundamental thesis is that men's behaviour constitutes the norm, which women will sooner or later come to emulate even in relation to crime. One natural, but rarely posed, question is why increased gender equality should lead to a decline in the gender gap via an increase in female involvement in crime and not instead via a decrease in male offending.

Over recent years, the debate on the declining gender gap has once again become topical. The central question is what is producing the declining gender gap in registered crime. Is it, for example, due to the registered offending of women having increased, while that of men may have decreased, as a result of *behavioural changes* linked to the liberation of women and men from traditional gender roles? An alternative explanation instead refers to a reduced tolerance in western societies towards crime in general and violence in particular. Against this backdrop, the declining gender gap may be under-

1 This essay builds on Estrada, Bäckman, Nilsson (2016): "The Darker Side of Equality? The Declining Gender Gap in Crime: Historical Trends and an Enhanced Analysis of Staggered Birth Cohorts." *British Journal of Criminology*, vol 56 (6): 1272–1290.

stood as being the result of a net-widening process with regard to which behaviours societies are choosing to *react* to and to prosecute through the justice system. Given that women account for a larger proportion of minor offences than of serious crimes, this type of net-widening process will affect the registered crime levels of women more than those of men (Steffensmeier et al. 2005).

The literature on the changing gender gap in crime has primarily focused on the situation in the USA. At the same time, there is nothing to say that the hypotheses on net-widening or a changed propensity for crime among women should not be relevant in other countries. To the extent that the "emancipation hypothesis" is important for understanding the declining gender gap, Sweden constitutes a reasonable case to study. It is easy to find empirical support for the argument that Swedish society lies at the forefront of trends towards increased emancipation among women and increased gender equality. Although Sweden still falls considerably short of complete gender equality, the country is probably counted among those that come closest to the hypothetical situation described by Sutherland in the quotation above.

The current study

Our objective is to elucidate the way the gender gap in crime has changed. In this article we present long historical time series on the gender gap in theft and violent crime. In our original study we have also looked at convictions of different birth cohorts and examined whether the change in the gender gap is general or whether it can be specified to a certain age or to specific categories of theft or violent crime. Most of our findings refute the hypothesis that the declining gender gap in crime is due to an increasing number of women committing offences.

On the basis of long historical time-series describing trends in the gender gap for theft and violent crime in Sweden, we can show that the period subsequent to World War II is unique (Figure 1a–1d). During this period, the gender gap has undergone a continuous and substantial decline. At the same time, the declining gender gap in crime has been produced by different processes during different parts of this post-war period. During the first half of the post-war period, the process is characterised by relative differences, i.e. women's registered crime increases from significantly lower levels than those found among men, whereas recent decades are instead characterised by absolute differences in the trends among men and women respectively. The trends of the first post-war decades thus do not require the same type of gender-specific explanations as those of the most recent 30 years. It would appear more reasonable, for example, to explain the increases in crime noted among both sexes during the first post-war decades as being due to a change in the opportunity structure that affected both men and women than it would to argue that increased equality (Adler et al 1975) was what was pushing both women and men to commit more offences. Thus for the debate regarding the value of the emancipation hypothesis, and that regarding the relative significance of behavioural change and society's reaction to crime respectively, the central issue becomes that of how the trends witnessed since the beginning of the 1980s should best be understood.

Figure 1a–d. Number of convictions for assault (1866–2012) and theft (1841–2012) per 100,000 of population. Men and women, and the gender gap ratio (men/women). Five-year moving averages.

Figure 1a. Number of convictions for assault (1866–2012) per 100,000




Figure 1b. Gender gap ratio assault (1866–2012)




Figure 1c. Number of convictions for theft (1841–2012) per 100,000





Figure 1d. Gender gap ratio theft (1866–2012)



The most important driving force in recent times is the powerful decline in the number of men convicted of crime. An additional analysis (Estrada et al 2016) of three cohorts born in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s allows us to add that the gender gap has only declined substantially during one particular period of the life course, specifically the later teenage years (age 15–20). When we look more closely at what types of crime the youths from the three cohorts are convicted for, the data suggest that the declining gender gap is due to an increased inflow of minor types of theft and violent crime. These findings are in line with what might be expected as a result of crime policy trends characterised by net-widening (Steffensmeier et al. 2005).

It is likely that these trends have produced a situation in which a larger proportion of young women are starting adult life with a criminal record, and for offences for which they would not previously have been convicted.

Finally, to the extent that the emancipation hypothesis and increased gender equality constitute a relevant explanation, this should be viewed in relation to the general crime trends that have characterised this period, which have taken the form of a visible crime drop rather than increasing crime levels. For those who still wish to focus on behavioural changes, rather than changes in society's reaction to crime, it would today seem more fruitful to focus on the gendered nature of the crime drop rather than on the causes of continually increasing crime among women. We would argue that the paradox here is that arguments focused on gender equality may have potential as a means of explaining why men's crime levels are moving towards those of women, rather than the reverse. The feminist criticism of the way men's behaviour is regarded as the norm tells us that there is nothing innate in men's high levels of crime that women will sooner or later emulate. The low levels of crime found among women are of course at least as "normal" and are perhaps becoming ever more so in societies that are communicating an increasingly intolerant view of crime. This means that with increasing gender equality, the values and behaviour patterns that have traditionally been viewed as more feminine, many of which have an inhibitory effect on crime, may be spreading to broader groups of men. Stated briefly, to the extent that increased gender equality may have affected the difference between men's and women's propensity for crime, its effect may primarily be due to having produced changes in the type of masculinity that encourages criminality.

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Street-gang violence in Sweden is a growing concern

Abstract

Over the past 30 years, Sweden has witnessed a growth in criminal gangs. Gun violence among young males is also on the rise and have only recently gained wide political attention. Street gangs and gun violence are two prevalent, partially overlapping phenomena that constitute social challenges. Empirically supported legal, policy and practical frameworks are needed in order to reduce the prevalence of gangs and gang violence in Sweden. The first step is to recognize that gangs and gang violence are an emerging societal problem and to identify its root causes, organizational dimensions, and operational patterns. In this note, Swedish street gangs and gang violence are briefly discussed.

Keywords: Street gangs, gun violence, crime prevention

TWO YOUNG ADULTS are shot dead and eight are injured in a gang-related mass shooting; a car bomb targeting a gang member kills three young men and a four-year-old girl; an eight-year-old boy is killed when a hand grenade is thrown into an apartment in an attempted assassination of a gang member; police stations and police officials are targeted in several hand grenade attacks.¹ This all happened in Sweden in the past three years, and the list goes on. Drive-by shootings commonly associated with American street gangs have now become a reality in Sweden, although with the difference that in Sweden hand grenades are also part of the gang violence. Also, there are signs that there is a clear nexus between gangs and violent extremism in Sweden (Sturup & Rostami, 2017).

Unfortunately, little academic attention has been paid to Swedish street gangs despite a worrying development in the proliferation of gangs and gang related violence in Sweden. Up until recently, authorities have been reluctant to recognize "street gangs" as an emerging internal security challenge. In 2009, the Stockholm Gang Intervention Program (SGIP) started as an attempt to develop innovative gang prevention strategies from the existing international literature on street gangs. Within SGIP, a number of studies came to highlight some essential characteristics of Swedish street-gangs and the

1 SVT, 22 December 2016; Aftonbladet, 26 January 2016; Aftonbladet, 22 August 2016. SVT, 28 november 2017.

overall gang development in Sweden (e.g., Rostami, Leinfelt, and Holgersson 2012). This note is based on ongoing research² that study the organizing of antagonistic groups, and includes the mapping of gun violence in the metropolitan areas Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö.

Gangs in Sweden

As early as 1941, the so-called *Ligabrottslighet* (gang criminality) in Stockholm was explored by the Swedish national association of social work (*Centralförbundet för Socialt arbete*, 1941). The report stated that there were 322 gangs, containing 1595 members in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö. The report suggested that the crime trend in Sweden is not as alarming as in other countries, however, to prevent the rise of serious crime, it is necessary to "catch and dissolve [the gangs] as soon as possible", [...] instead of tracking and arresting isolated working criminals (*Centralförbundet för Socialt arbete* 1941:41)." During the 1950s and 60s, organized crime and gangs are understood as mainly a foreign phenomenon and it is not until the 1970s that organized crime becomes an established term in Sweden (Rostami, 2016). Since then organized crime is a widely debated topic, even though "gang" is not yet an established concept and the primary focus of Swedish crime policy in the 1980s are illegal drugs and financial crime. However, the embryo of more organized criminal organizations emerged during this period, with the rise of – and conflict between – domestic outlaw motorcycle clubs. With the entry of international outlaw motorcycle clubs at the beginning of the 1990s and the so called Great Nordic Biker War (1994–1997), organized crime and gangs received wider political and media attention and gained a more important role in the Swedish crime policy (Rostami, 2016). Even if street gangs such as The Warriors and later the Original Gangster existed in the early 1990s, it was not until the late 1990s and early 2000s that Sweden witnessed the proliferation of street gangs, and it is only recently that street gangs have become recognized as one of the most significant challenges in socio-economically deprived areas.

Rostami, Leinfelt, and Holgersson (2012) studied seven Swedish street gangs and found that Swedish street gangs are criminally both highly active, and diverse. The age of members ranged from 15 to 49 years and the mean age ranged between 22.8 years to 34.0 years, depending on the gang. They found that the Swedish street gangs are ethnically heterogeneous and membership is not related to a specific country of birth or ethnicity. Roughly 42 percent of the gang members are born in Sweden and 76 percent are either first- or second-generation immigrants (from 35 different countries). The life cycle of these street gangs varied between 2 years and 18 years, which is largely in line with reports from North-American and European street-gangs (Klein et al., 2006). The Swedish street-gangs seem to have versatile criminal behavioral patterns featuring a wide array of offenses such as drug-related and weapon offenses, and various violent crimes e.g., robberies, assaults, and homicides. In this study, none of the

² Supported by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency.

examined gangs seems to be territorially bounded. However, recent reports indicate that new emerging street gangs have a lesser degree of formal organization, are more violent and territorially bounded, with more rapid and flexible recruitment process (Polismyndigheten, 2017).

Gang violence

Street gangs and gun violence are two partially overlapping phenomena, and Sweden is witnessing a change in gun violence (Khoshnood 2017). There has been an overall increase in victim-to-perpetrator ratio of a gun violence, which is especially pronounced for individuals under 30 years. Gun violence is becoming more concentrated and cemented in some urban areas. As an example, between 2011 and 2016, 1,165 shootings and 54 hand-grenades attacks were identified in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö, which resulted in over 100 dead and 440 injured. In all three cities there is a significantly elevated risk of a new shooting within a relatively small distance and period in, which are interpreted as an indication of gang-related conflicts (Sturup et al., 2017). In an ongoing study, we estimate that around 35 percent of the homicides in Sweden, between 2007–2011, is linked to organized crime groups such as street gangs. While a gun offender (both in deadly and non-deadly shootings with illicit firearms) in Eastern, Southern, and Western Europe is most likely to be in the age group 30–34, in Northern Europe, the age group of 20–24 is responsible for the largest share. This pattern is explained by a "huge presence of gangs in Sweden who are composed of young men dealing with local criminal activities and internal struggles" (Savona & Mancuso 2017:24).

While the recent development has provoked political debate and policy reactions, more research is needed to increase our understanding of the dimensions of street gangs and the appropriate societal responses. An effective response requires a good understanding of the root causes, organizational dimensions, operational patterns of the crime problem in question, and the distribution of responsibilities between various actors. Future research will address these issues.

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Open custody for criminal youth hold back re-offending

Abstract

In Sweden, youths who commit very serious offences are sentenced to youth custody. This article addresses issues relating to how these children experience being incarcerated, the significance of custodial openness for their everyday institutional lives, and how the experience of more open custodial forms during youth custody sentences is related to re-offending. The empirical data provide support for the significance of more open custodial forms as a means of both providing incarcerated youths with a less destructive environment and increasing the likelihood of more positive re-offending outcomes following their release.

Keywords: re-offending, youth custody, custodial openness

THE NORDIC COUNTRIES are well known for the humaneness of their criminal justice systems in an international perspective (Pratt 2008). However, this humaneness has also been problematized (Barker 2013; Ugelvik and Dullum 2012). One reason for questioning the low levels of incarceration in the Nordic countries is that both a large amount of incarceration and other forms of repressive interventions take place within the welfare system rather than via the justice system. This is particularly true for young offenders, since Sweden has a tradition of re-directing them into the care of the social services (Pettersson 2017). Youth custody, the sanction that constitutes the focus for this study, is a good example of this tradition. It was introduced in 1999, in part in response to the requirements of Article 37 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that the use of prison for children should be avoided as far as possible. Children between the ages of 15 (the age of criminal responsibility in Sweden) and 17 are (almost always) sentenced to youth custody instead of prison. These sentences are served in youth institutions known as special approved homes. These institutions are state-administered, and prior to 1999 they only provided care for youths placed by the social services. They are, however, secure institutions, and most of the units are locked. The special approved homes occupy a unique position within the framework of youth care provision in Sweden. They are the only institutions in which youths may be kept in locked units. The staff also have special powers in relation to the institutionalized youths (e.g. to place the youths in isolation, to conduct searches and to take blood and urine samples).

The criticism of the idea of the (supposedly) lenient Nordic justice systems may be illustrated by reference to the results produced by the introduction of youth custody. On the one hand, the new legislation has meant that youths are no longer sentenced to prison, but on the other hand it has also generated a so-called net-widening effect in the sense that the *number* of youths sentenced to incarceration has increased, as well as the *length of time* they spend incarcerated. In part this may be explained by the fact that the sanction is focused on treatment provision, and may therefore be perceived as less severe than a prison sentence (Pettersson 2017). Given the findings of previous research, which have shown incarceration to produce criminogenic effects (Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson 2009; Bales and Piquero 2012), an increase in the number and length of custodial sentences is unfortunate to say the least, and the issue of strategies to reduce the negative effects of incarceration is an important one. This article addresses one possible strategy to do so, namely by opening up secure institutions by giving youths institutional leave and allowing them to stay on open units towards the end of their sentences. In a study that followed up boys¹ sentenced to youth custody during the years 1999–2006 (N= 638) for five years subsequent to their youth custody sentences, and that also interviewed youths and staff at special approved homes, the importance of custodial openness both for re-offending and for everyday life at the special approved homes was examined (Pettersson 2017).

The quantitative data were collected from both official crime statistics and the youths' journals. These data show that, after matching (using propensity score matching) on the most important variables for both the risk for re-offending and the likelihood of ending one's sentence on an open unit,² the risk for re-offending resulting in a new custodial sentence is significantly lower for youths that conclude their sentences on an open unit.³ After matching, the excess risk of being awarded a new custodial sentence among those released from a locked unit, by comparison with those released from an open unit, is 1.4 (CI 95 %: 1.3 – 1.4) (Pettersson 2017: chapter 6).

Taken together, the quantitative results strongly suggest that one way of reducing the criminogenic effects of incarceration is to open up the locked environment experienced by the youths in custody. The qualitative interviews conducted among staff and boys serving youth custody sentences also point to the significance of periods of custodial leave and time spent on an open unit at the end of the sentence. One reason is the extent of the process of institutionalization to which youths are sometimes subject, which then leads to e.g. feelings of intense stress when they temporarily spend

1 Only 21 girls were sentenced to youth custody between 1999 and 2006.

2 Matching variables: Prior convictions, prior placement in a special approved home, principal offence in the youth custody conviction, custodial leave/100 days of sentence, length of sentence, having leave rescinded for bad behavior, being subject to isolation during sentence, absconding, having changed unit because of problems.

3 The analysis showed that it was more important for the risk for re-offending to conclude one's sentence on an open unit than it was to have been given custodial leave on a large number of occasions. For this reason, the frequency of custodial leave is used as a matching variable in the analysis, and not as the treatment variable (having been released from an open unit).

time in a residence outside the institution. Periods of custodial leave and time spent on an open unit serve to reduce the extent of this process. They also enable the youths to maintain contacts with significant persons outside the institution, such as their family. These contacts are important both for the youths' willingness to desist from offending, and for their chances of achieving this. Custodial leave is also important as a means of providing the youths with an opportunity, under controlled conditions, to practice realizing their intention to avoid re-offending (almost all of the boys expressed a desire to desist from offending, a finding in line with several other interview studies of incarcerated individuals). However, the interviews also serve to complicate the picture of the importance of custodial openness. On the basis of different points of departure, both Goffman (1991) and Foucault (1991) have pointed to the importance of discipline in these kind of institutions. In this environment, the opportunity to obtain a more open custodial existence becomes a powerful disciplinary tool for the staff, and gives them substantial power over the youths. When the staff, as sometimes happens, use this primarily to produce a calm and peaceful environment on a given unit, and in this way to make their own work easier, there is a risk that this will produce a range of problems. For example it generates resistance among the youths, which in turn leads to superficial adaptation rather than real change. It is also clear from the interviews that the micro-discipline it generates undermines the perception that the staff really care, and instead contributes to producing a more destructive relationship between staff and youths. All of this means, however, that the potential effects of increasing the degree of custodial openness as a means of reducing re-offending are actually greater than is shown by the results of this study, provided the staff make use of their power in a more constructive manner, and not simply for the purposes of short-term strategies intended to produce a calm environment on a given unit.

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Bodies, doings, and gendered ideals in Swedish graffiti

Abstract

Drawing from extensive fieldwork among graffiti writers in Sweden this article investigates gendered identity work and its consequences. It points to how potentially inclusive aspects of disembodied subcultural performances—that identities are negotiated through the material representation of the writer rather than on basis of the physical body—nevertheless work excludingly, especially so in terms of gender. This is so because identity work in graffiti revolves around a re-embodiment of identities through normative notions of the able, male and invisible body.

Keywords: gender, identity work, graffiti

IT'S FRIDAY AFTERNOON and I am walking the streets of Stockholm with one of my informants. As we pass a doorway she stops, points at two tags written in the same style with, what looks like, the same marker and adds in passing “that’s nice, I didn’t know they knew each other”. Looking at me, she then answers my tacit question of “what?” by saying that these two graffiti writers have a similar style and mindset, and that she admires them both, however she has never seen them write together before. We continue walking and I ask her if she knows both of them. She answers, “I have never met any of them, but like I said they have similar way of thinking of graffiti, I’m glad they hang out” (Fieldnotes Stockholm, May 2015).

During the three years that I have followed graffiti writers in Stockholm and Malmö, this kind of episode has continuously been replayed: participants constructing images of other participants through their graffiti without having ever physically met them. Similar to other subcultural groups – be it punks, skaters, climbers, goths etc. – graffiti centers on an emplacement of identities, boundaries and ideals within public space. It does not only occur in space, but also through space (Gieryn 2000). Yet, in contrast to other subcultural groups, this emplacement of the subcultural is largely disembodied. In contrast to punks or skaters for whom subcultural identities and activities are physically embodied in a here and now, subcultural identities and activities in graffiti are worked through the graffiti left behind. The physical person behind the tag remains absent from the present – including both its temporal and spatial aspect.

The last two decades of zero tolerance against graffiti in Sweden has deepened

this absence of the physical person behind the tag. The definition of zero tolerance in many Swedish cities as including a prohibition against all forms of graffiti, be it on legal walls, in galleries, or commissioned works, has largely meant that the graffiti writer has moved further into the shadows of the city (Kimvall 2012). The consequence of this absence of the physical body is that most writers were largely unaware of the physical features of other writers. This was often discussed as something positive and inclusive, that subcultural identities were based on doings rather than beings. What matters is your graffiti, not your gender, ethnic background, class, age, or body size. Among the more than 150 graffiti writers that I followed, as well as the hundreds of writers I was briefly introduced to, there was indeed a multitude of bodies.

Nevertheless, even though the doings of graffiti were largely disembodied, the boundary work of subcultural identities and activities in graffiti involves a re-embodiment of the body that effectively counters this inclusive belief. The body is re-constructed through notions of bodily features such as height, gender, courage, ability, ethnicity and age that are deduced from how the graffiti was written and where: "X has to be tall, I mean look at the heights of his tags." Or; "Y? I hate him, just a stupid fucking kid, you can tell from the style that he does not know anything about graffiti." Such deductions formed rumors that spread among writers and were used to define others. Both of the quotes above are examples of how writers talked about others without having ever met them, but both are also examples of how the re-embodiment of the subcultural identity is in conflict with the physical body of the particular writer. X that is here referred to as a he is a she, and Y is a thirty-year-old writer who has been writing graffiti for years. Whereas this conflict between the body behind the tag and the construction of that body through the tag is interesting, the point is rather how the plurality of bodies doing graffiti is reduced through the restoration of the symbolic to bodily form through taken for granted notions of what graffiti should be.

As is obvious in the quotes above these notions referred first and foremost to a male body, masculine pronouns being the standard referral when discussing and assessing other writers. When an identity or activity was re-embodied as feminine, it was exclusively negative as in "that has to be a girl, I mean it is way too arty." Similarly, age and ethnicity were rarely openly denoted as something positive: "you see that, that's a standard 14-year-old ghetto kid, just fucking things up." In most cases, other writers were assumed to be between 16 to 30 years old and white, the exception being terms like "kids" and "toys" that were frequently used to designate the inexperienced and childish as opposed to the worthy and committed.

Further, implicit in these re-embodiments are two interrelated bodily capacities, that of mobility and of access. Mobility here refers to an able body in motion. First of all, in the doing of graffiti; as in moving the body so as to paint fast and efficiently and reach a desired result. Second, it involves a stress on moving around between places, writing graffiti across the entire city, but also as in being able to move in and out of specific places, such as train yards and abandoned industrial buildings. Third, mobility also signifies being able to escape risks and dangers, as in moving away from the police

or guards, climbing a fence or jumping off a roof, avoiding trains and the electrified third rail, or as in physically confronting those who may interfere.

This ability to move freely in doing graffiti and escaping risk is based on being able to do so in the first place. It implies an unproblematic access so as to be able to move. Such access relates to what Goffman (1963) refers to as *passing*, that the disembodied doing of graffiti rests on being able to conceal crucial information concerning a criminal identity. Writers would remind themselves and others to manage their bodies and bodily conduct so as to be able to move, dress and behave in such a way that no one would notice or question their presence or writing. Not standing still for too long, not looking around too much, keeping a low profile. Or if spotted as potentially suspicious pretending to be drunk, talking on the phone, or urinating to disarm the situation. The disembodied doing of graffiti thus rests on notions of the able body as in the normal and invisible body. As note geographers Carrie Mott and Susan M. Roberts (2014), subcultural notions of the ideal privilege particular bodies while discouraging others.

These normative notions of the body in graffiti are highly gendered and racialized. They refer to bodies whose presence and right to move freely in public are rarely questioned, bodies that are able to exploit privileges of a continuous access to urban space. Not only does the notion of mobility exclude the non-able body in terms of the doing or moving, but notions of risks were entirely related to graffiti and not general risks that non-male or non-white bodies face, especially so in graffiti's pursuit of the urban margins at night. The able body as in moving and handling risks did not include the risks of violence, sexual harassment, rape, or being stopped and searched by the police due to racial profiling. Such risk management were not recognized as valid or related at all to graffiti among writers. Female writers for example talked about a double risk management: one related to graffiti and one to the gendered body in the city.

Instead of being validated as a further commitment, of doing graffiti despite risks unrelated to such doings, this risk management was rather defined as being a problem, that; "girls can't jump fences," "they are too afraid," "they can't handle being arrest", thus placing the female body in graffiti in opposition to the able and normal male body (MacDonald 2001).

This is obvious in how the re-embodied identity was negotiated with a physical body when known. To male writers this was rarely a problem, although writers often expressed disappointment when someone did not live up to the conceived image of the writer "first time I met Z, I was a bit disappointed, I mean he looks kinda nerdy, it was not what I had expected, but I guess it's good, cause no one would suspect him being a writer." As in this quote, known bodily features of male writers, although anticlimactic, were related to the doings of graffiti. One may look like a nerd, but it can be turned to one's advantage when writing. For non-male body it was the opposite, when being outed as female the re-embodied identity was repeatedly replaced by a non-normative body, placing them as "girl writers" or "girl bombers."

As a consequence, many of the female writers I followed sought to retain the distance between their physical bodies and their re-embodied and non-gendered – e.g. male – subcultural bodies. They would avoid frequenting open legal walls, or identify-

ing themselves with their tag to people whom they did not trust. In short, they did not only have to conceal their criminal identities to pass in public, they would also have to conceal their gendered bodies to pass as worthy subcultural participants.

To conclude, even though the doing of graffiti is intimately tied to bodily practices and plurality, the latter is confounded through a disembodied performance of identities through the symbolic. The lack of visibility, increased by two decades of zero tolerance against all forms of graffiti, works to reduce plurality as identities are re-embodied through gendered notions of who, what and how graffiti should be about. The stress on movement and access further these normative assumptions and work to exclude non-white and non-male bodies. Instead, the potential inclusivity that the anonymity of the physical person behind the tag opens for works to close the subcultural off. Even though the majority of writers that I have followed are white and male, graffiti is far from an all-male ritual. However, the re-embodiment of subcultural identities through normative bodily notions means that it often is performed as such. It creates a belief of a communal space that is conceived of as freed from the passive and fake, but also from women, creating and reinforcing masculine ideal and a conceived homosociality. The disproportion of women within the subcultural is thus a matter of an active exclusion of femininity, rather than due to women's lack of interest in graffiti, risk taking, visibility, or criminal activity (Mullaney 2007).

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”In Sweden we shake hands”

– *but are we really?*

Abstract

Motivated by a recent controversy over handshaking, a survey of the personal networks of young Swedes (n=2244) is used to describe greeting practices across social class, gender, immigrant background, and geographic location. While greeting practices in the sample are fairly uniform, there are also important differences. Handshaking is predominantly used by respondents with an immigrant background, men and women distinguish between greetings depending on the gender of the person they are greeting, and greeting practices differ between northern and southern Sweden as well as between rural and urban areas.

Keywords: greeting practice, friendship networks, gender

GREETINGS ARE A salient feature of social life and constitute an important everyday act that anchors cultural practices. Whatever expression it takes, it can be assumed that the flow of every interpersonal social interaction, long and short term, is dependent upon a successful, reciprocal, greeting (e.g., Schiffrin 1977). Because greeting practices are so strongly embedded in social life, both ritualistically and culturally, it is not surprising that greetings are occasionally the source of controversy. One such controversy is what motivates this research note, in which we use a survey of the personal networks of young Swedes to describe greeting practices across social class, gender, immigrant background, and geographic location.

On April 19, 2016, a young male, Muslim, politician from the Green Party sparked a controversy as he refused to shake hands with a female news reporter. Instead he greeted her by placing his hand over his chest. Many observers took this as a scandalous disrespect of women, and the general sentiment was that he breached some Swedish norm of egalitarian greeting practice. An analysis of articles published in the main Swedish newspapers over the two weeks that followed the scandal show that 20 percent of the articles were neutral, 23 percent defended the politician right to choose his way of greeting, while 57 percent criticised his refusal to shake hands (Arnljots 2017). The Swedish Prime Minister and politicians from across the scale, including the Green Party, unanimously joined in the criticism. The debate that followed was chiefly about ”Swedish norms and values”. In fact, there is little doubt that very few were particularly

concerned with greetings as such. At stake in this controversy was the putatively failed integration of immigrants into Swedish society in general and a fear of Muslims in particular. From a sociological perspective however, the controversy highlighted an interesting question about the relationship between shared norms and values (i.e., culture), and social acts (i.e. practices), and the idea that culture is expressed in action (e.g., Swidler 2001).

Swedes consider shaking hands a rather formal form of greeting, to be used particularly in new introductions (cf. Asplund 2006). In informal and more intimate settings other greeting practices are at play. But how do Swedes greet one another? Is there a monolithic repertoire of greeting practices in Sweden? And do different social strata display different greeting practices? Such questions form the basis for an on-going study. Here we present early findings about the greeting practices of young Swedes.

In the winter of 2013, the survey *Social capital and labour market integration* (Edling and Rydgren 2014) collected data on the personal networks of 23-year old Swedes with and without immigration background (for further description of the data and some results see e.g., Andersson, 2017; Hällsten, Edling, & Rydgren, 2017). In the second wave of the survey Statistics Sweden interviewed 2244 persons, of whom 501 had a least one parent born in Iran and 675 had a least one parent born in former Yugoslavia. The remaining 1068 had two parents born in Sweden. The survey used a range of established instruments to collect rich data on individuals and their life context. For the section on personal networks we applied a so-called name generator (Burt 1984) that asks each respondent (or ego) to name those (up to) five persons with whom she spends most of her spare time,¹ resulting in 8688 relations. For each such friend (or alter) we use a name interpreter to probe the respondent for additional information on each of her friends and on her relationship to each of her friends. One such question asked how they would greet this particular friend if they met "in town or on the street".² The response had eight alternatives and the respondents could select more than one alternative. In Figure 1 we report the four most distinct answers: a kiss on the cheek, a handshake, a hug, and simply saying "hej". There are at least two obvious limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting our results: First, the sample consists of 23-year olds, and are thus not representative for the Swedish population at large. Second, the survey asks about greetings between friends, and it cannot be assumed that strangers or acquaintances are greeted in the same fashion.

Focusing on the four distinctive practices reported in Figure 1, the most common way of greeting friends among young Swedes is hug, followed by saying "hej!", handshake, and kiss on the cheek. Thus, contrary to what the Swedish Prime Minister and other leading politicians suggested in April 2016, our results indicate that in Sweden we do not shake hands, at least not in the friendship circles of young adults. This should come as no surprise. As aptly noted by Asplund (2006), shaking hands is by no means

1 "Tänk på de fem personer som du träffar och umgås med oftast på din fritid."

2 "Hur brukar du hälsa på [vän] om ni stöter ihop på stan eller på gatan?"

a universal greeting practice in Sweden. However, we will not pursue the issue of what does and what does not pass for a Swedish way of greeting any further in this note. What really concerns us is whether or not there are systematic differences in greeting practices among friends across four key categories of stratification: (parents') social class, (respondents') gender, (respondents') immigrant background, and (respondents') geographic location.




Figure 1. The Distribution of four different greeting practices of young Swedes across social class, gender, immigrant background, and geographic location (n=8611 relations).

Note: It is possible to use several greeting practices for each friend. Analysis is based on mean values weighting each observation based on how common it is in the population taking a number of variables including parents' country of birth and education into account. North refers to Norrland, Urban refers to urban areas and their suburb municipalities (Kommungruppsindelning 2011). E refers to respondent (ego), A refers to respondent's friend (alter). Immigration background: Swedish denotes two Swedish born parents, Iranian denotes at least one parent born in Iran, and Yugoslavian denotes at least one parent born in former Yugoslavia. Parental class is coded with the Swedish SEI scheme. Source: Edling & Rydgren (2014)

The results, in Figure 1, show some differences across social class. Saying "hej!" is somewhat more common among working class youth, and the hug is more common in the upper service class. The most striking differences in greeting practice are observed across gender. Shaking hands almost only occur between men. But while a man greeting another man tends to refrain from hugs in preference of shaking hands or saying "hej!", he prefers hug when greeting another woman. Women on the other hand have a strong preference for hugs both when greeting men and women. Kissing on the cheek is not a common greeting practice and tends to occur only when a woman is involved. As for immigrant background, hugging and saying "hej!" are the most popular greetings. The group with native Swedish parents in particular have a preference for saying "hej!". Respondents with an Iranian background are the most intimate, in preferring hugs and cheek kisses, while respondents with a Yugoslavian background are over-represented in their preference for shaking hands. In fact, the group with native Swedish parents are strongly under-represented when it comes to shaking hands. Lastly, we come to geographical differences. As we see from Figure 1, saying "hej!" is the preferred greeting practice in the north and in rural areas, while hugging is mostly preferred in urban areas of the south of Sweden. The urban south is also where we observe most of the handshaking and the cheek kissing.

Given that shaking hands is a somewhat formal greeting, it is unsurprising that it is in infrequent use among friendship circles of young Swedes and that the more intimate hug or the informal "hej" is much more preferred. Greeting practices in our sample are fairly uniform, although some important differences in particular across gender, but also with respect to immigrant background, and geographic location are evident. The next step of our study is to try and explain these differences.

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Föreningen för alla Sveriges sociologer

TEMAT FÖR DETTA nummer av Sociologisk Forskning är ”Look at what’s happening in Sweden”. Att mycket hänt på senare tid, i nutid och framtid är klart. Vi kan konstatera parlamentarisk instabilitet, populistisk politik, ”fake news” aktivism, ökad social stratifiering innebärande större avstånd mellan de som har mest och de som inte har något, rasism och sexism. Parallellt ser vi också andra processer: synliggörande av och kollektiv mobilisering mot nämnda strukturella förtryck (”meetoo”, ”vistärinteut”), lokalt engagemang och globala rörelser mot konsumism (bytesekonomi) och klimatförändringar (köttfria dagar).

Sociologin har sedan ämnets formering haft som en huvuduppgift att förstå och förklara samhällsförändring såväl som stabilitet. Hur kan vi förstå nya organisations- och kommunikationsformer, intimitetssfärens skiftningar, arbetslivets mening? Vilka aktörer, makt- och styrformer, teknologier och diskurser är inblandade i och påverkar förändringsprocesser och deras utfall? Hur kan vi sociologiskt förklara konflikter såväl som samarbeten? Sociologer har svaren på dessa frågor. Inte var och en av oss, men kollektivt.

I ett föränderligt Sverige behövs en sociologi som fortsätter att synliggöra, analysera, kritisera och förklara. Sveriges sociologförbund (SSF) finns till för att stärka sociologisk forskning och utbildning, genom:

- Att främja den vetenskapliga utvecklingen inom sociologin och dess tillämpningsområden,
- Att verka för en ökad förståelse hos myndigheter, organisationer och bland allmänheten för sociologin som samhällsvetenskap,
- Att stärka sociologers yrkesmedvetande och yrkesansvar.

Sveriges sociologförbund är sedan 60-talet föreningen för Sveriges alla sociologer. Vi bevakar sociologins intressen i samhället och på universitetet och stärker det intellektuella utbytet svenska och internationella sociologer emellan. Vi verkar för sociologin i internationella sammanhang som International Sociological Association, European Sociological Association och Nordiska sociologförbundet.

SSF är intresseorganisationen för yrkesverksamma sociologer – på och utanför universitet – den självklara mötesplatsen för att utbyta erfarenheter och skapa kontakter. Men även studenter och andra intresserade får möjlighet att följa och påverka sociologins utveckling, debatter och samtal.

Förutom att vi sedan 1964 publicerar den framgångsrika tidskriften *Sociologisk*

forskning, som 2016 övergick till elektronisk publicering (listad i web of science), finansierar och samarrangerar vi den nationella mötesplatsen Sociologidagarna, tre dagar vartannat år.

Vi tar fram riktlinjer och policyrekommendationer, och distribuerar förlöpande information om kurser, tjänster, konferenser mm via förbundets hemsida www.sverigessociologforbund.se och på Facebook (Sveriges sociologförbund). Under #sociologertalar delas tidningsartiklar, tv och radioprogram och andra debatter där svenska sociologer medverkar.

Under 2016/2017 har förbundets styrelse bidragit till att samordna och stärka initiativ kring sociologin i gymnasieskolan. Tillsammans med företrädare för de allra flesta sociologimiljöer har vi drivit frågan framåt. Två workshops (varav en i samband med ämnesdagarna i oktober i Uppsala) har anordnats med syfte att förstärka sociologins roll och kvalitet i gymnasieskolan. En kartläggning har genomförts och en rapport publiceras inom kort. Rapporten sammanfattar möjliga vägar framåt och ger konkreta förslag för samarbeten och lokala initiativ.

Genom att samordna och stärka forskning och undervisning blir SSF – det vill säga alla vi medlemmar – ett starkt nav i sociologisverige.

Tora Holmberg
Ordförande SSF

Recensioner

Jamila Hussein, *Heder och hedersvåld. Berättelser, fakta, fördomar*. Göteborg: Bokförlaget Korpen, 2017.

”Går allt detta an, Albert?” frågar den unga Sara i Carl Jonas Love Almqvists roman-klassiker *Det går an* vilken publicerades första gången 1839. Vad Saras fråga syftar till är huruvida Albert kan tänka sig att leva tillsammans med henne utan att de ingår äktenskap och om han kan acceptera att hon försörjer sig själv. Albert menar att ja, detta går an.

Almqvists bok orsakade allmän upprördhet i dåtidens Sverige. Att angripa äkten-skapet som institution och den patriarkala ordningen tilläts icke. Att tala för kvinnors ekonomiska självständighet och jämlikhet med mannen var detsamma som att före-språka osedlighet.

I inledningen till sin bok påminner Jamila Hussein läsaren om denna skandal och framhåller att ”detta synsätt har mycket gemensamt med den moral som idag styr människorna i patriarkala hederskulturer i Mellanöstern” (s. 15).

Hussein framhåller att i Sverige tar debatten om hedersrelaterat våld och förtryck ofta sin utgångspunkt antingen i en feministisk eller en kulturell förklaringsmodell. Enligt den feministiska modellen görs ingen skillnad mellan hedersmord och andra mord på kvinnor som utförts av män. Det handlar i båda fallen om att det universella patriarka-tets kvinnoförakt tar sig konkret uttryck i mäns våldsutövande gentemot kvinnor. Att hedersmord kan förknippas med de kollektivistiska hederskulturer som förekommer i bland annat Mellanöstern, vilken den kulturella modellen gör gällande, är enligt den feministiska förklaringsmodellen ett uttryck för rasism. Genom att påtala kulturens relevans, och därigenom skilja på svenska och invandrade gärningsmän, finns det en risk för att det skapas en åtskiljande diskurs och ett vi-och-dom-tänkande. Hussein motsäger inte detta men hon understryker att det också kan vara riskabelt att *bortse* från skillnader.

Hussein ställer inte en ”svensk” kultur mot en ”patriarkal” även om hon alltså betonar kulturens vikt. Hon framhåller att patriarkatet kan manifesteras sig på olika sätt i olika kulturer. Hussein förklarar att hedersrelaterat våld har en flera tusen år gammal historia som härrör från den förislamiska beduinkulturen. De moderna he-derskulturerna styrs av normer, oskrivna lagar och traditioner som är djupt rotade i ett gammalt patriarkalt samhällssystem och klansamhälle där mannen hade enväldig makt över kvinnan. Denna makt är delvis paradoxal då det är flickorna och kvinnorna

i familjen som genom sina kroppar, sina handlingar och sina beteenden kan beröva mannen sin heder; kvinnan förvaltar på så sätt mannens sociala anseende och respekt.

Hussein lägger vikt vid att det sociala trycket i hederskulturer bidrar till att bevara en tradition med hedersmord i dagens samhälle. En kvinnas påstådda omoral skadar mannens, men också de övriga familjemedlemmarnas, anseende i gruppen. Gemenskapen och tillhörigheten i klansamhället står därmed på spel. Hussein skriver att man ”skulle kunna hävda att skvallret om omoral är viktigare än omoralen i sig själv” (s. 52). Ett rykte blir ofta detsamma som ett bevis på skuld. Därför blir den ständiga övervakningen av flickorna och kvinnorna i familjen påtaglig; det går inte att riskera att minsta lilla rykte uppstår. Hedersproblematiken är således tätt sammanflätad med klanens kontroll över individerna och individernas behov av tillhörighet i gruppen. Hussein poängterar i detta sammanhang behovet av en lyckad integration för de individer som lever i hederskulturer i Sverige. Vid ett misslyckat möte med det nya och främmande, vid marginalisering och utanförskap, kan behovet av klientillhörigheten förstärkas och hedern tillskrivas ännu större betydelse.

För att förstå hedersproblematiken och därmed också kunna motverka hedersrelaterat våld och förtryck är det angeläget att inte hamna i en intellektuell återvändsgränd där olika förklaringsmodeller blir viktigare än det problem de försöker förklara. Debatten är förvisso viktig (här finns mycket som kan – och *bör* – diskuteras) men bland de tidvis hårda ordväxlingarna och de orubbliga ståndpunkterna blir Husseins mer pragmatiskt orienterade bok ett välkommet inslag. Boken är informativ och till stora delar riktad till personer som ställs inför hedersrelaterade frågor i sitt vardagliga arbete, exempelvis skolpersonal som möter barn och ungdomar vars grundläggande rättigheter kränks av hedersskäl.

Hussein argumenterar sakligt för att hedersrelaterat våld och förtryck är en särskild typ av kvinnoförtryck. Det har förvisso sitt ursprung i en patriarkal maktordning men för att kunna motverkas måste det samtidigt förstås utifrån ett kulturperspektiv. När hon i bokens avslutande del ger konkreta råd för hur hedersförtryck och -våld ska kunna minskas i Sverige är hon tydlig med att det kräver god kulturkännedom samt snabba och omfattande insatser. I ett akut skede kan flickor och kvinnor (Hussein nämner men fokuserar tyvärr inte så mycket på utsatta pojkar och unga män) som lever under hot om hedersvåld omhändertas och placeras på skyddat boende. Men för att verkligen komma tillrätta med problemet krävs ett nära samarbete med hela familjen i syfte att förändra tankebanor och skapa trygghet och respekt.

De hotade flickorna lever i en situation där tryggheten samexisterar med faran. För att undkomma de potentiella gärningspersonerna måste de bryta med samtliga familjemedlemmar och släktingar – eftersom varje sådan kontakt innebär en fara. Ett uppbrott av detta slag är förstås inte lätt att göra. Husseins framställning för tankarna till vad Fadime Sahindal sa i sitt tal i riksdagen 2001: ”Jag har fått ge upp hela min bakgrund och börja om från början med att bygga upp mig själv, min identitet. [...] Oavsett vilken kulturell bakgrund man har bör det vara en självklarhet för varje ung kvinna att både få ha sin familj och det liv man önskar sig.”

Hussein har intervjuat män som har begått hedersmord (hon har även intervjuat några mammor, systrar och bröder till hedersmördade flickor samt flickor som utsatts

för hedersrelaterat våld) och hon menar att dessa män ofta beskriver hur de har försökt finna alternativa lösningar. Detta, menar Hussein, är något man kan försöka ta fasta på i arbetet med att förändra tankemönstret i familjerna. Det går att invända att ”alternativa lösningar” antyder att det likväl finns ett problem som behöver lösas; dvs. kvinnans påstådda omoral, men det är förstås ett steg i rätt riktning. Jag föreställer mig att för att komma åt de djupt rotade tankemönstren måste även andra män få en mer framträdande roll, dvs. de män som lever i hederskulturer men som aktivt tagit avstånd från dess traditioner, många gånger med fara för sina liv. Det kanske åtminstone kunde bidra till att pojkar, vilka förväntas gå i sina faders fotspår, ser att det finns alternativ till en förtryckande mansroll.

De män som kommer till tals i intervjuerna i Husseins bok är antingen hedersmördare eller bröder till hedersmördade flickor. Ingen av dessa säger sig ångra hedersmordet. Nu fungerar intervjuerna i stor utsträckning som informativa exempel. Det är i sig inte är negativt men jag efterlyser en djupdykning i detta rika empiriska material och en närmare analys av *hur* de berättar (dvs. inte endast vad de berättar om). Att en hedersmördare *säger* att han inte ångrar sig innebär inte nödvändigtvis att han *faktiskt* inte ångrar sig. Att en bror till en hedersmördad flicka säger att han anser att fadern handlat rätt innebär inte nödvändigtvis att han faktiskt tycker det. Det innebär förstås inte heller att berättelserna är ”osanna” eller ointressanta – tvärtom. Här finns utrymme för en fördjupad diskussion mot bakgrund av de sociala normer, föreställningar och förväntningar som männen har att förhålla sig till. Jag hoppas att Hussein får anledning att återkomma till en sådan diskussion. När hon exempelvis uppmärksammar de involverades ”inre konflikter” eller önskan om ”alternativa lösningar” blir resonemanget särskilt intressant. Likaså när hon noterar att ”...bakom den trygga fasaden utåt, med övertygelsen om att de handlat rätt och rättfärdigt, så fanns också tvivel och osäkerhet. [...] När de umgicks med andra medfångar eller när de fick besök av beundrande grannar och släktingar så satte de [...] upp en fasad av tuffhet och självsäkerhet” (s. 273).

I detta sammanhang kan jag tänka mig att mannens personliga tankar och känslor kolliderar med de tankar och känslor han *bör* ha, enligt den sociala gruppens normer. Det blir här lättare att förstå varför männen så gärna talar om sina handlingar och varför de visar sådan stolthet över dem. Det blir också tydligt varför det är möjligt att tala om en särskild typ av våld mot kvinnor – förvisso grundad i ett patriarkalt tänkande, men också i en kollektivistisk kultur. Individerna är underordnad. Svenska män dödar också kvinnor i ”hederns” namn, dvs. för att de upplever sig kränkta av vad de betraktar som olämpliga beteenden. Men, som Hussein skriver blir svenska män som dödat sina fruar inte hyllade av familj och vänner. Inte heller har släkten involverats i planeringen av sådana mord. För att förstå, och därmed kunna motarbeta, hedersvåld- och förtryck behöver vi studera detta som en särskild typ av våld med en särskild problematik grundad i ett särskilt sätt att leva. Även om jag ibland saknar ett analytiskt djup och tydlig teoretisk förankring uppfattar jag Husseins bok som ett betydelsefullt bidrag till denna förståelse.

Stellan Vinthagen, *Motståndets sociologi: Kampen mot förtryck med fredliga och frihetliga medel*. Sparsnäs: Irene Publishing, 2016.

När har vi varit så nära ett tredje världskrig som nu med den oberäknelige Donald Trump som USA:s president? Var det under Kubakrisen 1962 eller Ronald Reagans projekt med stjärnornas krig under 1980-talet? Antikärnvapenrörelser och fredsforskning borde därför stå centralt i samhället. Sociologen och fredsforskaren Stellan Vinthagen vid Göteborgs universitet och University of Massachusetts, Amherst i USA ger nu ut sin stora studie om vad ickevåld kan vara. Syftet är att utveckla sociologiska begrepp för ickevåld för att inom forskningen befrämja kritisk vetenskap och i världen att befrielsekamp förs fredligt.

Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) som ledde kampen för ett fritt och självständigt Indien mot den brittiska kolonialismen utgör en röd tråd i "Motståndets sociologi". Hans teori, eller ickevåldsfilosofi som Vinthagen skriver, jämförs med Habermas, Foucaults, Goffmans och Bourdieus teorier och förankras därför stadigt i sociologin. Gandhis teori kännetecknas av *satyagraha*, vilket ordagrant betyder "att hålla fast vid sanningen" och utmärks av försök att nå överenskommelser i konflikter via dialektisk interaktion.

Den grundläggande tanken i denna rika bok är att de som kämpar utan våld måste göra det på två fronter, dels göra aktivt och fredligt motstånd mot våld och förtryck, dels bygga upp alternativa sätt att göra saker och ting på, allt från enkla mötestekniker till hela nydanande samhällen såsom de så kallade ashrama i Indien. Vinthagens formel här är den följande: "Icke-våld = Utanvåld + Antivåld". Man kan ta en promenad utan att använda våld, men det kan ändå inte räknas till ickevåld. "Det är just kombinationen av ett bekämpande av våld på ett sådant *sätt* att man själv inte använder våld som blir ickevåld (s.10)." Vinthagen delar in ickevåld i fyra handlingstyper: maktbrytande, dialogunderlättande, normativ reglering och utopisk gestaltning. Han utformar dem utifrån Habermas fyra typer av handlingar, de målrationella, de kommunikativa, de normativa, och de dramaturgiska handlingarna. I den elegant uppbyggda "Motståndets sociologi" ägnas ett kapitel var åt handlingstyperna: Foucault är den relevanta teoretikern när det gäller att bryta någons makt, Habermas själv när det gäller att underlätta dialoger, Bourdieu när det gäller normer och förändring av normer och Goffman för ickevåldsaktivisternas teatrala gestaltning av det utopiska. Det är ovanligt med en sådan kunnsig syntes av central sociologisk teoribildning.

Sociala rörelser som bekämpar våld och förtryck utan att använda våld betonar ofta endast en sådan handlingstyp men det ideala är att en rörelse balanserar sig fram genom att använda alla fyra typerna av handlingar. Sådana idealiska rörelser benämner Vinthagen konsensusorienterade ickevåldsrörelser.

Genomgående utgör erfarenheter från sociala rörelser det empiriska material som illustrerar Vinthagens begreppsutveckling. Han är ödmjuk och slår inte fast sina begrepp och relationerna mellan dem utan menar att de är "enbart tänkbara".

Vinthagen menar:

Målet för ickevåldskampen är att i konflikter nå konsensus mellan alla inblandade parter, både en förnuftig överenskommelse och ett socialt arrangemang som alla kan acceptera såväl kognitivt som emotionellt. (Vinthagen, *Motståndets sociologi*, s.139)

Detta måste tyckas provocerande i ett samhälle med krav på många fler poliser, längre fängelsestraff och starkare försvar. Är det inte skamligt att en människa försöker komma överens med rasister och verkar för en kompromiss som tillfredsställer även dem känslomässigt? Nu är det inte den individuella nivån ickevåldskampen gäller utan det rör sig oftast om sociala rörelser som ställer krav på en förtryckande statsapparat. Polarisering ska undergrävas, vi-och-dom-tänkandet försvagas och de fasta identiteterna destabiliseras. Det gäller att handla som om fred redan rådde och som om vi redan var vänner. Bara information hjälper inte utan argumenten behöver gestaltas. Man måste handla i enlighet med den eftersträvade jämlikheten och respekten för varandra. Defiance-kampanjen i Sydafrika 1952, då 6 000 aktivister uppvisade civil olydnad i sin kamp mot det rasistiska apartheidsystemet, är en träffande illustration. Tidigare när en vit arbetsgivare avskedat en svart arbetare, tog denne av sig hatten, böjde sitt huvud och sa undergivet: ”Ja tack och adjö då”. Men med kampanjen för civil olydnad fick arbetaren modet att i stället se arbetsgivaren rakt in i ögonen och inte ta av sig hatten. På så sätt kunde arbetaren manifesteras sin värdighet.

Lidandet är centralt för Gandhi. Att visa makthavarna att aktivisterna har ett annat sorts mod än det militära, modet att dö för sin tro på ett jämlikt samhälle, påvisar för makthavarna att aktivisterna är människor. Att ickevåldsaktivisten är beredd att lida för sin sak visar enligt Vinthagen motståndarna att engagemanget är äkta. Det krävs också teknik. Att kunna gå genom en folkmassa som spottar och hånar en underlättas om man tränat på det. Den amerikanska svarta medborgarrörelsen liksom den senare amerikanska rörelsen för Lesbian and Gay Rights hade sådan träning.

De empiriska exemplen innebär dyrköpta folkliga lärdomar och de tas främst från den indiska befrielseörelsen, medborgarrättsrörelsen i USA, den sydafrikanska anti-apartheidrörelsen, den västtyska antimilitaristiska rörelsen och den fortfarande verksamma brasilianska lantarbetarrörelsen. Boken ger många färgstarka men kort beskrivna exempel, såsom Koncert Blockade som innebar att en symfoniorkester med 120 musiker spelade Bach, Beethoven, Schubert och Mozart utanför portarna till USAs kärnvapenbas i Mutlangen i dåvarande Västtyskland 1986. Musikerna såg kärnvapenbasen som ”förberedelse för folkmord”. Vinthagen skriver att ”[b]asen var tillfälligt ur bruk på grund av Beethovens musik” men efter en dags spelande arresterades hela orkestern.

”Motståndets sociologi” har sin styrka i författarens breda och djupa kunskap i ämnet och analysen som genom de fyra handlingstyperna sammanför forskning om ickevåldsaktioner med ämnet sociologi. Denna styrka är samtidigt den största svagheten. Boken är systematiskt upplagd, begreppen presenteras fortlöpande i text, figurer och tabeller och med en sammanfattning av begreppen på sidorna 334–335. Det är alltför logiskt och förnuftigt. Som läsare uppfattar jag att betydligt färre begrepp skulle ha räckt. Och språket blir ibland otympligt. Låt mig citera Vinthagens preciserade

syfte: ”att utifrån ett sociologiskt perspektiv tolka och begreppsligt beskriva rörelser ickevåldshandlande i konfliktsituationer, vilka utspelas i samhällen präglade av våld och förtryck, för att på så vis utveckla analytiska verktyg och en kritiskt präglad rörelserepertoar – och därmed främja en kombination av kritisk vetenskap och fredlig befrielsekamp” (s.4). Det må vara ett sätt att skriva på som uppfattas som vetenskapligt men om detta ideal är jag oenig.

För en läsare som ska hålla isär de många begreppen kan boken bli tung att läsa. Men jag vill betona att det är värt mödan. Jag menar att Stellan Vinthagens genomgång och systematisering av vetandet kring ickevåld är en värdefull vetenskaplig insats och samtidigt en insats för freden. I en tid då tanken på ett tredje världskrig fått ny aktualitet har vi mycket att lära av ickevåldstraditionen. Vinthagens empiriska exempel inger hopp: Antikolonial kamp och frigörelse från diktaturer på 1900-talet visar att den som använder ickevåldsliga kampmetoder har dubbelt så stor chans att nå sina mål. Och om en kamp har fört till självständighet är det tio gånger mer sannolikt att den följs av demokratisering och inte inbördeskrig, om kampen skett med ickevåldsmetoder.

Hedvig Ekerwald, Uppsala universitet

Maria Carbin, Johanna Overud och Elin Kvist, *Feminism som lönearbete*. Stockholm: Leopard, 2017.

Kanske är det genom arbetskritiken som svensk sociologi nu gör sig mer ”publik”. Roland Paulsens framgångar med sina böcker om arbetssamhället pekar på behovet av sociologiska analyser i den bredare kulturdebatten, men kanske mera på den allt bördigare jordmånen för en ny typ av kritisk diskussion kring arbetets roll och den så kallade balansen mellan jobb och fritid. Sedan ett decennium tillbaka har publika intellektuella på den internationella arenan lyckats fånga upp frågan om hur ny teknologi och fördelningspolitik skulle kunna förändra rådande former för arbetsdelning och livsvillkor i framförallt Väst. Inte minst tycks den anställda medelklassen vara öppen för den typen av diskussioner; det så kallade RUT-avdragets ställning har konsoliderats genom en bred politisk enighet kring en verklighetsbeskrivning som gör gällande att avdragsgilla hushållstjänster avlastar arbetande föräldrar och skapar mer jämställda familjer, samtidigt som det ger underordnade grupper en bättre ställning på arbetsmarknaden. Just detta inslag i berättelsen om RUT, att det minskar en negativ arbetsbörda för medelklassen genom att skapa mer arbete åt arbetarklassen, kan sägas vara utgångspunkten för boken *Feminism som lönearbete* av Maria Carbin, Johanna Overud och Elin Kvist. De identifierar lönearbetets centrala roll i människors liv och i byggandet av välfärdsstaten; som författarna konstaterar är det just genom lönearbete

som människor förväntas bli frigjorda individer och fullvärdiga medborgare. Men, frågar författarna (s. 11), innebär det att vi är fria eller snarare att vi är fritt tillgängliga för lönearbetets gränslöshet?

Utgångspunkten för boken är den klassiska feministiska frågeställningen kring produktivt kontra reproduktivt arbete, där författarna önskar lyfta fram formerna för det obetalda omsorgsarbetet som en utgångspunkt för mänsklig samvaro. Omsorgsarbetet ställs här i kontrast till lönearbetets ”ekonomiska premisser” som ”dikteras av kapitalismen” och drivs av tankar om oändlig tillväxt (s. 12). Boken syftar alltså till att skriva fram en feministisk arbetskritik, i samma anda som Kathi Weeks *The Problem with Work* från 2011, men med utgångspunkt i den svenska välfärdspolitiken och den svenska kvinnorörelsens fixering av lönearbetet som premis för inkludering och autonomi.

Den svenska arbetslinjen ägnas följdriktigt ett kapitel som inleds med rubriken ”Arbetslinjen som politisk norm”. Normbegreppet är relevant här; det går förmodligen inte att få en enda politiker att säga något annat än att ”full sysselsättning” är ett överordnat mål för den svenska politiken, trots att Riksbanken ersatte det med inflationsbekämpning redan i kölvattnet av 90-talskrisen. I själva verket har ekonomiska teorier om jämviktsarbetslöshet sedan länge överordnats idén om en verklig, full sysselsättning, vilket förklarar hur det kommer sig att vi trots underbemanning i många sektorer också dras med en arbetslöshet på runt 7 procent. Normen handlar alltså snarare om moral och kontroll, vilket författarna diskuterar förtjänstfullt; historien om de allt mer repressiva så kallade sysselsättningsåtgärderna förtjänar mer sociologisk uppmärksamhet. Den bakomliggande struktur som välfärdsstaten bygger på med krav på motprestation i ersättningssystemen diskuteras bara kortfattat och något ensidigt av författarna, som istället för fram den omdiskuterade idén med basinkomst som en lösning på de ojämlika effekter som kopplingen mellan lönearbete och socialförsäkringarna skapar.

Ett problem med den starka konsensusen kring arbetslinjen är enligt författarna att lönearbetsnormen omfattar också de lönearbetande. Här hade ett öppnare förhållningssätt gynnat analysen. Som författarna påpekar har den svenska kvinnorörelsen i hög utsträckning arbetat för reformer som gör det möjligt för kvinnor att just lönearbeta därför att det uppfattats som den viktigaste förutsättningen för kvinnors självständighet. Den rika floran av feministiska arbetsplatsetnografier skulle kunna vidga perspektivet här; kvinnors erfarenheter av lönearbete är inte bara en berättelse om förtryck, utan också om upplevelsen av att träda in i gemenskap, om möjligheten till självförverkligande och – faktiskt – en viss grad av autonomi. Hade författarna gått i dialog med någon av de klassiska feministiska arbetsplatsetnografierna, som illustrerar komplexiteten i erfarenheten att också under förtryckande former finna meningsfulla relationer i och till arbetet, hade analysen framstått som mindre inåtvänd. Inte minst hade diskussionen kring det reproduktiva arbetet kunnat vidgas – det är knappast, som författarna antyder (s. 31), bara skribenten Nina Björk som identifierat att kapitalismen har en tendens att suga in livets alla delar i kapitalackumulationens processer. Relationen mellan produktion, reproduktion och ackumulation har genomlysts av materialistiska feminister som gjort reda för den tidiga, pre-kapitalistiska ackumula-

tionen och dess könade struktur och effekter. Med en kort reflektion kring sådana mer historiesociologiska insatser hade författarna kunnat undvika det implicita antagandet att organiserat arbete i sig uppstått i och med kapitalismen. Möjligen hade det också fått författarna att reflektera kring vem som skrivs fram som det politiska subjektet i det arbetskritiska projektet.

Boken framstår nämligen som centrerad kring den svenska kärnfamiljen, vars produktion och reproduktion skrivs fram som isolerad, snarare än som del av världsökonomi i Wallersteins bemärkelse. Författarna argumenterar för att en vision behövs, ”som tar utgångspunkt i att vi alla varit (och är) små, sjuka, svaga, att vi kommer åldras och under perioder av våra liv vara oförmögna att fatta rationella och kostnadskalkylerande beslut (s. 132)”. Det är visst en relevant början, men hur skulle ett gott arbete utanför hemmet, och i syfte att sörja för kretsar utanför den egna familjen, kunna organiseras i ett globaliserat samhälle? Boken ger inga svar, eftersom frågan inte ställs.

Enligt författarna är det ”dialektiken” mellan produktivt och reproduktivt arbete som fått stå i centrum (s. 13), men just skillnader och likheter häremellan underbetonas. Trots spännande analyser av den svenska hemmafru-eran, RUT-avdragets historia och hemarbetarnas riksorganisation HARO förblir perspektivet på just omsorgsarbete snävt: kan det aldrig organiseras kollektivt, och har det inte funnits andra än ekonomiska poänger med offentlig barnomsorg? I sin slutdiskussion kring HAROs krav på erkännande för hemarbetande kvinnor skriver författarna att ”offentligt finansierad förskola är lönsam och fungerar inom en kapitalistisk logik, där kapitalet kan utnyttja vår arbetskraft och staten får in medel via skatter” (s. 130). Pedagogik och gemenskap, begrepp som varit och fortfarande ska vara centrala för barnomsorgens utövare, trycks här undan till förmån för idén att lönearbete i sig gör människor enbart ofria. Här framstår också författarnas feministiska arbetskritik som mycket hallå för en rätt enkel (och definitivt inte ny) idé: korta arbetstiden! Visst kan sociologin producera en något mer djuplodande arbetskritik än så? Enkla tankeexperiment illustrerar de snäva visioner som författarnas analyser trots allt utmynnar i. Vardagliga händelser, som att ett rör i ett hus går sönder, eller att någon drabbas av en allvarlig infektion som kräver omedelbar antibiotikaförskrivning, destabiliserar resonemangen nog för att ifrågasätta huruvida kritiken av *lönearbete* faktiskt grundar sig i en analys av det. Hur ser arbetskritiken ut när vi sätter den i relation till konkreta situationer där arbete räddar liv eller bara räddar oss undan livets skit? Hur ska avloppsjour och antibiotikadistribution organiseras egentligen?

För att göra upp med lönearbetets nödvändighet är det inte ”endast lönearbetets organisering som behöver ifrågasättas” argumenterar författarna – istället måste gränserna mellan obetalt och betalt arbete och marginaliseringen av omsorgsarbete synliggöras. Här illustrerar boken väl problemen med kravet på och det skapade behovet av att lönearbete, det vill säga att mot betalning sälja sin tid och sin kraft, under villkor som upplevs som orättvisa och pressande och som gör oss sjuka. Snarare än en analys av lönearbete är boken en anklagelseakt mot arbetsintensifiering och giriga arbetsorganisationer. Boken diskuterar däremot inte på allvar arbetets *organisering*, behovet av koordinerade arbetsinsatser som behöver vara rätt avancerade för att svara mot

komplexa behov, eller alternativa organiseringsformer. En konkret diskussion kring alternativ skulle behöva ta tag i de frågor som den svenska fackföreningsrörelsen med viss framgång hanterade i perioden efter andra världskriget. Här finns också svaret på frågan om varför full sysselsättning varit så viktigt för det vänsterfeministiska projekt som författarna kritiserar. Det handlar inte om att kapitalismen bygger på en ”norm” om lönearbete som såväl högern som vänstern oreflekterat omfamnat, utan om insikten att arbete och ägande, och därmed makt, är förbundna. Kortad arbetstid är alltså en central strategi för förändrade maktrelationer. En kanske lika viktig fråga för den som önskar öppna upp för realistiska utopier – och som inte nämns – är allt som rymms i tanken kring ”medbestämmande”. *Feminism som lönearbete* är en lättmanövrerad ingång till feministisk arbetskritik, men som inte hanterar möjligheten att förändra relationen mellan produktivt och reproduktivt arbete eller ens utsikten att faktiskt organisera om arbetet och makten över arbetet.

Rebecca Selberg, Lunds universitet

Olle Wästberg & Daniel Lindvall, *Folkstyret i rädslans tid*. Stockholm: Fri Tanke, 2017.

Det är inte så länge sedan som demokratins segertåg över världen föreföll omöjligt att stoppa. Muren föll, Europa enades under demokratisk flagg, Latinamerikas diktaturer ersattes en efter en av folkvalda styren. Triumfatoriska texter författades, övernationell eller global demokrati stod kanske runt hörnet. Och som kronan på verket tycktes också arabvärldens dysfunktionella autokratier sjunga på sista versen.

Så snabbt det har gått åt andra hållet. Ur den arabiska våren kom inbördeskrig och nya diktaturer medan Latinamerikas demokratier brottas med svåra korrupsionsproblem och återfall i auktoritära praktiker. I vissa EU-länder har bärare av anti-demokratiska värderingar tagit sig ända fram till maktens styrspakar, samtidigt som demokratin på Europa-nivån ter sig allt mer som en chimär. Och som kronan på verket har USA valt en president vars demokratiska instinkter är minst sagt tveksamma.

Denna demokratins kris och delvisa reträtt utgör den fond mot vilken *Folkstyret i rädslans tid* formulerar sina farhågor och föreslår motåtgärder. Författarna har helt nyligen samarbetat i den senaste svenska demokratiutredningen, nu tar de åter till pennan i förskräckelsen över valet av Trump och samtidens andra oroväckande strömningar. Samtidigt som fonden är kanske inte global men dock internationell så handlar det mesta av boken om den svenska demokratin. Wästberg & Lindvall beskriver en ganska bekymmersam utveckling, där den politiska jämlikheten försvagats genom förändringar i politiskt deltagande och inflytande, där de politiska partierna allt mer

fjärmats från medborgarnas vardag, där pengar och inhyrd professionell kunskap blivit viktigare politiska maktmedel och där den offentliga debatten förråts och fått en svagare bas i fakta och upplyst förståelse.

Författarna föreslår många åtgärder, i stort och smått, ifråga om hur demokratin kan stärkas. Det handlar sammantaget om att förstärka resurssvaga grupperns vilja och möjligheter att delta i politiken och om att hindra politiska eliter från att avskärma sig från medborgarnas granskning och inflytande. Det handlar också om att stärka den goda offentligheten inför samtidens fragmentariserande och polariserande tendenser. Även om inget av förslagen är särskilt revolutionerande skulle ändå vart och ett av dem bidra till ett mer demokratiskt Sverige.

Det finns överhuvudtaget mycket gott att säga om denna bok. Den är precis så bekymrad som läget kräver, den är insatt och eftertänksam (en märklig vurm för författaren Lena Anderssons åsikter till trots) och mycket välskriven (en del irriterande korrekturfel till trots). Den bärs av ett genuint demokratiskt patos som känns befriande i denna cynismens och uppgivenhetens tid.

Samtidigt lämnar den mig en smula otillfredsställd. Mot bakgrund av den bekymmersamma utveckling som skisseras känns de åtgärder som föreslås både lite väl små och lite väl svenska. Åtgärderna förutsätter en till största delen välfungerande offentlig makt för att kunna genomföras och författarna adresserar i liten utsträckning de internationella beroenden i vilka Sverige är inblandade.

Boken kommer därmed att nästan ignorera de två stora elefanterna i det demokratiska rummet. Den ena handlar om korruption i vid bemärkelse. En stor del av de demokratiska dysfunktioner som präglar våra dagars samhällen har inte i första hand med väljare, debatt och partier att göra. De kommer ur system som på sin utflödes-sida är korrupta, antingen genom att människor med kontakter eller rätt bakgrund kan få politiken att göra saker för dem som mindre lyckligt lottade inte kan, eller genom att rena mutor och andra former av ekonomiska övertramp är vanliga. Det är denna korruption som ätit hjärtat ur Latinamerikas demokratiska rörelse, och det är denna korruption som världen över göder ett politiskt raseri som inte sällan tar sig helt missriktade uttryck, när ”de andra” (med annan hudfärg eller härkomst) får bära hundhuvudet för systemens brister.

Korruptionen handlar inte bara om den fattiga världens gravt vanskötta offentliga institutioner och den är inte något historiskt stadium som vi i den rika världen tryggt lagt bakom oss. I den rika världens maktcentrum sitter nu människor och bestämmer, vilkas enda grund för att utöva makt är att de råkar vara släkt med landets president. Deras privatekonomiska intressen sammanflätas på ett groteskt vis med den politik som världens starkaste militärmakt bedriver. Det patrimoniala styre som redan Max Weber trodde var oåterkalleligt på väg ut återuppstår mitt framför våra ögon, i vad vi till helt nyligen trodde var institutionellt garanterade demokratiska miljöer.

Även om Sverige i en internationell jämförelse är relativt förskonat från korruption så är tecknen inte gynnsamma ens här. Vi har under senare år sett många exempel på en osund sammanblandning av offentlig makt och privatekonomiska intressen, i form av till exempel ursparade projekt av ”offentlig-privat samverkan” som fräter stora hål

i demokratin. Det är hål som näppeligen låter sig lagas av aldrig så välkonstruerade insatser ifråga om hur val och debatter ska utformas, här krävs att institutionella domäner åtskiljs och att den offentliga sektorns integritet återställs.

Den andra elefanten i rummet är makten över det ekonomiska beslutsfattandet. På denna punkt har Folkstyret i rädsans tid nästan inte något alls att säga – trots att den upprepade gånger pekar på hur en ökande ekonomisk ojämlikhet lägger grunden för ökad politisk ojämlikhet.

Detta handlar delvis om hur makten över grundläggande ekonomisk-politiska beslut ska kunna återföras till demokratin. Under decennierna har sådana beslut allt eftersom skeppats ut till diverse icke-valda expertorgan så att demokratin har tömts på meningsfullt innehåll i den gängse vänster-högerdimensionen och istället kommit att handla om frågor kring identitet, migration, livsstil och kultur. I detta vatten simmar rasister och andra högerpopulister bättre än andra. Vill vi stoppa deras framfart måste politiken få bestämma över väsentliga ekonomiska förhållanden. I dag är vi istället alla på sätt och vis greker, eftersom de politiska val vi gör får ganska små följder för våra samhällets grundläggande ekonomisk-politiska vägval.

Men det handlar också om hur den privata marknadsagerande delen av ekonomin ska kunna göras mer demokratisk. Ekonomins inflytande över politiken vore inte fullt så bekymmersam om det inte var så att företag och banker så tydligt styrdes i de fås intressen snarare än i de många. Om makten och rikedomerna inte koncentrerades så markant till toppen, om medborgarna även i sin roll som arbetande kunde få väga kortsiktiga vinster mot långsiktiga mål, kunde konflikten mellan näringsliv och politik mildras och vi alla till slut bli myndiga på riktigt. Jag tror inte det är en slump att den enda svenska storbank som aldrig behövt lösas ut av skattebetalarna – Handelsbanken – till del ägs av sina anställda.

Jag föreställer mig att Olle Wästberg och Daniel Lindvall kanske håller med om mycket av detta och en del av det står till och med i deras bok. Men det är som om de inte riktigt förmår följa upp sin bekymrade samtidsbeskrivning med att föreslå förändringar som verkligen skulle bita. Till del kan de sannerligen ursäktas: om vi verkligen vill demokratisera våra samhällen är det stora saker som krävs, som det kanske känns helt orealistiskt att ens diskutera i dagens läge. Men det är många saker som under historien tett sig orealistiska som i efterhand kommit att ses som närmast självklara. Kanske ska man om demokratin säga som Mahatma Ghandi påstås ha sagt om ”Western civilization”: I think it would be a good idea.

Stefan Svallfors, Institutet för framtidsstudier och Södertörns högskola

**Thomas P. Boje, *Civilsamfund, medborgerskap og deltagelse*.
Köpenhamn: Hans Reitzels, 2017.**

På anslagstavlan på mitt arbetsrum sitter en bild signerad Ulf Lundkvist. Två typiska Lundkvistska figurer är uppenbarligen i fara, varav den ena utbrister: ring civilsamhället! För mig är bilden en blinkning till alla dem som under senare decennier lyft fram civilsamhället som svaret på en rad utmaningar. Men vad menas med civilsamhället? Och i vilken mening kan det sägas kunna utgöra svaret på så många förhoppningar?

I Thomas P. Bojes *Civilsamfund, medborgerskap og deltagelse* ges välinformerade svar på bägge dessa frågor. Genom en analys av begreppets historiska bakgrund och av aktuell forskning på området civilsamhälle och medborgarskap vill boken klargöra på vilket sätt medborgare genom aktivt deltagande kan säkra reellt och demokratiskt inflytande över samhällens utveckling och dess mer konkreta former liksom också personliga livsvillkor. Bokens kontext och empiriska exempel är allra främst Danmark och de nordiska välfärdsstaterna även om där också ges rikligt med exempel från stora delar av västvärlden.

Bokens utgångspunkt är att civilsamhället inte enbart är en nödvändighet för en levande demokrati, det är bara dess ena sida. Det handlar lika mycket om att skapa förutsättningar för social rättvisa. Det är genom medborgarnas deltagande i civilsamhället som både rättvisa och demokrati kan skapas, även om dessa värden sedan kanaliseras till och drar nytta av andra sfärer (staten och marknaden).

För att analysera denna civilsamhällets dubbla betydelse utgår Boje från tre sammanlänkade begrepp: civilsamhälle, medborgarskap och deltagande. I bokens inledande delar går författaren igenom hur dessa begrepp formulerats genom seklerna liksom hur de under de senaste decennierna kommit att utmanas. Medborgarskapet har gått från att främst vara en rättighet, byggt på en vardaglig praxis utan större politiska inslag, till att bli en praktik betingad av socialt engagemang och arbetsmarknadens förutsättningar. Denna förändring har inneburit att exkludering och inkludering i samhälleliga gemenskaper i högre grad kommit att vara knutet till den enskildes relation till arbetsmarknaden. Rättighetsaspekten av medborgarskapet kan därför inte längre lika självklart motverka skillnader mellan sociala grupper.

Förändringen i synen på vad ett medborgarskap konkret kan innebära på individnivå har också inneburit och delvis drivits på framväxten av en mer *aktivistisk* medborgerlig hållning. Denna samtida typ av medborgarskap skiljer sin från ett *aktivt* medborgarskap som byggt på medlemskap i organisationer vilka i sin tur företrätt sina medlemmar. Medborgarskapet förstås då inte enbart som ett medlemskap i en territorialstat, utan som uttryck för olika former av kamp för inkludering i politiska gemenskaper.

Det aktivistiska medborgarskapet bedrivs också i relation till de som inte är medlemmar, dvs. icke-medborgare, men väl invånare i en territorialstat. I det här sammanhanget lyfter Boje fram Sans-Papier-rörelsen i Frankrike. Rörelsen växte fram 1996 och tog fart i och med att 324 migranter ockuperade en kyrka i Paris. Några av dem var asylsökande medan andra redan hade haft arbetstillstånd under ett antal år.

Som ett resultat av åtstramningar i lagstiftningen var dessa migranter, som tidigare kunnat få medborgarskap, inte längre berättigade till det. I förlängningen innebar det, att de inte heller hade samma sociala rättigheter. De krävde därför rätten att stanna i landet och att tillerkännas samma rättigheter som medborgare. Migranterna fick stort stöd i den franska befolkningen och det växte fram en rörelse som förmådde att sätta deras frågor på dagordningen.

Den förändrade synen på medborgarskap har tagit form samtidigt som civilsamhällets organisationer i ökande omfattning kommit att tas i bruk för social service. Non-for-profit-organisationer har blivit en aktiv partner för att lösa problem som stat, kommun, landsting, till stora delar tagit hand om sedan välfärdsstatens framväxt. Den förändringen äger rum parallellt med en större önskan från etablerade politiska organisationer att civilsamhället och medborgare överlag ska lösa växande problem med misstro och utanförskap.

Bokens kanske mest intressanta kapitel rör frågan om vilken roll bruket av sociala medier har i det samtida politiska landskapet (kapitel 9). På vilket sätt inverkar sociala medier etableringen av sociala nätverk och påverkan i politiska processer? Rör det sig i någon mån om att grupper som inte tidigare hade någon representation nu finner en plats där de kan vara aktiva och ta till orda som medborgare? Eller är det tvärt om så att de sociala medierna domineras av en redan etablerad – eller till och med framväxande – maktelit? Förstärker dessa senare grupper snarare sin position genom att också agera via de sociala medierna? Hur effektiva kanaler är de sociala medierna för att kunna påverka politiska processer?

För att besvara dessa frågor väljer Boje att sätta in dem i en bredare politisk kontext. Nyliberalismen som politisk doktrin beskrivs som orsak till det framväxande hat och den misstro som ofta kanaliseras i de sociala medierna. Kritiska rörelser av olika slag har vuxit fram som reaktion på detta politiska paradigm och dess betoning på en minimalistisk version av politiskt deltagande och demokrati, där användningen av sociala medier varit en viktig startpunkt. Det är framförallt finanskrisen 2008 som varit den tändande gnistan.

Boje lyfter fram Beppe Grillos rörelse MoVimento 5 Stelle (M5S) som det första och tydligaste exemplet på hur dessa strömningar kan te sig. Denna rörelse följdes sedan av många andra, exempelvis Indignados, Occupy Wall Street och Venligboerne. Signifikant för dessa rörelser är att de får genomslag just genom sitt bruk av sociala medier. Gemensamt för dem är också en önskan att utveckla en alternativ praxis för representation och beslutsfattande. De etablerar alla nya former för rådgivning och beslutsfattande och har samtidigt som idé att visa på betydelsen av att bilda nya former.

Upprättandet av dessa former blir ett uttryck för rörelsernas kritik av den representativa demokratins brister. För vissa grupper, som kvinnor och yngre, innebär dessa ofta mer horisontellt organiserade aktionsformer en öppning in till politiskt handlande. För andra grupper kan de däremot ha negativ inverkan eftersom de Internet-organiserade aktiviteterna ställer större krav på förmåga att uttrycka sig skriftligt och i många fall också muntligt. Det klassiska medlemskapet i en större organisation är i den bemärkelsen en enklare väg till engagemang.

Samtidigt behöver de faktiska grupperingar som växer fram ur dessa rörelser, liksom den misstro de uttrycker, inte utgöra en stor del av befolkningen för att ändå nå ut. I Bojes beskrivning kanaliseras grupperna ofta en framväxande vrede mot en lång period av neoliberalt orienterad politik liksom en uppgörelse med en allt mindre funktionsduglig representativ demokrati. Utmaningen för etablerade politiska organisationer – i en mening det demokratiska samhällets dilemma – är huruvida det politiska systemet förmår att balansera tillit och icke tillit i ett mer öppet system för beslutsfattande. En utmaning som de inte alltid förmår adressera. Dels för att alla former av politik och deltagande inte är demokratiskt, tolerant och solidariskt, dels för att många av civilsamhällets organisationer sin självbild till trots är mindre inkluderande och som Boje uttrycker ”reellt segregering” (s. 356).

Civilsamfund, medborgerskap og deltagelses största styrka ligger i en välutvecklad och grundad beskrivning av teorier och empiriska studier av det samtida civilsamhället. Boken är en bra källa för den som behöver en översikt av och introduktion till området. Här presenteras såväl teorier kring civilsamhälle och deltagande sedan antiken och framåt som en uppdaterad och kritisk analys av denna sfärs betydelse, möjligheter och utmaningar i samtiden. Särskilt väl presenteras Danmark, dess rörelser och utmaningar. Beskrivningen och diskussionen av hur civilsamhällets organisationer pressas att härbärgera såväl statens som marknadens tillkortakommanden utgör bokens främsta bidrag.

Boken i sin helhet bygger emellertid på lite väl entydiga beskrivningar. Trots att boken är omfångsrik saknas här mer nyanserade analyser av den politiska samtiden. Den bristen hänger delvis samman med Bojes normativa utgångspunkt. Likt de fina figurerna i Ulf Lundkvists seriestripp är hans utgångspunkt att civilsamhället är ett fungerande, demokratiskt och rättvis samhälles nav. Boje undersöker sedan i vad mån denna typ av civilsamhälle existerar. En alternativ utgångspunkt hade varit att med hjälp av mer analytiska begrepp, såsom relationen individ-kollektiv eller individualisering och reflexivitet, studera i vilken bemärkelse ett civilsamhälle av idag kan förmå att vara detta nav.

Min kritik ska inte förta bokens insiktsfulla och breda presentation och diskussion av några av de viktigaste begreppen i samtida demokratidebatt. Boje visar genom sina många empiriska exempel på hur drömmarna om civilsamhället inte alltid kan realiseras.

Adrienne Sörbom, Stockholms universitet

Andersson Catrin m. fl., *Marknadsstaten: Om vad svenska staten gör med marknaderna – och marknaden gör med staten*. Stockholm: Liber, 2017.

Hur fungerar egentligen samspelet mellan stat och marknad idag? I en tid ofta karaktäriserad som nyliberal och där marknaden hålls fram som ett ideal är det högst relevant att fråga sig vad som händer bortom pratet, diskursen och retoriken. Här ger *Marknadsstaten: Om vad svenska staten gör med marknaderna – och marknaden med staten* ett viktigt bidrag genom att skildra de praktiska relationerna mellan staten, dess myndigheter och marknaden. Texten tar avstamp i tre frågor som belyser (i) vad staten säger om sin roll i relation till marknaderna; (ii) hur statens marknadspåverkan sker, samt (iii) hur staten och dess myndigheter förhåller sig till och organiserar sig i relation till andra organisationer.

Detta att staten på olika sätt söker påverka och styra marknader är måhända inget nytt. Redan i Lydekini excerpter till den Gamla Västgöotalagen står, till exempel, att läsa att ”den järnproducent som säljer undermåligt järn skall böta tre och sexton örtoger, och är järnet ej märkt med korrekt märke tilldelas han ytterligare tre och sexton örtoger i böter (min översättn.)” Denna lag, genom vilken järnproducenter som sålde undermåligt och omärkt järn belades med böter, är ett exempel på hur staten kan styra och påverka en specifik marknad. Men kan staten vara lika rättfram i sin marknadspåverkan idag? Både ja och nej.

Efter att ha introducerat problemet och överblickat olika samhällsvetenskapliga marknadsteoretiska perspektiv lägger författarna grunden för förståelsen av marknaderna och staten i nutid. I kapitel 2 redogör författarna för hur marknadspolitiken utvecklats ur en modell med relativt fria marknader där få interventioner skedde och där pragmatisk reglering genom samarbete i partsammansatta styrelser var normen. Mellan 1985–1995 tog nyliberala ideal och tron på en liten stat med fokus på så kallade kärnverksamheter plats. Under denna tid var det inte längre aktuellt med reglering genom partsammansatta styrelser; istället växte en ambition om att skapa perfekta marknader där konkurrensärenden hanteras i juridiska processer. Författarna menar att dagens system karaktäriseras av en stat som söker stötta och stärka förutsättningarna för att de så kallade kärnverksamheterna ska fungera i enighet med nationalekonomiska modeller för perfekta marknader.

I kapitel 3 studeras sedan omfattningen av den nutida marknadspolitiken. Kapitlet visar hur nära nog en fjärdedel av de statliga myndigheterna är vad författarna kallar marknadsmyndigheter som på olika sätt har till uppgift att påverka marknaderna. Författarna utgår från Ahrnes och Brunssons konceptualisering av partiella organisationer och beskriver marknadspåverkan i termer av de organisatoriska elementen regler, tillsyn, sanktioner, medlemskap (exempelvis i form av legitimationer eller certifikat) och hierarkier. Till detta lägger författarna produktion av informationsmaterial och utbildningar som ytterligare, normerande, påverkansformer Även dessa är hämtade från organisatoriska element och handlar om det författarna kallar mjuka påverkansmetoder. Genom att informera om ”situationer och tillstånd” och genom att avbilda

”hur saker och ting hänger ihop” (s. 86) i organisationsscheman, omvärldsanalyser eller prognoser kan marknadsstaten påverka marknaderna och marknadsaktörerna utan att ställa upp regler eller använda andra ”hårda” påverkansmetoder.

Dessa organisatoriska begrepp tillämpas på de 53 marknadsmyndigheter som författarna identifierat. Här demonstreras till exempel att regler och tillsyn är de två vanligast förekommande påverkansmetoderna vid sidan av information och avbildningar – det sistnämnda i form av utredningar eller prognoser. Här visas även hur marknadsmyndigheterna söker påverka utbud, produkter, efterfrågan eller transaktioner genom inflytande över hur, när eller var en transaktion kan äga rum. Författarna visar även att priset är ett marknadselement som sällan är utsatt för påverkan och de argumenterar för att detta ligger i linje med modern ekonomisk teori där priset (eller skärningspunkten mellan utbud och efterfrågan) är närmast heligt.

I kapitel 4 undersöks marknadsmyndigheternas relation till andra myndigheter, marknadsaktörer och överordnade organisationer såsom EU. Kapitlet fördjupar diskussionen kring dessa relationer genom att fokusera på hur Konsumentverket samarbetar med andra myndigheter och organisationer på kommunal- och EU-nivå och med säljare på flera marknader, samt hur myndigheten söker stödja konsumenter att bli bättre marknadsaktörer genom olika informationskampanjer eller genom att driva rättsprocesser mot säljare.

Även om väldigt få myndigheter försöker påverka marknaderna genom att styra prissättningen så finns det några marknadsmyndigheter som har detta som uppgift. I Kapitel 5 ger författarna en detaljerad bild av två sådana myndighet, nämligen Post- och Telestyrelsen och Energimarknadsinspektionen. Här får läsaren inblick i processerna genom vilka dessa två myndigheter ålades att stödja marknaden och främja konkurrensen genom att reglera prissättningen på tillgången till infrastruktur i form av tele- och elnät. I kapitlet visas även hur friktioner uppstått i samband med myndigheternas förhandsreglering av marknaderna och hur säljarna på telekommunikationsmarknaden lyckats påverka en av dessa marknadsmyndigheter till att förändra sina prisregleringsmodeller och organisationssammansättning i linje med säljarnas önskemål.

Marknadsstatens genomlysning av nutidens marknadspolitik visar hur staten ofta försöker påverka marknaderna genom otydliga beslut och skrivelser som sedan konkretiseras på myndighetsnivå. Det blir tydligt att marknadsstaten som fenomen inte är en sak, utan ett diversifierat fält av olika myndigheter som alla arbetar med olika förutsättningar och strategier. Det blir också tydligt att merparten av den marknadspåverkan som görs inte kommer direkt från staten utan från byråkraten, i den bemärkelsen att det är tjänstepersonerna på de olika myndigheterna som konkretiserar, utvecklar och designar metoderna. Dessa byråkrater har att arbeta med olika instruktioner i syfte att värna olika värden. Många av dessa myndigheter arbetar till exempel för att stärka konkurrensen på marknaderna, men vissa har istället i uppgift att främja tillväxt, förnyelse, hälsa, säkerhet, integritet, yttrandefrihet eller mångfald. Vidare finns det bland marknadsmyndigheterna myndigheter som inte nödvändigtvis ser sig själva som marknadspåverkare, men som i sina uppdrag ändå påverkar marknader på olika sätt – exempel på detta är myndigheter som främst har till ansvar att värna andra värden

men som genom sin rätt att legitimera en yrkesgrupp eller genom sina avbildningar ändå påverkar en eller flera marknader. Dessa ofrivilliga marknadsmyndigheter är en intressant konstruktion från författarnas sida som dock i många fall lider av att vara allt för vag för att vara övertygande. Detta då avbildningarna lyfts fram som något "som kan antas forma föreställningarna om marknadernas beskaffenhet och utveckling." (s. 109) vilket öppnar upp för frågan om detta verkligen handlar om påverkan och organisering. Är det kanske så att avbildningar är en naturlig del av en myndighets arbete som endast kan antas ha en latent eller sporadisk påverkans effekt?

Marknadsstaten visar på hur marknader generellt "behöver spelregler och övervakning: någon som håller ordning och som försvarar inte bara de strikt ekonomiska värdena." (ss. 217–18). Staten är, genom sina olika marknadsmyndigheter, en viktig aktör i detta ordningsskapande. Att staten så att säga lägger sig i marknaderna betyder dock inte att staten inte agerar utifrån en stark tro på den rena marknaden. I själva verket stöder flertalet marknadsmyndigheter olika marknader i syfte att hjälpa dem efterlikna den teoretiska perfekta marknaden, bland annat genom Konsumentverkets och Konkurrensverkets arbete för att utbilda medvetna och rationella konsumenter och för att främja konkurrensen på marknaderna. Detta är grunden för det tvetydiga svaret ovan. Statens marknadsmyndigheter är till en del mycket rättframma och aggressiva i sin påverkan på vissa marknader och i vissa situationer. Det handlar bland annat om hur myndigheter sätter upp regler eller drar olika säljare inför domstol. Relationen mellan stat och marknad är dock inte enkelriktad. Staten agerar i stor utsträckning mot marknaderna med olika former av hårda och mjuka påverkansmetoder, men staten reagerar också på vad marknadens aktörer säger och gör. *Marknadsstaten* målar upp en bild av hur staten agerar och organiserar marknader för att få dem att efterlikna rena marknader, men också hur marknaderna agerar mot staten för att nå liknande syften.

Marknadsstaten ger läsaren en god inblick i hur marknadspolitiken ser ut i tal och handling och författarna lyckas visa på att idén om marknader och organisationer som varandras motsatser är missvisande. Istället framträder här, genom de interventioner som staten lagt på dem, marknad efter marknad som partiella organisationer. Genom att bringa insikt i vad myndigheterna faktiskt gör när de söker påverka de marknader de ansvarar för ger *Marknadsstaten* ett riktigt intressant bidrag till diskussionerna kring vår tids marknadspolitik.

Tobias Olofsson, Uppsala universitet

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